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## The old elite against the new state: the fall of the Kibrıslızade family and their struggle with the Committee of Union and Progress

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With the promulgation of the constitution for the second time in July 1908,<sup>1</sup> the power struggle in Ottoman politics took a new shape. In the past, without the existence of political parties, political clashes in Ottoman administrative ranks were mostly restricted to mid to higher bureaucratic circles, away from the public eye. However, with the implementation of multi-party electoral administration, public opinion became a crucial element in Ottoman politics. As a result, political life was reshaped into a new competitive field in which different elements based on socially diverse groups contended for authority and popularity. The main protagonists of the constitutional revolution were the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a new entity in politics that had almost no base in the ruling elite of the past. The CUP mostly consisted of mid-ranked state servants and military personnel, and the revolution they created led to an elite transformation in the Ottoman Empire. This transformation set in motion a discernible pattern that continued throughout the second constitutional period, with remnants of the old elite gradually aligning as opposition forces against the CUP.

According to Gaetano Mosca, whether in a primitive or modern social structure, as a rule people are divided into two classes: the ruling and the ruled. The first class, which is smaller in number, holds political power and instruments and enjoys privileges, while the less organized and crowded second class depends on them for their very existence.<sup>2</sup> If this theory is applied to Ottoman society, the bureaucracy emerges as the ruling class while the masses of ordinary people – ‘reaya’ – stand as the ruled.

In his elite theory, Vilfredo Pareto posits that as a ‘physiological law’, the elites of a society are in a state of constant flux, with one ascending while another is descending.<sup>3</sup> At the dawn of the twentieth century, a novel force emerged from the Ottoman Balkans-Roumelia, which was predominantly comprised of mid-ranked state officials and military officers who had undergone a formal military education. These individuals constituted the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), many of whom were the founders of the Ottoman Freedom Society (Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti) founded in Salonica, prior to its merger with the CUP. On the other hand, a particular group of inhabitants in the capital city, the descendants of the traditional elite whose fathers had already failed in their power struggle against Abdülhamid II, were preparing

a last move to regain their previously lost privileges. This group included, but was not limited to, notable figures such as Prince Sabahaddin,<sup>4</sup> who fled the country with his father Mahmud Celaleddin Pasha due to Mahmud Celaleddin's discontent with Abdülhamid II, Damat Şerif Pasha, Damat Ferid Pasha, Nazim Pasha, the son of Çerkes (Circassian) İsmail Pasha and members of the Kibrislizade family. These kinds of elites and their families, who had been marginalized during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II entered into open conflict with the CUP soon after the proclamation of the Second Constitution. Many of their members were killed, forced into exile or excluded from political life. Nazim Pasha, for example, was assassinated during the Raid on the Porte in January 1913,<sup>5</sup> while Damat Şerif Pasha fled to Paris and lived in long exile to escape political pressure.<sup>6</sup> The Kibrislizade family shared the fate of such a traditional elite, yet the variety of hardships they simultaneously endured makes them a distinctive case. Two male members were forced to flee abroad, while another was shot dead – a convergence of tragedies that set them apart from other families of the period. Examining the fate of the Kibrislizade family thus offers a particularly illuminating case, providing insights into the struggles and sufferings of other similar elite families of the era.

Despite being excluded from state power, many members of the traditional elite still maintained their cultural and moral codes shaped over decades in Istanbul, the Ottoman capital city, along with their wealth and their network among the other elites. This work aims to investigate the Kibrislizade family and their role in the opposition against the CUP in the context of the elite reaction to the power changeover in the second constitutional era of the Ottoman Empire.

Despite the considerable volume of scholarship on the Committee of Union and Progress and the broader processes of state transformation during the Second Constitutional Era, the political opposition has remained comparatively understudied. This article seeks to address that gap by focusing on a virtually overlooked opposition element – the Kibrislizade family – and tracing the political trajectory they pursued. The study introduces new archival evidence and family-based documentation that have not been utilized in previous research. By analyzing the Kibrislizades' opposition to the CUP, the article offers original perspectives on elite transition, political exclusion and the contested nature of the empire's transformation under the CUP rule.

### **The Kibrislizade family and their role during the proclamation of the constitution**

According to Pareto, the transition in Europe's ruling elite was from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie, whose roots often lay in the former aristocracy.<sup>7</sup> However, the concept of elite transformation in Ottoman society followed a different trajectory. The Ottoman elite predominantly consisted of bureaucrats. Some inherited their titles from their families, while others were ordinary individuals who ascended to higher ranks during periods of crisis that led to the removal of part of the existing elite. This dual dynamic is exemplified within the Kibrislizade family. On the maternal side, Kibrisli (the Cypriot) Mehmed Emin Pasha<sup>8</sup> represents the continuity of inherited prestige, while on the paternal side, Morali (the Morean) Tosun Pasha embodies the ascent of individuals who capitalized on transformative moments. Morali (the Morean) Tosun Pasha advanced his career during the army modernization efforts initiated by

Mahmud II,<sup>9</sup> a time defined by sweeping reforms and intense conflict between progressive modernizers and the entrenched traditional elite. These reforms not only reshaped the Ottoman military but also recalibrated the pathways to power within the empire, enabling figures like Tosun Pasha to rise through the ranks and contribute to the shifting dynamics of the Ottoman bureaucracy.

Mosca argues that within any ruling class, one or a couple of dominant figures can always be described as 'at the helm of the state'. This individual, however, is not necessarily the highest-ranking or most visibly powerful person in the official hierarchy.<sup>10</sup> Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha, the grandfather of the Kıbrıslı family and a three-time Grand Vizier, exemplifies this type of leadership in the Ottoman context. Known for his personal qualities of integrity and strictness, Mehmed Emin Pasha was a commanding and influential figure within the Ottoman bureaucracy. Although he held the position of grand vizier three times, his opposition to high salaries and the entrenched bribery within the bureaucracy led to his terms being relatively short at no more than fifteen months. Nevertheless, his political acumen, diplomatic skill and authoritative presence allowed him to maintain significant influence, even when he was not officially in power.<sup>11</sup> In line with Mosca's description, Mehmed Emin Pasha, while not always at the top of the bureaucratic structure, wielded considerable authority as a dominant 'alpha' figure within the Ottoman elite.

Tosun Pasha, who originated from a non-elite background and ascended to prominence through his military career, strategically reinforced his family's social standing through marriage alliances. As the first-generation elite of his lineage, he solidified ties with a distinguished and well-established family by arranging the marriage of his son,<sup>12</sup> Mustafa Sadreddin Bey,<sup>13</sup> to Hatice Atiye Hanım, the daughter of Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha.<sup>14</sup> This union resulted in six children: three sons – Tefvik Bey, Şevket Bey, and Nazım Bey – and three daughters – Azize Hanım, Refika Hanım and Müzeyyen Hanım.<sup>15</sup> In his military career, Mustafa Sadreddin Bey rose to the rank of general (pasha) and his family, who lived in a mansion on the shores of the Bosphorus which was inherited from Atiye Hanım's father, Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha, became a renowned household of Istanbul. During the era of the Ottoman Empire's constitutional transformation, the Kıbrıslı Mansion served as a prominent gathering place for influential figures of the period, hosting notable personalities such as the Ottoman poet Yahya Kemal Beyatlı and the French intellectual Pierre Loti (Louis Marie Julien).<sup>16</sup>

During the constitutional revolution against Sultan Abdülhamid II's autocratic regime, the three sons of Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha – Tefvik, Şevket and Nazım – emerged as significant supporters of the constitutional movement. Among the brothers, Tefvik and Nazım served as cavalry officers in Istanbul, while Şevket Bey pursued a career in law. All three brothers were well-educated and prominent members of Istanbul society. The family's connection to the opposition movement was further strengthened through their kinship with Nureddin Ferruh Bey (Alkend), a distinguished man of letters of Cypriot-Turkish origin, who had himself experienced the repressive nature of Abdülhamid II's regime when he was imprisoned for three months based solely on unsubstantiated allegations. Nureddin Ferruh Bey, who had married into the family, resided with them in their mansion during this period.<sup>17</sup>

Nureddin Ferruh Bey recounts that on the day the constitution was proclaimed, 23 July 1908, he attended a meeting organized by Tefvik Bey and Şevket Bey, with

the participation of Selim Sırrı Bey (Tarcan).<sup>18</sup> During this gathering, the attendees discussed the conspicuous lack of public enthusiasm and activity in Istanbul, in stark contrast to the widespread celebrations and mass gatherings observed in Roumelia. The city appeared indifferent, as though unaware of the revolution's significance. Consequently, the participants resolved to undertake actions aimed at galvanizing the civil population of Istanbul and awakening revolutionary fervor. The following day, the group convened in the city center and proceeded to Beyazıt Square, a bustling location near the Ministry of War. The reformists addressed crowd there, announcing plans for a mass rally to be held the next day. This rally took place as intended, and similar efforts were repeated on subsequent days. Through these activities, the group significantly contributed to fostering a revolutionary spirit among the general populace of Istanbul.<sup>19</sup> Tevfik Bey, during his tenure as the Ottoman Second Military Attaché in Paris, corroborated his role in these pro-revolutionary efforts in an interview with the Parisian press. He revealed that in the days following the proclamation of the constitution, he had intervened to disrupt a counter-revolutionary demonstration by addressing a crowd of nearly two thousand people.<sup>20</sup>

Despite the initial unity following the proclamation of the constitution, political differences among the revolutionaries soon began to surface. From the moment of his arrival in Ottoman lands, Prince Sabahaddin – founder of the Society for Private Enterprise and Decentralization (*Teşebbüs-i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti*) and a member of the Ottoman royal family – faced discrimination from members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), including from prominent figures such as Dr Nazım Bey.<sup>21</sup> Beneath the surface of the revolutionary euphoria, tensions persisted between the liberal faction led by Prince Sabahaddin and the CUP. In an effort to present a unified front, both groups temporarily merged under the banner of the CUP.<sup>22</sup> However, this union proved short-lived, as ideological divergences soon reemerged, ultimately dividing the revolutionaries into two opposing political camps. Paradoxically, the deepest crack between the two political camps was not the ideological issues such as divergences over the degree of state centralization. It was a rather concrete and emergency matter. The CUP had decided to keep Abdülhamid II on the throne while the liberals opposed this idea. According to Sabahaddin Bey, the uncompromising attitude of the Liberals towards Sultan Abdülhamid II was seen as treachery by CUP members.<sup>23</sup>

One of the key factors contributing to the division between the two factions was the CUP's inclination to establish itself as the dominant political force following the revolution. Among the liberals concerned about the CUP's electoral strategy were the Kırıslızade brothers. In an effort to dispel uncertainties, certain liberal figures designated Kırıslızade Şevket Bey as their representative and tasked him with engaging CUP officials to inquire about the party's electoral policies. Şevket Bey subsequently met with Bahaeddin Şakir, a prominent CUP figure, and sought clarification regarding the CUP's stance on the electoral process. However, Bahaeddin Şakir refused to disclose any information and warned him against becoming involved in electoral matters.<sup>24</sup> This response underscored the CUP's reluctance to allocate parliamentary seats to liberal elements and further reinforced concerns about its monopolization of political power.

Following this meeting, this particular group of liberals began deliberating on the formation of an opposition party. Nureddin Ferruh Bey reached out to Prince

Sabahaddin Bey, expressing his views on establishing such a party and inviting him to assume its leadership. Although Prince Sabahaddin Bey declined direct involvement in politics, he facilitated a gathering with his trusted associates, Fazıl Bey, Mahir Said Bey and Celaleddin Arif Bey. The Kıbrıslızade brothers Tevfik Bey and Şevket Bey also participated in these discussions. The attendees collectively agreed on the need for an opposition party and swiftly began drafting the party program and the party's internal regulations. Following the creation of party documents, the first comprehensive meeting of the party, in which almost one hundred people participated, was held in the Kıbrıslı Mansion. The party was named the *Ahrar Fırkası* (the Liberal Party – LP).<sup>25</sup> By hosting this gathering and actively participating in the party's founding efforts, the Kıbrıslızade family positioned itself as a central actor in the emerging opposition against the CUP. An intriguing contrast emerges when considering the foundational moments of the LP and the CUP. One of the CUP's two key founding components, the Ottoman Freedom Society (*Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti*), was established in a modest public garden in Salonica,<sup>26</sup> a stark contrast to the Ahrar Party's founding meeting at the Kıbrıslı Mansion, a grand private residence along the Bosphorus. This difference in the two settings underscores the social and economic distinctions between the two movements, reflecting possible divergences in their political attitude and approaches.

### The polarization after the founding of the Liberal Party and the growing pressure on the family (1909–1911)

Following the establishment of the constitutional regime under the leadership of Kâmil Pasha, the newly reconstituted Ottoman administration encountered significant challenges in international politics. In October 1908, a series of crises unfolded, including Bulgaria's declaration of independence, Greece's annexation of Crete and Austria-Hungary's formal annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, all of which placed considerable strain on the Kâmil Pasha government. Shortly thereafter, on 30 December 1908, in the wake of the Ottoman Parliament's first convening after a 33-year intermission, Hüseyin Cahid Bey – a prominent journalist and the CUP deputy – submitted an interpellation questioning the government's foreign policy, particularly regarding recent geopolitical setbacks. With the intervention of the CUP's central committee, on 13 January 1909, Kâmil Pasha successfully navigated the crisis and secured a vote of confidence.<sup>27</sup> It was not the first conflict between Kâmil Pasha and the CUP; this particular vote of confidence, however, prompted him to align more closely with the opposition, the Liberal Party (LP). Ismail Kemal Bey, an opposition deputy of Albanian origins, asserts that, despite the confidence shown in parliament, the leaders of the CUP followed a policy to weaken Kâmil Pasha's political authority while increasing their own influence.<sup>28</sup> When the Kâmil Pasha government was overthrown by the parliament following a cabinet crisis, which included the assignment of Nazım Pasha, a close friend of Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha,<sup>29</sup> to the Ministry of War, all ties between the CUP and the liberals collapsed.<sup>30</sup>

During these events, the Kıbrıslızadeler brothers were active in Istanbul's social life. Tevfik Bey's duty to oversee the security of a state-held horse race taking place in the city in December 1908 not only reflected his sportsmanship but also demonstrated

the trust placed in him by the state authorities of the time.<sup>31</sup> Nazım Bey's role in organizing a cotillion for Aghkadasser, an Armenian Society in February 1909 highlights how well he was received by various communities within Istanbul society.<sup>32</sup> The collapse of the Kâmil Pasha government also marked a change for the Kıbrıslızaade family, who were the hosts of the foundation of the only opposition party against the CUP, the LP. Kâmil Pasha was an ally of the LP, and Nazım Pasha, whose assignment sparked the crisis, was a close friend of Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha and his family. The Kıbrıslızaade brothers naturally became a significant element in the opposition, which included broad involvement from Istanbul elites.

Following the foundation of the new government led by Huseyin Hilmi Pasha, who was known to be a pro-CUP figure in the period, the clash between the opposition and the CUP became fierce. The opposition not only criticized the government through media outlets under its control, but also organized mass rallies to challenge the political authority who were under the influence of the CUP.<sup>33</sup> In early March 1909, about a month before the 31 March Incident, Tevfik Bey applied for the position of second military attaché in Paris, with the intention of studying political science and law.<sup>34</sup> The Grand Vizierate granted his request,<sup>35</sup> seizing the opportunity to send a dissident away.

The absence of Tevfik Bey might have been perceived as a gain by circles within the CUP. However, the real challenge came from the younger son of the Kıbrıslızaade family, Şevket Bey. Despite his youth, Şevket was bold and confrontational, and his stance culminated in a dramatic gesture: he challenged Hüseyin Cahid Bey, deputy of Istanbul and lead columnist of *Tanin*, to a duel. According to Cavid Bey's account, on 30 March 1909, Kıbrıslızaade Şevket Bey challenged Hüseyin Cahid Bey to a duel. He brought with him two witnesses: Müfid Bey, the deputy of Argiri (Gjirokastër) and a well-known Albanian separatist, and another Albanian deputy. The confrontation took place at the offices of the *Tanin* newspaper, where Cavid Bey happened to be present as well. Addressing Şevket Bey and his companions, Cavid Bey stated that dueling had no place in Ottoman society, and even if it did, Hüseyin Cahid Bey would not accept such a challenge. After hearing this, Şevket Bey and his group left the *Tanin* Office.<sup>36</sup>

On 13 April 1909, a military uprising (the '31 March Incident') broke out in Istanbul.<sup>37</sup> Tevfik Bey was in Paris at the time of the upheaval, while the roles of Şevket and Nazım Bey during those chaotic days remain unclear. The mutiny was ultimately suppressed by the Rumelian forces, after which the National Assembly voted to depose Sultan Abdülhamid II and declared Reşad Efendi the new monarch, who ascended the throne as Sultan Mehmed Reşad V.<sup>38</sup> The CUP leveraged this opportunity to consolidate its power within Ottoman politics and eliminate its rivals. In the wake of the uprising, a broad political purge ensued: the LP was dissolved,<sup>39</sup> and many opposition figures either fled abroad or adopted a more cautious political stance. During this period, on 15 December 1909, Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha, the patriarch of the Kıbrıslızaade family, retired from active service by his own request after 43 years of military service.<sup>40</sup>

Although Nazım Bey, as a military officer, appeared to distance himself from direct political engagement during this period, he nonetheless maintained a prominent presence in Istanbul's elite social life. His attendance at the funeral of Madame Coûteaux, a member of the Levantine community,<sup>41</sup> underscores his continued ties

with the city's non-Muslim populations and reflects the cosmopolitan dimensions of his personal network. In February 1910, he participated in the Italian Ball organized by the Italian Benevolent Society, an event attended by high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats, members of the diplomatic corps and foreign nationals residing in the capital.<sup>42</sup> Nazım Bey was also actively involved in organizing and competing in equestrian events reserved exclusively for military officers.<sup>43</sup> Notably, he secured second place in a race held on 1 May 1910 and achieved a significant victory by winning first place in the 3000-meter steeplechase on 27 May 1910.<sup>44</sup> These activities mark his active role within military social networks and the elite leisure culture of the capital.

During this period there was a total contrast between Nazım and Şevket. While Nazım Bey was mostly appearing in non-political events, his younger brother, Şevket Bey, was doing the opposite: he was a staple in opposition circles. According to Mevhibe Celaleddin, the future wife of Şevket Bey, following the 31 March Incident and under the strict conditions of the imposed martial law, Şevket Bey joined the publishing efforts of the liberal journalist, Ahmed Samim Bey.<sup>45</sup> On 9 June 1910, Ahmed Samim Bey was assassinated, most likely by a supporter or a member of the CUP. The following day, his colleagues, including Şevket Bey, gathered at Hilal Matbaası, the printing house responsible for publishing Ahmed Samim Bey's newspaper. His body, placed in a coffin, was kept at the premises. When gendarmes arrived with the intention of seizing the coffin, Şevket Bey was the first to resist this attempt. Confronting the authorities, he reportedly declared, 'You cannot seize the coffin. If you intend to take it, shoot me first.' That night, the Kıbrıslı Mansion bore witness to another gathering of the opposition. Visibly shaken and emotionally distressed, Şevket Bey insisted on retaliatory action against the pro-CUP government. However, not all participants shared his bold stance. The meeting ultimately concluded with a more cautious decision – to publish a leaflet commemorating Ahmed Samim Bey and condemning the assassination.<sup>46</sup>

Despite the threat such a political climate posed, Şevket Bey, together with a group of like-minded friends, started to look for a printing house that could publish such a special newspaper. Yet, almost all press outlets hesitated to take part in such a bold act. However, Hilmi Bey, the publisher of *İştirak* – the first and only socialist journal of the Ottoman period – agreed to collaborate with the liberals on this matter.<sup>47</sup> This unlikely but meaningful alliance brought together two distinct political currents in a joint stand against a political assassination.

The planned press effort materialized on 13 June 1910, with the publication of *İştirak*'s 17th issue. Ahmed Samim Bey's last will, addressed to Şevket Bey with the opening words, 'My brother Şevket', was included in its pages. In his will, it became clear that Ahmed Samim had already informed Şevket Bey about the threats he had received from supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress. He requested to be buried in a specific village cemetery on the Black Sea coast of Istanbul and explicitly asked that no elaborate funeral procession be organized on his behalf. He also expressed a profound sense of *tevekkül* – a spiritual state of surrender and trust in fate – and declared that he was ready to face death.<sup>48</sup> The lead article was also written by Şevket Bey and bore his signature beneath the column. It was addressed to Asım Bey, the father of Ahmed Samim Bey. From the article, it becomes clear that the government had prohibited the fulfillment of Ahmed Samim's last will and did

not permit his burial in the Demirciköy Cemetery, where he had wished to be laid to rest. He further stated that he possessed knowledge of at least two individuals who had threatened Ahmed Samim Bey and affirmed his determination to submit their names to the authorities.<sup>49</sup> It can be concluded that the death of a close friend – and the CUP's likely responsibility in the assassination – must have intensified Şevket Bey's hostility toward the CUP. Yet, the CUP would soon go even further, taking the life of one of Şevket Bey's own kin.

It is likely that Şevket Bey married Mevhibe Hanım, a member of the Ottoman royal family, sometime after the assassination of his close friend, Ahmed Samim Bey. This marriage strengthened his place among the Istanbul elite. Around the same time, the couple went on an extended honeymoon. They visited several places, including Cyprus and Paris where Şevket's brother, Tevfik Bey, was stationed.<sup>50</sup> For Şevket Bey, who had just lost a friend to a political murder, this journey was also a way to step back from the tense world of Ottoman politics.

Despite his father-in-law's appeals to remain detached from political affairs, Şevket Bey did not refrain from political engagement, nor did his volatile temperament show signs of abating.<sup>51</sup> On 30 April 1911, *Tanin* published an editorial penned by Hüseyin Cahid Bey, in which he lamented the decline of political decorum and referenced 'school boys' who had challenged Ahmet Rıza Bey, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, to a duel. Although the article did not mention Şevket Bey by name, he perceived the remarks as a veiled reference to himself.<sup>52</sup> Enraged by what he considered a public affront, the following day Şevket Bey confronted Hüseyin Cahid Bey at the entrance of the *Meclis-i Mebusan*. After requesting a brief conversation, which Cahit Bey declined, Şevket Bey led him aside near the building's entrance and produced a copy of the contested editorial. He expressed his indignation at what he interpreted as a personal attack and, without further provocation, struck Hüseyin Cahid Bey twice in the face. The assault was quickly interrupted by nearby police officers, who apprehended Şevket Bey and placed him in custody before the situation could escalate further. In his defence, Şevket argued that he did not batter Hüseyin Cahid Bey because of his political position – a deputy of the nation – but due to his identity as an author in the media.<sup>53</sup> A while after being taken into custody, Şevket Bey's release was announced by the media.<sup>54</sup>

This incident – Şevket Bey's physical assault against a deputy of the ruling party – may have served as a symbolic morale boost for opposition circles who felt increasingly stifled by the mechanisms of state power. In the following week, the satirical newspaper, *Züğürt*, covered the event with a tone of biting irony. Among its satirical content, the paper featured a series of seemingly imaginary interviews with prominent political figures. In one such fictional exchange, a governor was quoted as saying, 'These are the tyrannical notables; their expulsion from Istanbul is absolutely necessary.'<sup>55</sup> Though couched in humor, this fabricated remark clearly reflected the underlying class tensions between the CUP and the entrenched Istanbul elites. On the other hand, in his memoirs, Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, a pro-opposition figure of the period, interpreted Şevket Bey's assault as an act of retribution for an earlier incident in which Derviş Bey, a CUP deputy, had struck İsmail Kemal Bey, a member of the opposition.<sup>56</sup>

During this period, Tevfik Bey was residing in Paris and continued to fulfill his diplomatic duties with regularity. Archival records and press coverage from the time

offer limited information about his activities. However, one particular event he attended appears to carry symbolic and political significance. During the visit of Yusuf İzzeddin Bey, the heir apparent to the Ottoman throne, to Le Creusot, Tevfik Bey was among those selected to accompany him.<sup>57</sup> In an imperial context like the Ottoman Empire, being company to the heir could offer not only symbolic capital but also potential advantages for one's political and bureaucratic career. Le Creusot was one of France's major armament production centers, and given the CUP's growing military cooperation with Germany, this visit may have carried a subtle anti-CUP implication. It is important to note that, as evidenced by his statements in 1912, Tevfik Bey opposed the Ottoman-German military cooperation and advocated for alignment with France instead.<sup>58</sup> Available accounts also indicate that Tevfik Bey, while in Paris, had been in contact with Damat Şerif Pasha, a leading figure from the imperial dynasty and a noted critic of the CUP.<sup>59</sup>

### Twilight for the Kıbrıslızade family

The year 1912 marked the peak of the political struggle between the liberals and the CUP. On 21 November 1911, the opposition succeeded in establishing its second political party, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası* (the Liberty and Accord Party – LAP). In a by-election for a parliamentary seat in Istanbul, the LAP narrowly won the race in the second round by a single vote. This victory provided a significant morale boost for the opposition. At the time, the ongoing Italo-Turkish War had already placed the CUP in a vulnerable and unpopular position, and the opposition appeared to be capitalizing on the CUP's inability to manage both domestic and international crises. In response, the CUP decided to call for snap elections before losing further control over the unfolding political landscape. To achieve this objective, the CUP adopted a distinctly Machiavellian approach, securing a constitutional amendment through expansive interpretations of certain constitutional provisions and disregarding elements of the parliament's internal regulations. Despite mounting criticism over the CUP's instrumentalization of state power for partisan ends, the party secured a sweeping electoral victory, capturing nearly all parliamentary seats. Confronted with the CUP's coercive political maneuvers, the opposition began seeking alliances with disaffected elements within the military and Albanian separatist factions.<sup>60</sup>

During the elections, Şevket Bey actively contributed to the opposition's campaign. As a member of the Istanbul elite, he traveled to Anatolia to garner support from rural populations. His activities did not go unnoticed, state officials monitored him closely. According to official reports, he spoke at a conference in Amasya, where he voiced opposition claims that held the CUP solely responsible for both domestic and foreign failures of the state. It was also reported that he addressed non-Muslim communities, warning them about the CUP's Turkification policies and their alleged plans to relocate non-Muslims in line with these policies. The governor of Sivas recommended that the Ministry of the Interior consider detaining Şevket Bey through the Court Martial, should the Ministry choose to. It appears from the relevant report that Şevket Bey may have continued his election campaign in the Black Sea region of Anatolia.<sup>61</sup>

Despite the increasingly polarized political atmosphere, the Kıbrıslızade family was confronted with a more immediate personal concern. Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha's health

was deteriorating rapidly. Upon receiving word of his father's critical condition, Tevfik Bey tendered his resignation from his post as second military attaché in Paris and immediately returned to Istanbul. On 22 June 1912, Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha passed away at the family mansion, surrounded by all his children.<sup>62</sup>

Nevertheless, Tevfik Bey's resignation may not have been solely motivated by familial concerns. Archival records suggest that during his service in Paris, he had been involved in research related to military aviation, a field of growing strategic importance. In this context, Tevfik Bey visited the REP (Robert Esnault-Pelterie) factory, a prominent French aviation manufacturer. He not only inspected the facilities but also facilitated a visit by the factory's director to Istanbul. As a result of this engagement, several Ottoman military pilots received training from the director, and the Ottoman government was able to procure aircraft from the firm at a 20 per cent discount.<sup>63</sup> It later emerged that, when the Ottoman government leaned towards purchasing aircraft and training pilots in cooperation with Germany, Tevfik Bey openly criticized this policy. Some French newspapers claimed that the underlying reason for Tevfik Bey's resignation was his disagreement with Mahmud Şevket Pasha, the Minister of War, who favored collaboration with Germany in the field of military aviation.<sup>64</sup>

Shortly after Tevfik Bey's return to Istanbul, the pro-CUP Said Pasha government was overthrown. On 22 July 1912, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, widely regarded as a more neutral and conciliatory figure, was appointed Grand Vizier. Nazım Pasha, a close associate of the late Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha, assumed the post of Minister of War. As a trusted figure in Nazım Pasha's circle, Tevfik Bey was promptly appointed aide-de-camp to the Minister.<sup>65</sup> On 8 October 1912, the First Balkan War erupted, a devastating blow to the Ottoman Empire barely weeks after the formation of the new government.<sup>66</sup> On the very day the First Balkan War broke out, a significant development regarding Tevfik Bey was recorded in the Ottoman archival documents. According to the record, Tevfik Bey, who had previously opposed the growing influence of the German military sphere in the Ottoman army, was decorated with the Legion of Honour Fifth Class by the French government.<sup>67</sup> This decoration held symbolic significance, reflecting Tevfik Bey's pro-Allies (Entente Powers) orientation in opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress's pro-German military alignment.

The first large-scale engagements between the Ottoman forces and the armies of the Balkan League, which unfolded around 23 October 1912, resulted in a heavy defeat for the Ottoman Empire. In an effort to stabilize the deteriorating military situation, Nazım Pasha and his headquarters relocated to Çerkezköy, a town situated closer to the Eastern Army's frontline. During this period, Tevfik Bey was also present alongside him. According to Gustav Hochwächter, a German military officer who volunteered to fight for the Ottomans during the First Balkan War, when he met Nazım Pasha aboard a train in Çerkezköy on 26 October 1912, Tevfik Bey was accompanying the Minister of War.<sup>68</sup> On 29 October, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha resigned from the grand vizierate, and Kâmil Pasha, a prominent figure among the liberals, was tasked with forming a new government. Kâmil Pasha retained Nazım Pasha as Minister of War in the cabinet he subsequently formed.

However, Nazım Pasha was unable to reorganize and strengthen the army effectively. Following the devastating defeat at Pınarhisar on 2 November, Ottoman forces

were compelled to retreat to Çatalca, a sanjak located merely 40 kilometers from Istanbul. After several unsuccessful Bulgarian offensives aimed at breaching the Çatalca defensive line, both sides eventually agreed to a ceasefire on 28 November and began negotiating a long-term armistice as a prelude to formal peace talks. The armistice was signed on 3 December 1912.<sup>69</sup> During this five-day period Tevfik Bey can be traced in the photos that the Ottoman delegation appear.<sup>70</sup> Due to his official capacity as the aide-de-camp to the Minister of War, Tevfik Bey was closely involved in the process and appeared to have exerted considerable effort throughout the course of this diplomatic initiative.

The armistice led to the London Peace Conference, where the Ottoman Empire was confronted with severe demands from the Great Powers of Europe. Among these, the demand for the cession of Edirne (Adrianople), a former imperial capital, was met with fierce opposition from the CUP, which was then in the opposition. In the absence of a functioning parliament, the government, seeking to share the political burden of this decision, referred the matter to the *Şura-yı Saltanat* (Council of the Sultanate), a traditional imperial advisory body with no constitutional standing. The *Şura-yı Saltanat* approved the peace terms proposed at the London Conference,<sup>71</sup> prompting the CUP to resolve to overthrow the government by means of a military coup, which was to take place the following day, 23 January 1913. During the successful coup attempt known as the Raid on the Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı Ali Baskını*), Tevfik Bey was fatally shot and killed, along with others, including the Minister of War, Nazım Pasha, who was also a friend to the Kıbrıslıade family.<sup>72</sup> After the raid Mahmud Şevket Pasha, a prominent military figure admired by the CUP, was assigned as the Grand Vizier.<sup>73</sup>

According to Mevhibe Celaleddin, following the raid, Şevket Bey was taken into custody at the Bekirağa Division, a detention facility within the Ministry of War, while Nazım Bey was held at the Ministry of Law Enforcement (*Zabtiye Nezareti*). Both were released after five days of detention. Şevket Bey returned to the Kıbrıslı Mansion, whereas Nazım Bey took refuge in the home of a Russian acquaintance, Lena Hanım, whom he would later marry.<sup>74</sup> However, the suffering of the Kıbrıslıade family was far from over. The new administration buried the bodies of Tevfik Bey and the two others killed during the raid in an undisclosed location. Despite all their efforts, the family was unable to learn the whereabouts of the burial site.<sup>75</sup> Under these grave circumstances, Şevket Bey's opposition to the CUP intensified. According to Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, during this period, the Kıbrıslı Mansion became a venue for meetings aimed at overthrowing Mahmud Şevket Pasha's government through another coup attempt.<sup>76</sup>

A couple of months after the raid, thanks to the efforts of the renowned poet Yahya Kemal Bey, a close friend of the family with strong ties to CUP members, the burial site of Tevfik Bey was finally identified.<sup>77</sup> Within this turbulent period, government forces raided the Kıbrıslı Mansion at dawn in order to confiscate a letter sent to Şevket Bey by a military officer sympathetic to the family. According to Mevhibe Hanım, she managed to destroy the letter just moments before it could be confiscated by law enforcement. However the raid was conducted after the government forces seized Şevket Bey's reply to the officer and due to this seized letter, government forces detained Şevket Bey.<sup>78</sup> In the meantime, Nazım Bey was also arrested<sup>79</sup>

presumably for military insubordination.<sup>80</sup> In her memoirs, Mevhibe Celeleddin recounts that she contacted Cemal Pasha, then serving as the *Muhafız* of Istanbul, the military commander responsible for maintaining public order in the capital. During the meeting, Talat Pasha, a leading figure of the CUP and former Minister of the Interior, was also present. Mevhibe Hanım requested the release of Şevket Bey, and Cemal Pasha assured her that if both Şevket and Nazım Bey agreed to leave Istanbul within 48 hours, the authorities would not interfere with their departure. This amounted to a tacitly sanctioned prison break. The prison break became successful and Şevket Bey left the country for Constantza in Romania while Nazım Bey sailed to Odesa, nowadays in Ukraine.<sup>81</sup> According to Pareto, elites, particularly those relegated to the opposition, tend over time to become 'effete', gradually losing the will to sustain active political struggle.<sup>82</sup> This pattern is observable in the case of Şevket Bey and Nazım Bey. Once they departed from the Ottoman realm, their commitment to opposition visibly declined. As reflected in the memoirs of Mevhibe Hanım, the brothers increasingly immersed themselves in the occupations and even the pleasures of daily life rather than maintaining their earlier engagement in oppositional activities.<sup>83</sup>

Tevfik was dead, and his brothers had been driven into exile. Approximately one year after their departure, the First World War broke out, rendering any opposition to the CUP virtually impossible under the harsh conditions of wartime. According to Mevhibe Celeleddin, Şevket and Nazım Bey reunited in Cyprus during the early phase of the war.<sup>84</sup> On the other hand Şevket Bey's contacts with Prince Sabahaddin during the First World War were mentioned in archive documents.<sup>85</sup> At the end of the First World War, the CUP dissolved itself, and its prominent leaders such as Talat Pasha, Cemal Pasha, and Enver Pasha left the country.<sup>86</sup> Therefore the organic rivalry between the Kıbrıslı family and the CUP had already ended when Şevket and Nazım left the land of the Ottoman Empire.

## Conclusion

As Pareto theorized, elite circulation is a hallmark of all complex societies, and the Ottoman Empire was no exception. Yet, the dynamics of elite change in the Ottoman context differed markedly from those in Europe. In contrast to European polities, where economic capital derived from production, trade and landownership underpinned elite power, in the Ottoman Empire the state itself was the primary source of wealth and authority. For an Ottoman Turk, access to state mechanisms meant access to land, revenue, patronage networks and political legitimacy.

Among the traditional elite families situated in Istanbul, the Kıbrıslı family, descendants of Kıbrıslı Mehmed Emin Pasha, who had served multiple times as Grand Vizier, stood out as a prominent example. These elites and their families included, among others, Prince Sabahaddin<sup>87</sup> and Lütfullah Bey,<sup>88</sup> the sons of Mahmud Celeleddin Pasha; Kâmil Pasha<sup>89</sup> and his son Said Pasha; Damat Şerif Pasha,<sup>90</sup> son of Kürt Said Pasha (former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1881, and President of the Council of State); Nazım Pasha, son of Circassian İsmail Pasha; and Damat Salih Pasha,<sup>91</sup> son of Hayreddin Pasha (the Tunisian). When confronted with a new generation of elites, predominantly mid-level military and civil officers of Rumelian origin, this traditional elite attempted a tactical alliance against the autocratic rule of Abdülhamid II who had distanced

himself from the traditional bureaucratic aristocracy of the former Sultans. However, the CUP intended to keep the Sultan on the throne, which the traditional elites were against, and harbored centralist ambitions and envisioned themselves as the new owner of state power, visions that clashed directly with the interests of the old elite.

Mosca argues that the tendency to be hereditary is common among ruling elites.<sup>92</sup> The constitutional revolution of 1908 offered the traditional elite a perceived chance to reclaim their previously lost political dominance. Yet the members of the CUP, far from being passive upstarts, were determined actors shaped by the revolutionary and militarized environment of the Balkans. The attempted alliance between the two groups soon gave way to open hostility. The Kibrıslızade family was a prominent force of this political clash. Their opposition to the CUP was not limited to being the main contributors to the founding of the Liberal Party in 1908: for instance Şevket Bey extended it to challenging CUP members to duels which echoed the culture of the European aristocracy. However, Şevket Bey's physical assault against Hüseyin Cahid at the entrance of the Parliament also demonstrated how he might lose control and leave aside the aristocratic codes.

Yet the CUP was more resolute and ready to utilize different cards on the table – drawing from their asymmetric warfare experience in Macedonia, they were able to use the legal, institutional and extralegal tools available. Their methods were not limited to political trickery, such as stretched interpretations of the constitutional law, but also extended to the use of violence. The assassinations of Hasan Fehmi Bey and Ahmed Samim Bey, a close friend of Şevket Bey, both critical journalists with ties to the opposition, demonstrated the capabilities of the CUP. For the CUP, this was not only a political rivalry but a blood feud that might guarantee the future of the Empire's existence. The Bab-ı Ali Raid, in which Nazım Pasha and Tevfik Bey, two members of the traditional elite, were killed, marked that the CUP was willing to ignore both legal and moral boundaries. Moreover, the consequences of intra-Young Turk factionalism attracted Mosca's attention; in his account, the Young Turks' rule during the constitutional era did not ease but rather exacerbated the 'disorganization and incapacity' of the Turkish elite, deficiencies already manifest under Sultan Abdülhamid II's thirty-year reign.<sup>93</sup>

The nature of the rivalry between the CUP and the Kibrıslızade family – an example of the traditional elite – bore the signatures of a deeper class-based struggle within the Ottoman socio-cultural structure. As an Istanbul-based family whose roots lay in lineage, elite networks and the cultural capital accumulated in the richest city of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, the Kibrıslızades were a representative of the ancien régime. In stark contrast, the CUP emerged from the descendants of the old *reaya*, the lower class in the classical Ottoman social structure. The rise of the CUP was a hallmark of the transition of the Ottoman elite and the inability of the traditional elites to address the challenges of modern times. The bitter rivalry between the Kibrıslızade family and the CUP provides a concrete example of class-based struggle in the late Ottoman era.

The fact that the Kibrıslızades, like other elites of the Ottoman ancien régime, lost their political initiative in the face of the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress demonstrates the irreversible transformation of the Ottoman ruling structure. Şevket and Nazım Bey, who had lost their brother Tevfik in the Raid on the Sublime Porte, did not serve in the Ottoman Army during the First World War. The war brought an

end to the CUP's dominance, paving the way for a new elite, the Kemalist bureaucracy, to emerge during the postwar nation-building process. Yet the devastation caused by successive wars also opened a social space in which members of the old elite could reassert themselves, not through direct political power, but by means of their inherited cultural capital and civic engagement. The Kibrıslızades adapted to this new context. Azize Kibrıslı, one of the daughters of the family, represented Ottoman women at the International Woman Suffrage Alliance Congress in Geneva in 1920,<sup>94</sup> while Nazım Bey became one of the founding figures of the Animal Protection Society in early Republican Turkey before his death in 1963.<sup>95</sup> The Kibrıslızade family's withdrawal from politics and their later devotion to issues such as women's and animal rights is consistent with Pareto's inference that declining elites tend to engage more in humanitarian and socially oriented endeavors.<sup>96</sup> As the Turkish society evolved and new social classes emerged, the Kibrıslızades, as remnants of the ancien régime, found their place within the ongoing reconfiguration of elite circulation and social hierarchies.

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## Notes

1. *Düstur - Tertib-i Sani*, [The Code: The Second Composition], vol. 1 (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1329 [1913–1914]), p.2.
2. Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939), p.50.
3. Vilfredo Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of the Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology* (New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1968), p.36.
4. For more information about Sabahaddin Bey and his works, see Prens Sabahaddin, *Gönüllü Sürgünden Zorunlu Sürgüne – Bütün Eserleri* [From Voluntary Exile to Forced Exile: His Complete Works] (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007).
5. 'Le Meurtre de Nazım Pacha' [The Murder of Nazım Pasha], *Le Temps*, no. 18883, 26 January 1913, pp.1, 2. For further information about Nazım Pasha's life, see Ender Korkmaz, *Harbiye Nazırı Nazım Paşa – 31 Mart Vakası – Balkan Harbi – Bab-ı Ali Baskını* [Nazım Pasha the Minister of War: the 31 March Incident – The Balkan War – The Raid on Sublime Porte] (Istanbul: Selenge Yayınları, 2021).
6. Ali Birinci, 'Şerif Paşa, Mehmed', in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* vol. 28 (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2010), pp.1–2.
7. Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of the Elites*, p.73.
8. Kemal Çiçek, 'Mehmed Emin Paşa, Kibrıslı', in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, 2003), pp.463, 464.

9. Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani* [The Ottoman Register], vol. 5 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), pp.1637–38.
10. Mosca, *Ruling Class*, pp.50, 51.
11. Çiçek, 'MEHMED EMİN PAŞA, Kıbrıslı', pp.463, 464.
12. According to Ottoman Archive documents, Tosun Pasha had three sons: Ali Rıza Bey, Mustafa Sadreddin Bey and Ahmed Tevfik Bey. The Memorandum Dated 3 September 1861, Sent from the Grand Vizierate to the Ministry of Finance: Presidency of The Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives, Istanbul (hereafter BOA), A.)MKT.MHM. 233/76. Another document shows that Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha's mother was Ayşe İffet Hanım (1850–1908). The Civil Registry Record Dated 8 July 1961, Showing the Heirs of Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha, 1961: Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha's Pension Inheritance Records, The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Defence (RTMND) Archive.
13. Mustafa Sadreddin Bey graduated from the military staff school in 1870. Mehmed Esad, *Mirat-ı Mekteb-i Harbiye* [A Mirror to the War College] (Istanbul: Artin Asadoryan Şirket-i Mürettibiye Matbaası, 1310 [1894–1895]), p.422.
14. Mevhibe Celaledin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki* [A Time Long Gone] (Istanbul: M. Sıralar Matbaası, 1953), p.98.
15. Tayfun Er, *Yalıdakiler* [Those at the Bosphorus Mansions] (Istanbul: Destek Yayınevi, 2009), pp.196, 197. Tevfik and Şevket are buried in the same grave. According to their tombstone, Tevfik Bey was born in 1879. However the birthdate of Şevket Bey is not mentioned on the tombstone. According to Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha's pension inheritance records his son Mehmet Nazım was born on 31 August 1880. The Civil Registry Record Dated 8 July 1961, Showing the Heirs of Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha: RTMND Archive.
16. Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, *Siyasi ve Edebi Portreler* [Political and Literary Portraits] (Istanbul: İstanbul Fetiş Cemiyeti, 2014), pp.101, 102.
17. Nureddin Ferruh Bey was also son of a high-level bureaucrat and married to Azize Hanım. Nureddin Ferruh Alkend, *Ahrar Fırkası ve II. Meşrutiyet Anıları* [The Liberal Party and Memoirs from the Second Constitutional Period] (Konya: Salkımsöğüt Yayınevi, 2017), pp.28–31. Er, *Yalıdakiler*, p.255.
18. Selim Sırrı Tarcan was a soldier with the rank of captain and a member of the CUP. He is known for his contribution to Turkey's involvement in the Olympics. For further information, see Mustafa Mutlu, 'Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor Hayatında Selim Sırrı Tarcan (1874–1957)' [Selim Sırrı Tarcan (1874–1957) in the Life of Physical Education and Sports], *Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no. 32 (2020), pp.584–615.
19. Alkend, *Ahrar Fırkası ve II. Meşrutiyet Anıları*, pp.30–33.
20. 'Opinion Publique' [Public Opinion], *La Patrie Creole*, no. 3666, 15 April 19, 12, p.1.
21. Mahir Said Pekmen, *31 Mart Hatıraları – İsyân Günlerinde Bir Muhalif* [Memoirs of 31 March – A Dissident in Days of Revolt] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), p.42.
22. Hüseyin Cahid Bey, 'Adem-i Merkeziyet' [Decentralization], *Tanin*, no. 35 (1908), p.1; Pekmen, *31 Mart Hatıraları*, p.64.
23. Prens Sabahaddin, *İttihat ve Terakki'ye Açık Mektuplar -Mesleğimiz Hakkında Üçüncü Son Bir İzah* [Open Letters to the Committee of Union and Progress – A Final Third Clarification Regarding Our Political Stance] (Istanbul: Mahmutbey Matbaası, 1327 [1911–1912]), p.24.
24. Alkend, *Ahrar Fırkası ve II. Meşrutiyet Anıları*, pp.40, 41.
25. *Ibid.*, p.44.
26. The Ottoman Freedom Society accepted new members at Mithat Şükrü Bey's residence, a modest house in Salonica, where registrations were conducted under strict secrecy. Mithat Şükrü Bleda, *İmparatorluğun Çöküşü* [The Fall of the Empire] (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973), pp.21–23.
27. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi [Grand National Assembly of Türkiye] (ed.), *Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi* [Proceedings of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies], Period 1 (vol. 1, Ankara: TBMM Yayınevi, 1982), pp.80, 175–78; Süleyman Kani İrtem, *31 Mart İsyanı ve Hareket Ordusu – Abdülhamid'in Selanik Sürgünü* [The 31 March Rebellion and the Action Army – Abdulhamid's Exile to Salonica] (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2003), p.67.

28. İsmail Kemal Bey, *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey* (London: Constable, 1920), p.322.
29. Mevhibe Celaledin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki*, p.202.
30. For a detailed narration of the crisis, see Ender Korkmaz, 'The Ottoman Government Crisis of 10–13 February 1909 and the Press Reaction', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 59, no. 5 (2023), pp.696–712, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2022.2139684>.
31. The document indicates that it was decided that Captain Süleyman Tevfik Bey should be responsible for the security measures of the horse race to be held on Büyükdere Avenue on 5 December. The document also states that twenty police officers, including one commissioner from the Beyoğlu Police Directorate, were to be present on Büyükdere Avenue in clean uniforms, and that they were to carry out their duties at the locations designated by Süleyman Tevfik Bey, in the manner he would specify: Document Sent from the Ministry of Public Security to the Beyoğlu Police Directorate on 24 December 1908, BOA. ZB. 622/55.
32. 'Le Bal Aghkadasser' [The Aghkadasser Ball], *Stamboul*, no. 80 (1909), p.2.
33. These kind of rallies might be traced through the Ottoman media outlets of the period. As a couple of examples 'Miting' [Meeting], *Serbesti*, no. 91 (1909), p.4; 'Talebe-i Ulum Mitingi' [Students' Meeting], *İkdam*, no. 5302 (1908), p.3.
34. Memorandum Sent from the Ministry of War to the Grand Vizierate on 4 March 1909, BOA. İ. HB. 417/14, Folio 1. Tevfik's grandfather, Mehmed Emin Pasha, also studied in Paris: Çiçek, 'Mehmed Emin Paşa, Kıbrıslı', p.463.
35. The Imperial Decree (Irade-i Seniyye) Issued on 11 March 1909, in Response to the Memorandum of the Grand Vizierate Dated 10 March 1909, BOA. İ. HB. 417/14, Folio 2.
36. Cavid Bey, *Meşrutiyet Ruznamesi*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2016), p.27.
37. For further information about the uprising, see Ender Korkmaz, *31 Mart Vakası: Belgeler ve Tanıklıklarla* [The 31 March Incident: With Documents and Testimonies] (Istanbul: Kronik Yayınları, 2025). Sina Akşin, *31 Mart Olayı* [The 31 March Incident] (Istanbul: Imge Kitabevi, 2015).
38. Circular Sent by the Grand Vizierate to the Provinces, Sanjaks Not Affiliated with Provinces, and Special-Status Subordinate Units, Dated 27 April 1909: BOA. A. VRK. 892/9.
39. Similar to Tevfik Bey, Nureddin Ferruh Bey, the son-in-law of the Kıbrıslı family, was abroad, visiting Egypt at the time of the uprising. Alkend, *Ahrar Fırkası ve II. Meşrutiyet Anıları*, p.113.
40. Dossier on the Imperial Decree for the Retirement of Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha, 1909: BOA. İ. AS. 101/34.
41. 'Les funéailles de Madame Richard Coûteaux' [The Funeral of Madame Richard Coûteaux], *La Turquie*, 5, no. 18 (1910), p.2.
42. 'Le Bal Italien' [the Italian Ball], *Le Turquie*, no. 30 (1910), pp.2–3.
43. 'Courses D'Officiers à Ali-Bey-Keuy' [Officers' Races at Ali-Bey-Keuy], *Le Turquie*, no. 115 (1910), p.2.
44. Gresy, 'Les Courses d'Hier' [Yesterday's Races], *Stamboul*, no. 126 (1910), pp.1–2.
45. Ahmed Samim Bey was the owner of two media outlets, *Saday-ı Millet* and *İtilaf*. In her memoir, written long after the events had taken place, Mevhibe Hanım appeared to conflate the names of the newspapers, likely due to Şevket Bey's involvement with multiple publications. She mistakenly identifies *İştirak* as the press organ of the Ahrar Party and claims that Ahmed Samim wrote for that paper. However, it is evident from the context that the newspaper she was referring to was in fact *İtilaf* or *Saday-ı Millet* but not *İştirak*. Mevhibe Celaledin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki*, pp.135, 136.
46. It is worth noting that similar to Kıbrıslızade Şevket Bey, the other participants of this gathering – Muhtar Bey, the son of Sheikh al-Islam Cemaleddin Efendi, Refik Halid Bey, the son of Mehmed Halid Bey, Chief Treasurer of the Ministry of Finance and Hacısufuzade Celal Bey – belonged to the younger generation of Istanbul's elite. Refik Halid Karay, *Bir Ömür Boyunca* [Through a Lifetime] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2011), p.205, 206.
47. *Ibid.*, pp.102–03.
48. 'Kardeşim Şevket' [My Brother Şevket], *İştirak*, no. 13 (1910), p.2.

49. Kıbrıslıade Şevket, 'Azimim Asım Bey' [My Dear Asım Bey], *İştirak*, no. 17 (1909), pp.1–2.
50. Mevhibe Celaleddin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki*, pp.174–94.
51. He and his father-in-law, made a fierce argument when Şevket Bey conducted a meeting with his friends from the opposition in the Celaleddin residence. After the argument Şevket Bey and his wife, Mevhibe Hanım, moved to the Kıbrıslıade manor. *Ibid.*, pp.195, 196.
52. Hüseyin Cahid Bey, 'Muhafazakarlık Liberallik' [Conservatism and Liberalism], *Tanin*, no. 955 (1911), p.1. The part of the editorial which enraged Şevket Bey, was a mention that Hüseyin Cahid Bey made from another editorial of himself which was published on 29 March 1909. Hüseyin Cahid Bey, 'Osmanlılık ve Hanedan-ı Saltanat' [Ottoman Identity and Imperial Dynasty], *Tanin*, no. 237 (1909), p.1.
53. 'Bir Tecavüz' [An Assault], *Yeni İkdâm*, no. 411 (1911), p.2.
54. 'Tanin Gazetesinde Yazılan...' [According to Tanin], *Memurin*, no. 80 (1911), p.4.
55. 'Men Dakka Dukka' [He who Strikes, Gets Struck], *Züğürt*, no. 9 (1911), p.2.
56. Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele* [Revolutionary Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the National Struggle] (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), p.535.
57. 'Le Prince Héritier de Turque au Creusot' [The Heir to the Turkish Throne in Le Creusot], *Le Petit Parisien*, no. 12647 (1911), p.1.
58. 'On annonce que...' [It is announced that...], *Le Gaulois*, no. 12703 (1912), p.1.
59. 'Une Autre Grande Victime' [Another Great Victim], *Mecheroutiette*, no. 38 (1913), p.36.
60. For more information about these events, see Cezmi Eraslan and Kenan Olgun, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Meşrutiyet ve Parlamento* [Constitutionalism and Parliament in the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: 3F Yayınları, 2006). Rıza Nur, *Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu Nasıl Öldü* [How the Liberty and Accord Party Was Born and How It Died] (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1996).
61. The telegram sent by the Governor of Sivas to the Ministry of the Interior, dated 21 March 1912: BOA. DH. SYS. 55.1/95, Folio 3.
62. The date that Mustafa Sadreddin Pasha died was taken from his tombstone. Other details from Mevhibe Celaleddin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki*, p.198.
63. The report written by the Inspectorate General of Technical Troops and Fortified Positions, Ottoman Ministry of War on 15 June 1913, The Turkish Ministry of National Defence, Military History and Strategic Studies Archive (hereafter MSB.ATASE), 110-9-1-7/BALKAN HARBI [The Balkan War] (1912–1913) - 179 - 92 - 10.
64. 'On annonce que...' [It is announced that...], *Le Gaulois*, no. 12703 (1912), p.1. 'Où l'on voit intervenir la France et l'aviation' [Where France and Aviation Intervene], *L'Express*, no. 208 (1912), p.1; 'L'attaché militaire ottoman donne sa démission' [The Ottoman Military Attaché Resigns], *Paris Journal*, no. 1389 (1912), p.2.
65. Mevhibe Celaleddin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki*, pp.201, 202; 'Yeni Kabine' [The New Cabinet], *İktihâm*, no. 6172 (1912), p.1; 'Heyet-i Cedide-i Vükela' [The New Council of Ministers], *İktihâm*, no. 6173 (1912), p.2.
66. 'Tebliğ-i Resmî' [Official Notice], *Tanin*, no. 1465 (1912), p.1.
67. Memorandum sent from the Grand Vizierate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 October 1912: BOA. BEO. 4095/307123.
68. Gustav von Hochwächter, *Balkan Savaşı Günlüğü - Türklerle Cephe* [Balkan War Diary: On the Front Lines with the Turks] (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2025), p.33.
69. Ender Korkmaz, *Harbiye Nazırı Nazım Paşa: 31 Mart Vakası - Balkan Harbi - Bab-ı Ali Baskını* [Minister of War Nazım Pasha: The 31 March Incident - The Balkan Wars - The Raid on the Sublime Porte] (Istanbul: Selenge Yayınları, 2021), pp.293–340.
70. For example, 'La Journée Fatale de Nazim Pacha: Le Signature de l'Armistice' [The Fatal Day of Nazım Pasha: The Signing of the Armistice], *L'illustration*, no. 3649 (1913), p.85.
71. Memorandum of the Special Council (*Meclis-i Mahsus*), 22 January 1913: BOA, MB. 901/1. Note prepared by the Council of Ministers (*Meclis-i Vükela*) in response to the note of the Great Powers dated 17 January 1913, 23 January 1913: BOA, HR.SYS. 1983/1\_18, in *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Balkan Savaşları* [The Balkan Wars in Ottoman Documents] (vol. 1, Istanbul: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 2013), pp.503, 508–10.

72. Celal Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım - Milli Mücadeleye Gidiş* [I Too Have Written – The Road to the National Struggle] (vol. 4, Istanbul: Sabah Yayınları, 1997), pp.22–25; Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp İşittiklerim* [What I Saw and Heard] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2010), pp.89, 90; ‘Le Meurtre de Nazim Pacha’ [The Murder of Nazim Pasha], *Le Temps*, no. 18883 (1913), pp.1, 2.
73. Imperial Rescript of Grand Vizierial appointment, 23 January 1913: BOA, İ.DÜİT. 190/71, p.3.
74. Mevhibe Celaledin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki*, pp.206, 207.
75. Beyatlı, *Siyasi ve Edebi Portreler*, p.107.
76. Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İnkılap Hareketleri ve Milli Mücadele* [Revolutionary Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the National Struggle] (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2012), p.596.
77. Beyatlı, *Siyasi ve Edebi Portreler*, pp.108–11.
78. Mevhibe Celaledin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki*, pp.208–12.
79. ‘Le Capitaine Nazim Bey Kıbrıslı’ [Captain Nazim Bey the Cypriot], *La Patrie – Journal Ottoman Publié en Français*, no. 218 (1913), p.74.
80. According to Nazim Bey’s personal record in the Ministry of Defence Archives, he was appointed to Erzincan, a military post in rural Anatolia, on 2 March 1913. However, he failed to report to his assigned unit. As a result, he was tried in absentia, sentenced to six months in prison and subsequently discharged from the army for insubordination. The records in Kıbrıslı Nazım Bey’s personal dossier, RTMND Archive.
81. Mevhibe Celaledin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki*, pp.214–18.
82. Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of the Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology*, p.60.
83. Mevhibe Celaledin, *Geçmiş Zaman Olur Ki*, pp.217–47.
84. *Ibid.*, p.230.
85. The memorandum sent by the Consulate General in Geneva to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 20 January 1916: BOA. HR.SYS. 2417/36, Folio 3.
86. For further information regarding the dissolution of the CUP and the voluntary exile of its leading members, see Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler* [Political Parties in Turkey], vol. 3: İttihat ve Terakki-Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi [Committee of Union and Progress—The History of an Era, a Generation, and a Party] (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), pp.545–82.
87. Sabahaddin Bey, who was widely styled ‘Prince’, lived in exile abroad under sustained political pressure. For a detailed account of his exile, see Cavit Orhan Tütengil and Vedat Günyol, *Prens Lütfullah Dosyası* [The Prince Lütfullah File] (Istanbul: Çan Yayınları, 1977).
88. Lütfullah Bey, brother of Prince Sabahaddin, was likewise exiled and lost his influence in Ottoman politics. *Ibid.*, p.49.
89. Kamil Pasha had been exiled to Cyprus where he was born. Atilla Çetin, ‘Kıbrıslı Kâmil Paşa’ [Kamil Pasha the Cypriot], in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 25 (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2022), pp.391–93.
90. Damat Şerif Pasha, a Kurdish-origin, a diplomat and a royal in-law, went into voluntary exile in Paris. Ali Birinci, ‘Şerif Paşa, Mehmed’, in *TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol.28 (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2010), pp.1–2.
91. Damat Salih Pasha was executed by hanging on charges of involvement in the assassination of Mahmud Şevket Pasha. For further information about the process that led to the execution of Damad Salih Pasha, see Cemal Paşa, *1913–1922 Anıları* [1911–1922: My Memoirs] (Istanbul: Paraf Yayınları, 2010), pp.32–36, 48, 49, 53–56.
92. Mosca, *Ruling Class*, p.61.
93. *Ibid.*, p.108.
94. Aslı Davaz, ‘An Annotated Archive of Entangled European Feminist History: The Union of Turkish Women, the Second Balkan Conference and Cécile Brunschvicg’s Visit to Balkan Feminists (1923–1935)’, *Feminist Encounters: A Journal of Critical Studies in Culture and Politics*, vol.4, no. 2 (2023), p.3; ‘New Woman in New Lands’, *Moline Daily Dispatch*, 7 September 1920, p.12.
95. Nazım Kıbrıslı, ‘Zavallı Hayvanlar İçin’ [For the Poor Animals], *Akşam*, no. 8423 (1942), p.3; ‘Vefat’ [Obituary], *Cumhuriyet*, no. 14135 (1963), p.3.
96. Pareto, *The Rise and Fall of the Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology*, p.68.