

**T.C.**  
**KIRŐEHİR AHİ EVRAN ÜNİVERSİTESİ**  
**SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ**  
**ULUSLARARASI İLİŐKİLER ANABİLİM DALI**

**ULUSLARARASI İLİŐKİLERDE İLHAK TEORİSİ**

**Kyrylo DOVHOPOL**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ**

**KIRŐEHİR-2023**



**©2023-Kyrylo DOVHOPOL**

**T.C.**  
**KIRŐEHİR AHİ EVRAN ÜNİVERSİTESİ**  
**SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ**  
**ULUSLARARASI İLİŐKİLER ANABİLİM DALI**

**ULUSLARARASI İLİŐKİLERDE İLHAK TEORİSİ**  
**THEORY OF ANNEXATION IN INTERNATIONAL**  
**RELATIONS**

**Hazırlayan**  
**Kyrylo DOVHOPOL**

**YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ**

**Danışman**  
**Doç. Dr. Öner Akgül**

**KIRŐEHİR-2023**

## KABUL VE ONAY

Kırşehir Ahi Evran Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı yüksek lisans öğrencisi, Kyrlyo DOVHOPOL tarafından hazırlanan “Uluslararası İlişkilerde İlhak Teorisi” adlı tez çalışması ..... tarihinde yapılan savunma sınavı sonucunda başarılı bulunarak jürimiz tarafından oybirliği/oyçokluğu ile **YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ** olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Danışman: Doç. Dr. Öner AKGÜL

Üye: Prof. Dr. Nur ÇETİN

Üye: Dr. Öğr. Üye. Barış ATEŞ

Yukarıdaki imzaların, adı geçen öğretim üyelerine ait olduğunu onaylarım.

.../.../20..

(İmza)

Unvanı Adı Soyadı

Enstitü Müdürü

Bu tez çalışması ..... tarafından ..... nolu proje ile desteklenmiştir.

## BİLDİRİM

Hazırladığım tezin tamamen kendi çalışmam olduğunu ve her alıntıya kaynak gösterdiğimi taahhüt eder, tezimin kâğıt ve elektronik kopyalarının Kırşehir Ahi Evran Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü arşivlerinde aşağıda belirttiğim koşullarda saklanmasına izin verdiğimi onaylarım:

- Tezimin tamamı her yerden erişime açılabilir.
- Tezim sadece Kırşehir Ahi Evran Üniversitesi yerleşkelerinden erişime açılabilir.
- Tezimin **2** yıl süreyle erişime açılmasını istemiyorum. Bu sürenin sonunda uzatma için başvuruda bulunmadığım takdirde, tezimin/raporumun tamamı her yerden erişime açılabilir.



28/08/2023

Kyrylo DOVHOPOL

## ÖZET

### ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLERDE İLHAK TEORİSİ

#### YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

Hazırlayan: Kyrylo DOVHOPOL

Danışman: Doç. Dr. Öner AKGÜL

2023 – (XV+99) Sayfa

Kırşehir Ahi Evran Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı

Jüri

Doç. Dr. Öner AKGÜL

Prof. Dr. Nur ÇETİN

Dr. Öğr. Üye. Barış ATEŞ

Bu çalışma, uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında ülke ilhakı olgusunun teorik analizinin 1816'dan 2022'ye kadar olan süreçteki önemini belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik istikrarsızlık çerçevesinde zayıf devletleri çeşitli yöntemlerle edinen ülke örneklerini kullanarak ilhak kavramının analiz edilmesi gereklidir. Bu tabii ki uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini içinde ilhak kavramının rolünü ve bileşenlerini incelemek amacıyla taşımaktadır.

Bu araştırmanın temel problemi, fethetme, ayrılma, işgal ve ilhak kavramlarının yetersiz bir şekilde analiz edildiği aşağıdaki noktaları içermektedir. Bir toprak parçasının ilhakından kimin sorumlu olduğunu anlamak için ilhak olgusu bazı durumlarda araştırılmalıdır. Ya devlet saldırgan bir şekilde savaşı başlatmış, ya da saldırgan devlet topraklarına savaşmadan ilhak etmek için kriz koşulları yaratmış ya da ülke ilhak edilen toprak parçasını ilhak etme isteğini ifade eden toprak parçasının sakinleri tarafından ilhak edilmiştir. Bu fark, ilhakın belirli bir toprak parçasını ilhak etme araçlarının türlerini anlamak için örneklerde ele alınacaktır. Kuşkusuz ki teorik yaklaşımın yanı sıra, ilhak konusundaki küresel ilişkiler düzeyindeki metodolojinin bu olguyu niteliksel ve kapsamlı bir şekilde değerlendirmek için şimdiye kadar niteliksel olarak incelenmediğini belirtmek gerekir.

Bu çalışmada, analiz için karşılaştırmalı yöntem olarak bilinen bir ampirik araştırma yöntemi kullanılacaktır. Bu yöntem, ilhaklar arasındaki benzerlikleri veya farklılıkları belirlemeye yardımcı olacak ve ayrıca 1816'dan 2022'ye kadar olan dönemde meydana gelen iki veya daha fazla ilhakin ortak, doğal özelliklerini bulmamıza da yardımcı olacaktır. Yani, karşılaştırmalı yöntemi kullanarak, belirli bölgeleri kendi lehlerine ilhak eden ülkelerin eylemlerini özetlemek mümkün olacaktır.

İlhakların bu kavrama dahil olan ve yukarıda bahsettiğimiz kısımları ise fetih, ayrılma ve işgaldir. Fetih, yalnızca iki ülke arasında savaş olduğunda ve bunlardan birinin yenilgisi nedeniyle toprak üzerindeki egemenlik kaybeden devletten galip devlete geçtiğinde bağımsızlığın kaybına neden olur. Fetih, kontrolün sürekli olacağı varsayımını haklı çıkaran koşullarda fethedilen bölgenin fiilen yönetilmesi anlamına gelir. Diğer bir deyişle, bağımsızlığını geri kazanma olasılığı hala varken, ilhak uluslar ötesi hukuk kapsamında tanınmaz. Bu durumda, hasmın tamamen ya da kısmen fethedilmesi

arasında bir fark yoktur. Şimdiye kadar, tanıma ancak savaşın sona ermesinden sonra mümkün olmuştur.

Eğer 18'dan 2022'ye kadar olan dönemi ele alırsak, 18'dan Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na kadar ülkeler fethetme bağlamında kendi takdirlerine göre güç kullanıyorlardı. O dönemde klasik yaklaşım, daha doğrusu 1648'de Vestfalya Barışı'nın imzalanmasından sonra başlayan sistem hüküm sürüyordu. Açıkçası, büyük ülkeler sömürgelelere sahip olduğu ve daha fazla toprak ele geçirmeye çalıştığı, genel olarak fetihlere ve savaşa başvurduğu için ülkeler arasında bazı anlaşmalar vardı. Yani, kendi çıkarları için, belirli bir toprak üzerinde egemenlik kurmak, onlara belirli bir avantaj sağlayan fethetme yöntemiymi ve aynı zamanda savaş kendi takdirlerine göre sürdürebiliyorlardı, kimse yasaklamıyordu.

Elbette, belirli bir ülkenin bir parçasının ayrılması farklı bir düzeyde olabilir, ancak belirli bir bölgenin ayrılma sürecini izlemek için her zaman belirli güçlerin bulunması gerektiğini belirtmek gerekir. Yani, ayrılma sırasındaki taraflar A ve B tarafından gözlemlenecek tüm maddelerin uygulanmasını izleyecek bağımsız gözlemci ülke veya ülkeler olarak dış bir güç olmalıdır. Ayrılma, uti possidetis ilkesine saygıyı sürdürmek, üçüncü tarafların etkisinden kaçınmak ve en önemlisi halkın bölgenin kaderini belirleyecek bir oylamaya katılma arzusu olmak üzere üç ilkeye dayanmaktadır. Bu, ilgili bölgenin yasallığını korumanın tek yoludur, ancak pratikte, şu anda belirli bir bölgenin dalga doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak etkileyen üçüncü taraf C'nin etkisini görüyoruz.

İşgal konusunda, önceki hükümetin kamu faaliyetlerini yürütemez durumda ilan edilip edilmediği tanınabilir. Ayrıca, kuşatan güç, önceki yönetimi kendi yetkilileriyle değiştirme fırsatına sahiptir. Kuşatan güç, sahip olduğu gücü, yani işgal öncesi işlev gören gücü değiştirmek zorundadır. Önceki yönetim de kamu faaliyetlerini yürütemez hale gelmiş olmalıdır. Düşman kuvvetleri teslim olmuş, mağlup edilmiş veya çekilmiş olmalıdır. Kuşatan güç, kendi askeri birimlerini belirli bir süre içinde (tercihen kısa sürede) göndermek için yeterli askeri güce sahiptir, böylece kuşatan ülkenin işgal ettiği bölgede kuşatan güç hissedilir. Geçici bir yönetim, toprak üzerinde kurulmaktadır. Kuşatan güç, işgal edilen bölgelerde yaşayan insanlara karşı emirler çıkarmış ve uygulamıştır. Bu kavramın açıklanmasına, saldırıların genişletilmesi, orijinal kuruluşlar tarafından sağlam otoritelerin tatbik edilmesi, orijinal yönlendirme rolünde otoriteyi üstlenmek için taşan topluluğun geri dönüşü ve ele geçirme sırasında kalabalığın olması gibi çok sayıda faktör eklenir.

Eğer işgalin etkinliğinden bahsediyorsak, o zaman etkili kontrol işgalin en önemli bileşeni ve ana özelliğidir. Toprakların etkili bir şekilde işgal edilmesi ve kontrol edilmesi olmadan, işgali kendisi gerçekleştirmek ve bu terimi uygulamak mümkün değildir. Söylenecek açık bir şey, işgal öncesinde var olan yerine, gücün kullanma yeteneğine dayalı etkili kontrolün olması gerekmektedir. Bir işgalin şu anda gerçekleşip gerçekleşmediğini belirlemek için iki koşulun yerine getirilmesi gerekir: (i) önceki hükümetin kamusal faaliyetlerini yerine getiremeyecek durumda olduğunun ilan edilmiş olması ve (ii) işgalci gücün önceki hükümeti kendi görevlileriyle değiştirmesi gerekmektedir.

Ayrıca, saran gücün yetkisi kurulmuşsa, aşağıdaki koşullar sağlanmalıdır: (i) saran güç, önceki hükümetin kamusal görevlerini yerine getirememelidir, (ii) rakip güçler teslim olmuş, mağlup edilmiş veya çekilmiş olmalıdır. Bu durumda, savaş alanlarına ait yerleşim yerleri etkilenmez, ancak sarılı güce karşı yaşanabilecek direnç, fetheden tarafın işgalci olduğu ve bölgenin zaptedildiği gerçeğini etkilemez, (iii) saran yetkinin, saran ülke tarafından ele geçirilen bölgede hissedilmesi için belirli bir süre içinde (oldukça kısa bir süre) askeri birimlerini gönderme yetkisi olmalıdır, (iv) bölge üzerinde geçici bir yönetim kurulmuş olmalıdır, (v) saran güç, zaptedilmiş bölgelerde yaşayan nüfusa karşı emirler çıkarmış ve uygulamış olmalıdır.

İlhak kavramı, ilhakın kendisinden önce gelen ve daha önce bahsedilen işgal, hatta istila ya da tabi kılma (fetih) gibi diğer aşamaları da içerebilir. Bunlar farklı genellemelerdir, ancak bu araştırmada bu genellemeleri, ülkeler tarafından diğer alanlarda ve işlevlerde kapsamlı bir şekilde kullanılmayan tek bir varlık olarak görmeliyiz. İlhak, fetih, işgal ve tabiiyet gibi tüm eski terimlerden, işgalci ülkenin bölgeyi nihai olarak kendi lehine ilhak etmek ve orada kalma ve gücünü, siyasi yönetimini ve daha fazlasını kurma hakkına sahip olmak için iki güç faktörü kullanabileceği anlaşılmaktadır. Tabii ki, 1816 ile 2022 yılları arasındaki dönemde pek çok ilhak gerçekleşti ve bunlar farklı olabilir. Benzer ilhaklar arasında sert ilhak ve yumuşak ilhak ayrımı yapabiliriz. Türüne bağlı olarak belirli araçlar elenir ve zaman dilimleri belirlenir – yani ilhakın gerçekleştiği zaman çerçevesi.

İlhakla ilgili olarak, öncelikle sert ilhak ve yumuşak ilhak olmak üzere iki türü birbirinden ayırmamız gerekmektedir. İlk tür, hibrid olmayan ilhak yöntemlerini içerir. Bu yöntemler arasında askeri müdahale, baskıcı diplomasi ve ulusal çıkarları hizmet edecek ekonomik yaptırımlar gibi sert güçler ve gözdağları bulunmaktadırlar. Yumuşak ilhak ise zaten hibrid öğeleri içerir, bunlar arasında medya, propaganda, oligarklar ve etkili kişiler, ve kültür bir propaganda biçimi olarak yer alır. Ayrıca, etki ajanı olarak hizmet edebilecek diplomasi ve belirli askeri birimler de bunlar arasında yer alabilir. Yani, kitleleri etkileyebilmek, düşüncelerini kontrol etmek veya daha doğrusu duygularını ve düşüncelerini doğru yönde yönlendirmek, toprakları ilhak etmek isteyen devletin ihtiyaç duyduğu şeydir. Yani, fetheden ülkenin ilhak etmek istediği ülke içindeki tüm bileşenler kendi avantajlarını kullanacak ve diğer ülkeler için bu, kimsenin diğer ülkelerden, yani ilhak edilen gelecekteki bölgenin sakinlerinden kontrol etmediği doğal bir süreç gibi görünecektir. Mülkiyetin (işgalin) neden el koymadan (ilhaktan) önce gerçekleştiğini de kavradıktan sonra, sadece işgalin değil, aynı zamanda fethin ve hatta belirli bir menzilin ayrılmasının da nihayetinde belirli bir menzilin büyük güç lehine ilhakına yol açabileceği sonucuna varabiliriz.

Sonuç olarak, tezimizde yaptığımız analiz sonucunda şunları söyleyebiliriz: ilhak, ayrılma veya işgal sonucunda meydana gelen toprak değişikliklerinin diğer ülkeler tarafından tanınması, uluslararası ilişkilerde kritik bir faktördür. Uluslararası dikkat ve gözlemcilerin varlığı, ilhak, ayrılma, fethetme veya işgal süreçlerinde genellikle önemlidir. Üçüncü tarafların müdahalesi bu süreçleri etkileyebilir ve uluslararası hukuk bu tür durumlarda önemli bir rol oynar. İlhak, fethetme, ayrılma ve işgal, birbirine benzer görünebilir ancak farklı anlamlar taşır. İlhak genellikle kalıcı toprak kazanımını ima ederken, fethetme savaşla ele geçirmekle ilgilidir, ayrılma bir bölgenin bağımsızlık isteğini ifade eder ve işgal daha çok kontrol sırasında askeri gücün kullanımıyla alakalıdır. Ayrılma süreci genellikle yerel halkın iradesine bağlıdır. İlhak farklı yollarla gerçekleşebilir. Sert ilhak askeri güç kullanımını içerebilirken, yumuşak ilhak diplomatik ve siyasi baskılarla sağlanabilir. Bağımsızlık veya ayrılma isteğini ifade etme hakkı temel bir unsurdur. En önemli bulgu ise ilhakın bu süreçlerin başında geldiği ve ilhaktan önce, yani işgal ve sonrasında ilhak ya da ayrılma, sonrasında işgal ve nihayetinde ilhak gibi farklı kombinasyonlara sahip olabileceğimizdir. Açıkça görüyoruz ki ilhakın tüm bileşenleri, ilhak kavramının kısmen veya tamamen içine dahil edilebilir.

Kalitatif ve kantitatif yönleriyle tüm vaka eklemelerini analiz ettikten sonra, şu sonuçları elde ettik: 54 vakanın tamamında sistemli bir yapı bulunuyor, kalitatif ve kantitatif analizde olduğu gibi, bu analizde de rejimin toprak eklemesinde önemli bir rol oynadığını görebiliriz. Ayrıca, bölgeyi ilhak eden devlet tarafından ilhak için hazırlık yapılması da kilit rol oynamıştır. Kesinlikle, 1816 ile 1900 yılları arasındaki vakalarda ana devletlerin egemenliğinin büyük bir rol oynadığını görebiliriz; çünkü bu devletler, Büyük Britanya, Amerika veya Almanya gibi, Hollanda ve Portekiz ile birlikte birçok koloniyi kontrol ediyorlardı. Bundan sonra ilhak işlemleri çok daha karmaşık bir hal aldı ve saldırganlar ya da toprak ilhak etmek isteyen ülkeler, 1938'de Avusturya ile yaptıkları gibi, ilhaka başarı kazanmak için büyük bir adım atarak yerel vatandaşlarla karmaşık bir propaganda yapmış ve gelecekteki ilhaklarda başarı kazanmak için yerel bir hükümetle çalışmıştır.

Elbette, Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca savaş çalışmalarının egemenliği ve sonrasında yapılan eklemeler, ülkelerin ilhak edilen topraklar üzerindeki egemenliklerini başarıyla sağlamalarına yardımcı olmuştur. Hiç tereddüt etmeden, bu dönem, ülkelerin uzun zaman önce kendi toprakları olarak gördükleri bölgeleri geri almak istediklerini ve komşu ülkelere karşı direnmek için stratejik noktaları kontrol etmek istediklerini göstermiştir. Ayrıca, bundan sonra dünyanın tek kutuplu sistemi var olmaya başladı ve bize neredeyse hiç ilhak yapmayan ülkelerin pasif yolunu gösterdi ve sadece 1990'da Kuveyt ile istisnai bir durum vardı. Karabağ ve Prydnistrovia daha önce, SSCB dağılmadan önce başlamıştır. 2008'den 2022'ye kadar olan son dönemde Kafkasya ve Karadeniz'de Rusya'nın bölgedeki hakimiyetinin dünyanın iki kutuplu sisteminin geri dönmeye başladığını gösterdiğini söyleyebiliriz, ancak şimdi asıl engellerin Çin ve Amerika'nın ne yazık ki olası bir ikinci Soğuk Savaş ile güçlü bir iki kutuplu dünya yaratmaya başladığını görebiliyoruz.

Hiç tereddüt etmeden, CINC bileşeni, ülkenin hakimiyetini ve CINC bileşeninin kilit rolünü gösteren tabloların yardımıyla tanımladığımız niceliksel yönlerde kilit rol oynadı ve bu veya bu ülkenin neden daha az güçlü bir devleti ilhak ettiğini göstermiştir. Elbette burada bahsetmemiz gereken istisnalar var ve bunlar arasında 1895'te Tayvan'ın Japonya tarafından ilhakı vakası da yer alıyor; burada Japonya CINC puanı Çin CINC puanından daha azdı ve Japonya'nın o yılki başarısında başka

kilit faktörler de vardı. Burada, nitel yönler çok daha önemli bir rol oynadı, çünkü CINC o dönemdeki gerçek durumu göstermedi. Ayrıca, Kuzey Vietnam tarafından Güney Vietnam'a katılmak isteyen insanların olduğu Vietnam vakasını da belirtmeliyiz. Ayrıca, 2022'de Ukrayna ve Rusya arasındaki son vaka, CINC'in gerçek hayattaki durumları yansıtmada önemli bir rol oynamadığını ve burada Ukrayna'nın Rusya'ya karşı direnmesine yardımcı olan diğer faktörlerin olduğunu gösterdi, bunlar arasında Ukrayna'nın zeki yüksek komutanı Zalushniy de bulunuyordu, o büyük rakibe karşı bazı eylemleri önceden veya sonra gerçekleşecek olan bir Rus istilasının 2014'ten sonra gerçekleşeceğini anlayarak planladı. İkinci olarak, Rus askerleri tarafından ilhak edilmek istemeyen ve Batı silahlarına karşı direnen tüm insanların direnci, Rusya'ya karşı direnmeye yardımcı oldu. Bu temel faktörler başarı elde etmede önemli bir rol oynadı ve CINC faktörü, 2014'te olduğu gibi hangi ülkenin toprakları ilhak etmesi gerektiğini göstermede önemli bir rol oynamadı. Genel olarak, CINC bir ülkenin başka bir ülkenin üzerindeki gerçek egemenliğini gösterir ve bu bileşen, neden bu ya da şu ülkenin daha zayıf bir rakibi ilhak ettiğini analiz etmemize yardımcı olmuştur.

Özetlemek gerekirse, 54 ülke ilhakı vakasının tamamının iki şekilde sonuçlandığını görebiliriz: birincisi, saldırgan eylemler sonrasında ortaya çıkan ilhaklar, ikincisi ise saldırgan olmayan eylemler sonrasında ortaya çıkan ilhaklar. Bunlar arasında, 28 vaka saldırgan eylemlerin ve 26 vaka saldırgan olmayan eylemlerin ardından ortaya çıktı. Yüzde oranıyla, saldırgan eylemler %51,9'da ve saldırgan olmayan eylemlerin ardından ortaya çıkan ilhaklar %48,1'de bulunuyor. Gördüğümüz gibi, saldırgan eylemler çok fazla baskın değil. 1816'dan 1900'e kadar olan dönemi dikkate alırsak, 17 vaka bulunmaktadır, bunlardan 9'u saldırgan olmayan yollarla gerçekleşen ilhaklar ve 8'i saldırgan yollarla gerçekleşen ilhaklar. Bu durumda, yüzde oranıyla, saldırgan olmayan yollarla gerçekleşen ilhaklar %53'tür, diğer yandan saldırgan yollarla gerçekleşen ilhakların oranı ise %47'dir. 1901 ile 1945 arasındaki dönemi ele alırsak, burada 13 ilhak vakası bulunmaktadır, burada saldırgan olmayan stil, saldırgan stilin 5,5 katı kadar baskındır çünkü saldırgan olmayan ilhaklar 11 vakayla bulunuyor ve sadece 2 vaka saldırgan bir şekilde gerçekleşmiştir, yüzde oranı olarak %84,7'ye karşı %15,3'tür.

Eğer burada Soğuk Savaş dönemini dikkate alırsak, 17 vaka bulunuyor ki bunların 13'ü saldırgan ilhak yöntemlerinin saldırgan olmayanlara üstün geldiği durumlar. Bu durumda, bu 17 vakadan 13'ü saldırgan eylemlerin ardından gerçekleşen ilhaklar ve sadece 4 tanesi saldırgan olmayan eylemlerin ardından. Saldırgan yöntemin yüzde oranı %76,5'e karşı, saldırgan olmayan yöntemin yüzde oranı ise %23,5'tir. Soğuk Savaş'ın ardından gelen son dönemde, sadece 7 ilhak olduğunu söyleyebiliriz: 5 vaka saldırgan bir şekilde gerçekleşti ve 2 vaka saldırgan olmayan bir şekilde. Saldırgan yöntemin yüzde oranı %71,4'e karşı, saldırgan olmayan yöntemin yüzde oranı ise %28,6'dır. Büyük oyuncular: sadece II. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Büyük Britanya, toprakları ilhak etmeye devam etti ve Falkland Adaları ve Rockall ile iki vaka bulunuyor. Her durumda, Sovyetler Birliği veya Rusya'nın Kuril Adaları, Çekoslovakya ve özellikle 2008'den sonra Abhazya ve Güney Osetya, Kırım, Donbas ve Belarus gibi bölgeleri ilhak ettiğini belirtebiliriz. Genel olarak, Sovyetler Birliği/Rusya ile 6 vaka ve Büyük Britanya ile 2 vaka, toplam 54 vakadan 8 vaka yüzde oranı olarak %12,5 olacaktır.

Gördüğümüz gibi ilhakı etkileyen rejimler Nazi, Faşist ve tek kişinin diktatörlük rejimleri genellikle ülkelerin ilhakını etkiledi ve Nazi Almanyası örneğinde gördüğümüz gibi, bir kişinin ve altındaki tüm sistemlerin tüm ülkeyi nasıl etkileyebileceğini ve Avusturya ve Çekoslovakya'nın ilhakına nasıl yardımcı olabileceğini anlayabiliriz. Ayrıca, bölgeyi kimin ilhak ettiğini ve kimin ilhak edildiğini anlamada önemli bir rol oynayan CINC bileşeninden de bahsetmeliyiz. Burada CINC'i başka bir ülke tarafından ilhak edilen bir ülke ile karşılaştırdığımızda, bunun bir ülkeden diğerine toprak ilhakında kilit rol oynadığını açıkça görebiliriz. Ayrıca, halen var olan ilhaklardan da bahsetmeliyiz; 24 vaka vardır ve yüzde oranı olarak yüzde 44,4'tür. Burada bahsedilmesi gereken son nokta ise 34 ilhak vakasının büyük güçler tarafından tanınmasıdır; yüzde oranı yüzde 63'tür ve birçok vaka 1816'dan 1900'e kadar tanınmıştır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Ayrılma, Fethetme, İlhak, İşgal, Uluslararası İlişkiler.

## ÖZET

### ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLERDE İLHAK TEORİSİ

#### YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

**Hazırlayan: Kyrylo DOVHOPOL**

**Danışman: Doç. Dr. Öner AKGÜL**

**2023 – (XV+99) Sayfa**

**Kırşehir Ahi Evran Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimleri Enstitüsü**

**Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı**

**Jüri**

**Doç. Dr. Öner AKGÜL**

**Prof. Dr. Nur ÇETİN**

**Dr. Öğr. Üye. Barış ATEŞ**

Bu çalışma, Uluslararası İlişkiler bağlamında ülkelerin toprak ilhakı fenomeninin teorik analizinin uygunluğunu, siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik istikrarsızlık çerçevesinde zayıf devletleri farklı yollarla ele geçiren ülkelerin örnekleri üzerinden 1816-2022 döneminde ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Tabii ki, amacımız, ilhak kavramının derinlemesine analiz etmek ve bu kavramın böylece sıra Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininde bileşenlerinin rolünü ve önemini incelemektir. İlhak süreci, ilhakın kendisinden önce gelen fetih, ayrılma ve işgal bileşenlerine sahiptir ve bu bileşenler, ilhakın kendisinden önce gelen bileşenler olarak mantıksal bir sıraya incelenecektir. Bu değerlendirme, Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininde ilhak kavramının algılanışı açısından yukarıda belirtilen dönem ülkeler örneğinde yapılmıştır. Bu amaca ulaşmak için literatür sistematik bir literatür tarama-inceleme yöntemi ve deneysel araştırma yöntemi kullanılmaktadır. Ayrıca, ilhakın yapısını ve kavramını anlamak için nitel ve nicel analiz yöntemleri kullanılmaktadır. Araştırmamız, ilhak analizinin nasıl şekillendiğinin ve 1816-2022 döneminde bileşenlerin nasıl birleştirildiğinin iyi anlaşılması açısından önemlidir ve sonuç olarak ilhakın bileşenlerini ve kavramını, söz konusu dönemdeki dünya yapısının arka planında ele önem arz etmektedir. Bu dönem, tarih boyunca önce çok kutuplu, ardından da çift kutuplu bir yapıya sahip olup 20. yüzyılın sonlarına doğru tek kutuplu hale gelen bir dünya yapısıydı. Yani, her bileşeni ayrı ve bağımsız olarak değil, tek bir bütün olarak göstermek ve bu disiplinde yanlış bir şekilde kabul edilen her bileşeni ayrı bir şekilde değil, tüm bileşenleriyle birlikte göstermek istenmektedir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** İlhak, Nicel Analiz, Nitel Analiz, Uluslararası İlişkiler.

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THEORY OF ANNEXATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**M.Sc.Thesis**

**Preparer: Kyrylo DOVHOPOL**

**Advisor: Associate Professor Öner AKGÜL**

**2023 – (XV+99) Page**

**Kırşehir Ahi Evran University, Graduate School Of Social Sciences**

**International Relations Department**

**Jury**

**Assoc. Prof. Dc. Öner AKGÜL**

**Prof. Dr. Nur ÇETİN**

**Faculty Member Barış ATEŞ**

This study aims to determine the relevance of the theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of country annexation in the context of international relations, from 1816 to 2022 using examples of countries that acquired weaker states through various means within the framework of political, social, and economic destabilization. Needless to say, the purpose is to conduct a profound analysis of the concept of annexation and its concepts and the role of this concept and its components in the discipline of International Relations. The annexation process itself consists of components that directly precede annexation, namely conquest, secession, and occupation, and these components will be examined in a logical sequence as the elements preceding annexation itself. The assessment was made through examples of countries during the aforementioned period, considering the perception of the concept of annexation in the discipline of International Relations. The systematic literature review and empirical research method are employed to achieve this goal. Qualitative and quantitative analysis methods are also used to understand the structure and concept of annexation. This research is important for a thorough understanding of how annexation has evolved with the aforementioned components from 1816 to 2022. As a result, it is crucial to form an understanding of the components of annexation and the concept of annexation as a whole, against the backdrop of the world structure, which historically transitioned from multipolar to bipolar and eventually to a unipolar structure closer to the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In other words, the main result is presenting all the components as a unified whole, rather than considering each component separate and independent, as mistakenly believed in this discipline during the mentioned historical period.

**Keywords:** Annexation, International Relations, Qualitative Analysis, Quantitative Analysis.

## ÖN SÖZ

This thesis has been completed as a result of research on the concept of annexation and its examples of different countries in the discipline. The aim of the study is to contribute to the literature by identifying the differences between annexation, occupation, secession, and conquest and to see that these parts are complex of the main concept of annexation in the discipline of International Relations and examples of different countries show how it works. The first chapter provides theoretical information about the concept of annexation and related terms as parts of it.

The second chapter “Theoretical Explanation” provides a theoretical explanation of annexation and parts of it.

The third chapter “Qualitative and quantitative analysis with examples” provides qualitative and quantitative information about annexation and part of it with examples.

The fourth chapter “Complex information about annexation” provides examples of annexation and countries which took part in it.

The last fifth chapter “Sonuç ve öneriler” summarizes results obtained from the research results and makes suggestions.

I would like to say thank you for the help and significant support which was provided by my Associate Professor Öner AKGÜL.

I would like to thank the UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES, which protected my country and my house from Russian invasion, rockets, and night attacks on the energy system of my country. Also, I would like to say thank you to all my TEACHERS, PARENTS, and FRIENDS who supported me during this long and interesting writing of my thesis.

## İÇİNDEKİLER

KABUL VE ONAY .....	iii
BİLDİRİM.....	iv
ÖZET .....	v
GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET .....	ix
ABSTRACT .....	x
ÖN SÖZ.....	xi
TABLolar LİSTESİ .....	xiv
SİMGELER VE KISALTMALAR .....	xv
<b>CHAPTER I.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER II .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2. THEORETICAL EXPLANATION.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2.1. DEFINITION OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2.2. TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF STATES.....</b>	<b>4</b>
2.2.1. Conquest.....	4
2.2.2. Secession .....	8
2.2.2.1. An international involvement in secession process.....	10
2.2.2.2 Legality of secession at the global stratum.....	11
2.2.2.3. Decolonization of ranges as a realm of secession .....	12
2.2.3. Occupation.....	13
2.2.3.1 Occupation under international law.....	15
2.2.4. Annexation .....	18
2.2.4.1 Annexation in transnational law.....	19
2.2.4.2 Hard annexation .....	21
2.2.4.3. Soft annexation.....	23
<b>2.3. WHY OCCUPATION PRECEDES ANNEXATION .....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>CHAPTER III.....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>3. DATA AND CASES ON ANNEXATION.....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>3.1. CASES ON ANNEXATION.....</b>	<b>28</b>
3.1.1. Period from 1816 to 1945.....	29
3.1.2. Period from 1946 to 1989.....	35
3.1.3. Period from 1989 till 2022 .....	39
3.1.3.1. Prydnistrovya or Transnistria 1992 .....	40
3.1.3.2. Georgia 2008 .....	40
3.1.3.3. Ukraine 2014 .....	41

3.1.3.4. Ukraine 2022 .....	41
3.1.3.4.1. Annexation of Kherson region and Zaporizhzhia region.....	42
3.1.3.4.2. Annexation of Kyiv region, Chernihiv region, and Sumy region.....	42
3.1.3.4.3. Annexation of Kharkiv region .....	43
3.1.3.4.4. Annexation of Donetsk region and Luhansk region .....	43
3.1.4. From the 2022 year.....	44
<b>3.2. STATISTICS ON ANNEXATION .....</b>	<b>45</b>
3.2.1. Period from 1816 to 1945 year .....	45
3.2.2. Period from 1946 to 1989 .....	51
3.2.3. Period from 1990 to 2007 .....	54
3.2.3.1. Moldova and Transnistria .....	54
3.2.3.3. Armenia and Azerbaijan .....	55
3.2.4. Period from 2008 to 2022.....	56
<b>CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>APPENDIX .....</b>	<b>85</b>
<b>SHORT CV .....</b>	<b>99</b>

## TABLULAR LİSTESİ

<b>Table 3.1.</b> CINC components of countries that annexed territories from 1816 to 1900.....	46
<b>Table 3.2.</b> CINC components of China and Japan in 1895.....	47
<b>Table 3.3.</b> CINC components of USA and Spain in 1898 .....	48
<b>Table 3.4.</b> CINC components of Germany and Spain in 1899 .....	48
<b>Table 3.5.</b> CINC components of countries that annexed territories from 1900-1945.....	49
<b>Table 3.6.</b> CINC components of countries that annexed territories from 1900-1945.....	50
<b>Table 3.7.</b> CINC components of countries that were annexed from 1900-1945 .....	51
<b>Table 3.8.</b> CINC components of the USA, China, and Japan.....	51
<b>Table 3.9.</b> CINC components of countries who annexed between 1946-1989.....	52
<b>Table 3.10.</b> CINC components of countries who annexed between 1946-1989.....	52
<b>Table 3.11.</b> CINC components of countries that were annexed or lost colonies between 1946-1989.....	53
<b>Table 3.12.</b> CINC components of countries that were annexed or lost their territories .....	53
<b>Table 3.13.</b> CINC components of South Vietnam and North Vietnam .....	54
<b>Table 3.14.</b> CINC components of Iraq and Kuwait in 1990 .....	55
<b>Table 3.15.</b> CINC components of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994.....	55
<b>Table 3.16.</b> CINC components of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994 in percentage ratio .....	56
<b>Table 3.17.</b> CINC components of Russia and Georgia in 2008 in percentage ratio .....	57
<b>Table 3.18.</b> CINC components of Russia and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 .....	58
<b>Table 3.19.</b> CINC components of Russia and Belarus in 2020 .....	58

## SİMGELER VE KISALTMALAR

Bu çalışmada kullanılmış kısaltmalar, açıklamaları ile birlikte aşağıda sunulmuştur

<b>Kısaltmalar</b>	<b>Açıklamalar</b>
<b>CINC</b>	Composite Index of National Capability
<b>ICRC</b>	The International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>OBZZ</b>	Oppozytsiynyy Blok Za Zhittia
<b>TBS</b>	Kısaltmalar alfabetik sırayla verilmektedir
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

# CHAPTER I

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of humankind, the main commitment of the country has continued to be the safety of the rights and entitlements of its population and the defense of the country's borders, or, stated another way, ensuring sovereign government. Regarding the present, the current ruling authority is one of the fundamental principles of the canon of nations and international relations that can lead to violations of multinational peace. However, in recent periods, there has been a tendency to violate the principle of sovereign authority, so there are many new concepts, categories, and terms that require research and analysis. Categories such as “occupation”, “annexation”, “secession”, “invasion” and others are currently controversial.

As for concerns, the primary target of the research is to categorize the types of annexation in the sample of various states from 1816 to 2022 and to analyze the concept of annexation that has influenced and continues to affect the development of global relations amongst states. To completely understand the methodologies states are using to annex part of the region in their interests, it would be applicable to consider the following question: what methods do countries use to annex regions in their interests?

In this study, an empirical research method, namely the comparative method, will be used for analysis. This method will help to establish similarities or differences between annexations, and it will also help us to find common, natural features of two or more annexations that occurred in the period from 1816 to 2022. That is, it will be possible to use the comparative method to summarize the actions of countries that annex certain territories in their favor.

To form not only a methodological but also a theoretical aspect of the concept of annexation in the thesis, it is necessary to consider the following objectives in the study: The theoretical and methodological principles and nature of annexation using different country examples from 1816 to 2022. We took into account the period from 1816 to 2022 because the main component, the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), has data starting from 1816. To understand the algorithm of action, it is necessary to determine whether and how the invasion preceded annexation and whether it occurred in all the cases and examples that will be discussed in this thesis. So, one of the goals would be: does occupation precede annexation in all cases, or are there some exceptions among them?

As for other aspects, the key concept of annexation affects and will affect the construction of global relations between countries. The main problem of this research includes the next points, where the concepts of conquest, secession, occupation, and annexation have incomplete analysis. This phenomenon of annexation must be researched in some cases to understand who was responsible for the annexation of a particular piece of land. Either the state was an aggressor and started the war, or the aggressor state created the crisis conditions to annex the territory without fighting in its favor, or the country annexed a certain territory because the inhabitants of the annexed territory expressed a desire to participate. This difference will be considered in the examples to finally understand the types of means of influence for the annexation of a particular territory. Certainly, in addition to the theoretical approach, it should be noted that the methodology at the level of global relations on annexation has not been qualitatively studied so far to evaluate this phenomenon qualitatively and comprehensively.

In order to have a complete analysis and picture of the annexation of territories by other states from 1816 to 2022, a qualitative and quantitative analysis should be carried out to help understand how and why annexation by a country as a phenomenon and tool is used (in its favor is a precise region). As a consequence, it will make a qualitative and quantitative analysis of annexation examples. We should also mention that the CINC is a quantitative part of the analysis.

By analyzing the practice of forcible seizure of international territory, we can conclude that the history of international law includes dozens of cases of territorial annexation. For example, Great Britain annexed the Falkland Islands in 1833. In 1900, the United States annexed Hawaii. From 1910 to 1945, Japan annexed Korea, etc. In 1980, Israel annexed East Jerusalem. In 1991, Iraq annexed Kuwait but rejected it a year later. So, as we can see, annexation is quite a long process, but in each case, it took a different period. That is, annexation is a temporary phenomenon rather than a permanent one.

The annexation of an area violates the values and norms of modern global law. Meanwhile, the norms of this law allow territorial change only in the case of the self-governance of nations or in the case of an arrangement between states. Likewise, volunteerism and admiration for the parties are essential. Today, the annexation of lands in different parts of the world is on the agenda, and one of the latest cases of this is Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.

That is, using these examples of annexation and others, we will be able to construct a methodological approach to the concept of annexation in general. We will build a comprehensive theory that will help further distinguish between types of annexations and understand why this or that annexation was used by a particular country to annex territory in its favor.

As for the limitations of the study of this phenomenon, it is primarily for data on the crisis years that later led to the annexation in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially from 1816 to the mid-1850s, when the great powers were able to identify small states and countries with no precise dates and no data on the gradual progress of the annexation or conquest of the islands. It is also worth mentioning the annexation of the small islands that took place in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Since these islands do not have their own state structure, there is no documentation of how exactly the inhabitants of the island lived on the lands that were annexed before the arrival of the conquering country.

By all means, to ensure the annexation of a certain region, it is necessary to use specific methods to confirm the annexation for their benefit. For this purpose, the following question will be raised: why are these methods used by countries to annex a particular region? Furthermore, there are examples that will provide a comprehensive methodological and theoretical approach to the concept of annexation, but there are also exceptions that should be taken into account.

## CHAPTER II

### 2. THEORETICAL EXPLANATION

#### 2.1. DEFINITION OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

During the last two centuries, and especially in the period from 1816 to 2022, this period was chosen for writing a master's thesis. There were various forms of seizure of territories, from annexations to secession or from conquest to occupation. Conversely, there were cases of the annexation of territories, such as Hyderabad in September 1948, Dadra and Nagar Haveli in August 1961, and Goa in December 1961 (Rotter, 2000: 368). Yes, these territories were officially annexed to India, but each case will be considered separately. Not only the three examples above but also a large number of territories were annexed, occupied, conquered, separated, or annexed to a particular state in the period from 1816 until 2022.

A comprehensive analysis will be provided where we will see the sequence and relationship between the processes that will be described below. With the help of these processes, we will be able to understand why annexation is the key component and at the top of the list of processes, including occupation, conquest, and secession. And now let's move on to territorial expansion and its types, which will be listed below.

#### 2.2. TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF STATES

Therefore, according to territorial conquests, as mentioned above, we can identify four main types of territorial expansion: (i) conquest, (ii) secession (subjection), (iii) occupation, and (iiii) annexation. If we look at the order of perpetration of these stages, then annexation is not the first step to capture a certain area. It is a key component in the chain of interrelated processes in international relations. We can say that annexation is already a certain completion of all the above processes that have existed for some time.

Obviously, at the same time, when the state occupies the territory, it can be considered both the occupier and the conqueror of the country, which recently annexed the range. Still, there is an inevitable sequence of actions, and they will be considered independently.

Territories that are separated from certain states cannot be considered a crime at the level of transnational law, but it all depends on the specifics of each case, which will also be considered separately. As we consider all the components and the annexation as well, first of all, we need to mention the conquest or invasion.

##### 2.2.1. Conquest

The value of verity and veracity in countries is unique to the main values of ultramodern transnational law and a substantial utensil for maintaining the existing transnational legitimate order, which is grounded altogether on the vitals of the UN Charter and other generally assumed values and morals of transnational law. Although the UN in its alternate composition does not advertise this value, it follows straightaway from the principle elevated in the same paper, non-use of forcefulness or hazard of force, according to which all associates of the UN abstain in transnational kindred from the hazard or usage of power as opposed to the land decency or dogmatic freedom of any nation and in any supplementary way mutable by the purpose of the UN (UN Charter, Chapter I, Article 2, clause 4).

So, for the last few years, the concept of conquest has changed due to the globalization of the world. Although we should mention the articles of the UN that are used and obeyed by civilized countries around the world. The concept of conquest was written by H. W. Halleck (Halleck, 1861), (Halleck, 1885), (Halleck, 1893). Although S. Korman (Korman, 1996), D. Day (Day, 2005), (Day, 2008), R. Y. Jennings (Jennings, 1963), and others also wrote about the concept of conquest and generally about conquest as a phenomenon.

Therefore, conquest in transnational regulation is the attainment of range through power, particularly by a triumphant country at the expense of a losing state. Operative conquest occurs when the carnal seizure of territory (annexation) is accompanied by a lawful procedure of transfer of ownership. The most significant value of it is that it is essential to be a land-discharged annexation and acquire a new range evidently in mind (Kamenetsky, 1961: 29).

Conquest also acts as a cause of the loss of independence only when there are wars between two countries and, due to the defeat of one of them, sovereignty over the territory passes from the losing state to the victorious one. Conquest means factual governance of the conquered range in such circumstances that justify the presumption that control will be constant. In other words, while there is still the possibility of restoring its independence, annexation is not recognized under transnational law. In this case, there is no difference between the full or partial conquest of the adversary. So far, recognition is only possible after the end of the war.

Subjugation is based on the outmoded value that independent states can resort to war in their direction and that local and other advances from armed victory will be known as legally binding. That is, the very concept of conquest can be defined as the right of the victor who won the war to make a conquest involving a particular range and its inhabitants. After

that, there will be a certain period when the conquest will either be recognized by the states all over the world at the legal level or not. That is, either the territory that was conquered will enter into force or there will be a long process of recognition of the territory.

It should also be noted that the war and, further, the conquest only allow you to sign a certain document that will determine the difference that will arise after signing. That is due to the fact that the loser of the battle provides an opportunity to recognize that a certain territory will be conquered legally. This sounds a bit contradictory since the conquest was mentioned and written about by scientists such as Henry Bonfils (Bonfils, 1905) and Frantz C.R. Despagnet (Despagnet, 1910). This is the force that contradicts the law, and from this, the logical conclusion can be drawn that conquest cannot be recognized legally even if it is an act of state power (Singer, 2011: 769).

After all hostilities, it will be very difficult for states to understand how they are equal before the law and who was right, the winning side or the losing side. As a matter of course, this creates a certain inequality of power between states, and it is delicate to attune a confident, proper, or legitimate equivalency until, as noted above, the transnational community (countries) recognizes or adopts a decision that will give one side or another the right to property in the exact territory for which there was a fierce struggle. That is, in fact, war or conflict, and it is armed, which will lead to further conquest of the territory and will lead to the fact that the war will decide whose truth and who should own a particular territory.

That is, if the right to conquer were legally enshrined in theory, it would not only mean recognizing the very concept and act of conquest as legal but would also cause chaos, making it impossible to distinguish between legal or illegal means of acquisition, or rather, conquest. There will be no restrictions on the rules. That is, the transnational law that exists today is both a regulator and a certain legal basis that countries can refer to during conquests in a given territory.

However, this is not a way out because of the war to conquer territories for one reason or another, especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. If the hypothesis of conquest were feted at the level of transnational law, international law itself would recognize the fact of conquest, that is, the triumph of one side and the overthrow of the other. Even a state that waged an unjust war would have the upper hand and would officially recognize its victory, which is inappropriate and very dangerous for the whole world.

If we take the period from 1816 to 2022, then from 1816 until World War I, the countries used force at their discretion in the context of conquests. At that time, the classical

approach prevailed, or rather, the system, which began in 1648, after the signing of the Peace of Westphalia (Clodfelter, 2017: 40). Clearly, there were some agreements between the countries, as large countries owned colonies and tried to take over even more territory, resorting to conquests and warfare in general. That is, for their benefit, dominating a particular territory was the method of conquest that gave them a certain advantage, and at the same time, they could wage war at their discretion, which no one forbade.

Even so, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the verifiable approach to the commencement of conquest was called into question. Why did that happen? Since the approach to transnational law has changed since World War I, even in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, some countries have shown that transnational law can be ignored and ranges seized. These include Indonesia's seizure of East Timor in 1975 and the 1990 incident involving Iraq. Iraq tried to annex Kuwait, and before that, it carried out an invasion that no one expected.

It can be construed by the component that the subjugation of ranges is no longer happening in some countries about others, but the ambitions of large countries can be satisfied by a multi-pronged combination that will include the following stages: occupation and annexation. We can say that in some way, the conquest was transformed into other ways of capturing certain ranges since the world is globalizing and just taking and capturing an appropriate territory will not work. There is a transnational law that governs all civilized countries in the world. However, there are those who, even in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, are trying to break it and carry out their intentions, no longer using the conquest in general.

That is, the ban on seizing territory by force in our time has become a complex of many factors, including (i) the Pact of the League of Nations (The Covenant of the League of Nations, Erişim: 23.11.2022), (ii) the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Kellogg-Briand Pact, Erişim: 23.11.2022), (iii) Stimson's doctrine (U.S. Department of States, Erişim: 23.11.2022), (iv) UN Charter (UN Charter, Erişim: 23.11.2022), (v) Geneva Conventions in 1949 (ICRC, Erişim: 23.11.2022), (vi) on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1969 Vienna Convention (UN, 1980: 331), (vii) 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Relations and the Cooperation of the Principle of Self-government as a Law in International Law (General Assembly, 1970: 121-124).

Thus, conquest is the acquisition of territory by a country that has won by force. Ownership of the range passes to the victorious country and can be legally enshrined in the form of further annexation. It may take some time for the world community to acknowledge the conquest of the range and its subsequent annexation as legitimate. Before World War I,

the classical approach of conquest was used by the great powers. During the war, the great powers took control over the ranges they used at their discretion. However, at the transnational level after World War I, due to several factors, including doctrines, pacts, conventions, etc., conquest in its old form ceased to exist, and other tools and approaches were utilized by powerful nations seeking to acquire territories.

### **2.2.2. Secession**

Secession is the division or partition of the territory of an exacting country by the determinedness of its population or constitutional jurisdiction (Thürer, Burri, 2009: 511). Also, this conception can be characterized as the affairs and country of any of its executive-territorial units, involving the authority of the confederation, by the determinedness of the population of this unit, endorsed by a vote on the referendum, or by the determinedness of the constitutional references of this unit. Also, in the operation of secession, a certain range inhabited by the majority of ethnic minorities is secluded from the country and therefore becomes the majority in the recently created state unit (Meadwell, 1999: 374).

Amongst the researchers who have studied concept of secession, we can highlight C. Tomuschat (Tomuschat, 2006: 23-45), T.M. Fazal (Fazal and Griffiths, 2008: 199), (Fazal and Griffiths, 2014: 79-106), (Fazal, 2018) Ahsan I. Butt (Butt, 2011), (Butt, 2017), (Butt, 2017: 1-22), (Butt, 2020: 69-83), Ryan D. Griffiths (Griffiths, 2010), (Griffiths, 2014: 559-581), (Griffiths, 2014: 3367-3368), (Griffiths, 2015: 731-751), (Griffiths, 2016), (Alvarez, Coma and Griffiths, 2015: 43-61), (Griffiths, 2016), (Griffiths, 2016), (Alvarez, Coma and Griffiths, 2015: 43-61), (Griffiths, 2018: 111-126), (Griffiths, 2018: 79-84), (Griffiths, 2019: 138-147), (Griffiths, 2020: 527-528), (Griffiths, 2021), (Martinez and Griffiths, 2021: 580-590), (Griffiths, 2021: 1-19) and others. Today, most of the existing states are polyethnic; even the smallest states, which were previously monoethnic, are now inhabited by people of different nationalities. Nevertheless, philological, social, and religious differences between, and in some cases, exacerbating and often exacerbated philological, social, and religious differences, frequently lead to interethnic confrontations, both within and outside the country (Varenes, 1997: 143).

Altogether, secession became popular in the post-Cold War period, and many territories decided to secede, or rather intended to do so, but not on their own but with the help or influence of other and larger states. To be sure, in life, it looks as if people themselves want this separation, and they “consciously” came to this conclusion. However, this is not the case at all, and to control the masses and their thoughts, one must have a leader who will lead them.

Certainly, such a leader can be an agent of another state (country C), which is interested in separating territory B from territory A. That is, side C makes every effort to make the whole world perceive it as a proper and natural separation without realizing the role of side C.

There are other cases when territory B wishes to separate from territory A, as historically, they (side B) were independent, and due to certain historical circumstances, they were annexed to territory A. Tendencies towards segregation in general can be considered a certain exception to the rules that many states theoretically face, but in practice, few are implemented. Recall the annexation of the northern and southern parts of Vietnam, where, after the war, both parts agreed to unite into one state.

Needless to say, separation is not something unexpected or an instantaneous event. This process involves an integrated approach that includes claims from side B and decisions that side B intends to take, negotiations with side A, and/or a struggle that may lead to misunderstandings between sides A and B during the separation and creation of side B states.

This process takes place within the country without the involvement of other countries or organizations. However, more and more countries are turning to third parties to help resolve the dispute between sides A and B. That is, the involvement of side C is potentially undesirable, and its involvement could lead to even more catastrophic consequences if international law is not maintained in negotiations between sides A and B, where side C is a certain independent judge, as it may seem at first glance. *(i)* There must be no or indirect support from foreign countries, *(ii)* the consent of the majority of the population, expressed in a referendum, *(iii)* respect for the principle of *uti possidetis* (the principle that a newly independent state has the same territory and the same borders as before, as a colony or dependent territory, including administrative units within another state) (Moore, 1913: 6).

To be sure, we must also mention the separatist campaigns that exist in the region that want to separate from the country with which they have been together for some time. It was mentioned above that the consent of the majority of the population should lead to conscious separation, which is supported by the majority of people and has no external influence. However, the realities are a bit different, and in the conditions of the struggle between the two sides, the B side, which seems to separate itself, has the support of side C. It is side C that can produce and send its leader long before the influx of secession from side A. By all means, side C is interested in a successful outcome that will help expand side C's capabilities and influence on territory B.

That is, in addition to a leader who can prove himself at some point and call on people on side B to secede, he can also enlist the support of separatists (on side C), who will be an additional lever of influence and pressure on residents of side B. Later in the referendum, people voted for secession on side A. However, in fact, after the separation, side B will eventually become dependent on side C, which seems to have been a side not interested in the movement and subsequent referendum. When we see that secession is not an immediate component and there is no way for a conflict to arise without war, there is a referendum, which may or may not result in secession. According to further results, a new state is being created.

We can now consider the separation in two aspects. The newly formed state can exist independently. However, it should also be noted that the newly formed state may become part of another country as a federation. This also can't be ruled out, and in this case, it may be due to the fact that the country is still weak and can't cope with the creation of a new state and constitutional order, which takes more than one year to form. Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be such examples, providing information on annexation and occupation. But in this case, if we see that the range is separated from one range A and joined another range B, it is the result of the influence of foreign forces from side B, which we already see after the concurrence of range C to territory B.

#### **2.2.2.1. An international involvement in secession process**

As mentioned above, the process of secession occurs within the country. However, transnational involvement must also be ongoing, not only from one side but from several disinterested sides who are geographically far from this conflict. Independent experts and representatives of distant lands must be experts in resolving the issue of the separation of territories and the creation of a separate state, but they must be guided by law and transnational law. The law itself must confirm the legitimacy and identification of the inhabitants of a specific region who want to secede from the country they have been part of for an extended period.

Certainly, we can observe, especially in the last two cases, the progeny of Crimea and Donbas, that representatives of erstwhile countries are concerned about secession and annexation, which have already taken place, but nothing but sanctions and concerns. By all means, some interests play almost a crucial part in the places of some countries, but transnational law itself, and the only way it should be, should be a certain supreme law, which can be relied on in an adequate assessment of a particular division of ranges.

To do this, a step-by-step applicable process must be created in the case of dividing an ineluctable range, and before that, an appeal to apply this step should be made. These include three points that have already been mentioned above: the lack of military support, the consent of the majority of the population through a referendum, and an expectation of the principle of *uti possidetis*.

Even if certain points of this procedure are not respected, it does not mean that the new state will not exist at all. If we are talking about the fact that a foreign power influenced the creation of a new state, it will not mean that the new state was created according to all the rules, especially the observance of transnational law. Even so, to have some reasons for mistrust, one must first prove the involvement of a foreign power officially and then recognize the foreign power as an influential and key lever in resolving the issue of the separation of a certain territory.

#### **2.2.2.2 Legality of secession at the global stratum**

If we declaim in the terminology of intercontinental law, it has traditionally been known as secession after a factual country event, which has led to a situation in which the constitutive basics of a country are present rather than stating the conditions of its legality (Haverland, 2000: 354).

As for the legitimacy of secession, this issue is very vulnerable for countries, and when it comes to the segregation of a particular range, it combines normative, lawful, and transnational law. Since the reasons for separating, for example, from territory A, territory B has strong arguments that may or may not arise in the negotiation process since they (we mean requirements) may be quite specific and side A won't be able to satisfy them. Alternatively, statements may be general without specific suggestions or claims.

Otherwise, the conditions for exercising side B's equity to tone-determination are not met, or at least challenged, not only by side A (from which side B wishes to secede) but also by the transnational community, and considering that, the conditions set by side B must be met. This is precisely the case when part of side B seeks to secede from country A and create either its own state in the territory where it could potentially secede or later join another country and build a new state together.

Until it is formally documented by the global community or relatively by most realms, the secession of range B will take a long time to take place *de jure*. Furthermore, the global community and organizations must treat this event properly to avoid transnational law and its

legal norms, which were established earlier. By all means, transnational law is used because it falls under the internal sphere of the country. If the quarrel escalates into a fortified struggle, then the guidelines of reimbursement of intercontinental philanthropical law used in fortified struggles of a non-international level are formerly being used (Kohen, 2006: 474).

### **2.2.2.3. Decolonization of ranges as a realm of secession**

Now it is ineludible to remember when decolonization was claimed and the ranges that were to be decolonized. It was determined: (i) how it will go, (ii) whether there were restrictions on the capability of states during this procedure, and (iii) how the system of operation of those ranges can be overlooked. In some cases, blackballs (referendums) were organized, proposing options for resolving the issue of territory. An intermediate period was even measured, which would be preceded by self-independence (Bereketeab, 2012: 1).

Another way to create a state is to create a “road map”, as happened between Israel and Palestine, where step by step the emergence of a new and separate land. Certainly, it is necessary to (i) create a procedure following constitutional law, (ii) create a procedure under domestic law, and (iii) sign bilateral agreements. That is, these facts can also be filled with one of the three facts stated above and interpreted, which will be key in resolving the issue of separating range C from range A.

However, we should not forget that it must be the will of the population – we mean the population – that becomes key, without pressure from references. A blackball must be held in which the population either expresses a desire to secede or remains and votes by a majority for the old system. The most important thing is to maintain honesty and transparency in this paragraph because, as practice shows, bribery of results or individuals is a great crime, which then affects the further history of the development of all parties. That is, if a resonant situation occurs and the election is rigged in some way, sides A, B, and C may suffer greatly and take a hard line on the further aftermath of the situation, which could lead to conflicts that will end in no conflagration (Weizmann, 2016: 206).

Thus, drawing a wide-ranging conclusion on secession, we can say that the concept is multifaceted, and first of all, it should be said that to separate from a certain territory, there must be strong arguments for this in order to be able to leave the state. By all means, a blackout must be held in which the population votes by a majority for or against secession. There should be no third parties during the blackball and secession via distress secession bouts. The only exception is the presence of a third party as an independent observer, along with other realms, and no more. To be sure, the value of *uti possidetis*, which has already been mentioned above,

must be preserved. It should likewise be distinguished that decolonization was a procession of secession in the post-Cold War period when small areas wanted to be detached after a long stay under another state. Current examples include Abkhazia, Crimea, Donbas, and South Ossetia.

### **2.2.3. Occupation**

At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it was determined what the country's occupation was and what the tasks of the administration that occupied it were. Today we use this meaning due to the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land enacted to the Fourth Hague Convention of August 18, 1907 (Schindler and Toman, 2004: 69).

Occupancy is the impermanent control of a range by another country that claims no right to permanent autonomous control over that range (Benvenisti, 1993: 4). At the same time, there is an enemy armed force located in the territory of the enthralled country. Certainly, it can be assumed that the occupancy is a temporary solution to military restrictions. That is, it is assumed that after a certain period of time, the occupation will end due to a political agreement between the parties, and this agreement will further allow residents of the enthralled territories to have the right to enjoy their individual and collective rights.

K. Watkin (Watkin, 2008: 175-200), (Watkin, 2012: 267-315), T. Ferraro (Ferraro, 2008: 331-357), (Ferraro, 2012: 133-163), (Ferraro, 2012: 147), (Ferraro, 2013: 704) P. Stirk (Stirk, 2004: 527-536), (Stirk, 2005), (Stirk, 2012), (Stirk, 2015: 60-84), (Stirk, 2016), Y.A. Takahashi (Takahashi, 2009), and (Takahashi, 2012: 51-80), (Takahashi, 2018: 544-548), (Takahashi, 2019: 125-167) also mention in their works the term “occupation”. In general, a certain law tries to create a kind of balance between the interests of the population in the entrapped ranges and their needs with the military of the encompassing power. Due to the aim of ensuring order in public life, in the transition to a peace agreement, the military commander is given extended powers. That is, there are certain restrictions until the encompassing state agrees with the state, in which a certain range was selected, on certain demarcations of the state in the future. That is, the idea of temporality is embedded in this concept (Kretzmer, 2012: 207).

By all means, several other features complicate the definition of occupancy. Among such features are (i) continuance of hostilities, (ii) execution of certain powers by local authorities, and (iii) refusal of the invading party to adopt a professional observer in the role of occupant regulation and be it for the inhabitants during the occupancy.

Difficulties are also added when there is (i) gradual cessation of occupancy, (ii) partial withdrawal, (iii) maintaining a certain competence over the previously occupied ranges or districts, or (iv) an agreement to maintain a military presence in the enthralled territories. All of this causes and creates certain difficulties that arise in the process of occupancy. Estimating with certainty when the occupancy is terminated is impossible because even the agreement doesn't provide full guarantees that there will be no further invasion of territory by the invading side.

In Article 41 of its Guide on the Laws of War on Property (the Oxford Physical), the Institute of International Law in 1880 professed that range is observed as enthralled when, as the significance of assault by hostile forces has terminated, the municipality to which it goes has exercised its usual authority therein, and the invading municipality is alone in a location to uphold order there (Ferraro, 2012: 134).

That is, this statement only confirms the fact that martial occupancy is present. This was supported by the US Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. And during this court, it was said that transnational law doesn't distinguish between illegal and lawful occupiers in the performance of certain actions and errands by the occupier and the populace in the enthralled ranges (Levie, 1956: 148).

Although it must be documented that the foreign forces enthraling a certain territory have a noteworthy degree of power over the enthralled territory, the borderline between the stages of invasion and occupancy is very conditional, and it is unbearable to regulate exactly one hundred percent. By all means, after some hesitation, the very definition of occupancy was established in Article 42 of the Hague Regulations, which states that a range is considered under the control of the adversary army when it is in fact enthralled. The occupation extends only to those ranges where such powers will be established and can be peacefully exercised.

Subsequently, Article 2, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, expanded the notion of occupancy precisely to include an occupancy that had no armed confrontation. However, the generally acknowledged concept of this notion remained the same as stated directly above in the Hague Rules of Article 42 (Federal Political Department of Switzerland, 1949: 675).

If we talk about the effectiveness of occupancy, then effective control is the most important component and the main characteristic of occupancy. Without effective occupancy and control of the territory, it is impossible to carry out the occupancy itself and apply this term. Needless to say, there must be effective control based on the ability to exercise power

instead of that which existed before the occupation. Two conditions must be met to determine whether an occupancy is currently taking place: (i) the previous government was declared incapable of carrying out its activities in public, and (ii) the enwrapping power has to replace the former power with its government officers.

Also, to identify if the authority of the enwrapping power has been established, the following conditions must be met: (i) the enwrapping power must replace the power they enthralled, that is, the one that worked before the occupation, and the former government must be unable to perform in public, (ii) adversary forces must have capitulated, been defeated, or withdrew. In this case, the habitats belonging to the combat ranges can't be enthralled, but the resistance that may live against the enwrapping power doesn't affect the fact that the conquering side is the occupier and the range is enthralled, (iii) the enwrapping authority has the passable military power to dispatch its military units within a certain period (rather short) so that the enwrapping power is felt in the range enthralled by the enwrapping country, (iv) a temporary administration is established over the range, (v) the enwrapping power issued and executed orders against the population living in the enthralled territories.

Occupation is the temporary keeping of a range by another state that claims no right to endless autonomous control over that range. It is also necessary to determine whether the range belongs to the occupant or whether the former regime was declared incapable of carrying out its activities in public. At the same time, the occupying power has to replace the former government with its own government functionaries. Additionally, to determine whether the powers of the enwrapping power have been established, the conditions that have previously been given above must be met.

### **2.2.3.1 Occupation under international law**

Until the midpoint of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the range captured by the soldiers admired his property. He could do everything he wanted: (i) destroy everything that was in the engaged range, (ii) return in his favor all seized state and private property, (iii) kill the inhabitants, (iv) take them captive or swear allegiance.

There was no doubt about the occupier's right to conscript the residents of the occupied territories to serve in his army and fight against his legitimate supreme power. During the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, this state of affairs gradually began to change. Martial occupation and its execution, which are one of the tasks of war, were controlled by laws and customs; some more humane methods gradually became the custom and subject of obligations under treaties, thus becoming a rule of law. The difference between the temporary military

occupation and the actual acquisition of territories as a result of conquest became obvious. But to create norms that are now universally recognized and, in many respects, have been positively reflected in the Hague article on the laws and customs of land, which was signed on October 18, 1907.

The whole set of rights and responsibilities of the occupier, which relate to the issues of political management of the territory and its political power over its population, is important. The principle underlying the current rules is as follows: although the occupier doesn't acquire sovereignty over the occupied territory due to the mere fact of its occupation, during it he exercises military power over the range. As the occupier thus impedes the exercise of the power of legitimate administration and requires the population to obey the authority established by him, he must govern the enthralled range not only for the benefit of his martial interests but also, as far as possible, for the interests of the local population. Thus, transnational law not only gives the occupier certain rights but also imposes certain obligations on him.

When and under what circumstances can the range be considered under transnational law? The notion that invasion alone is not an occupation is no longer a challenge. Invasion is the entry of military service into the adversary's country. The difference between invasion (only) and occupation becomes apparent from the fact that the occupier establishes some kind of operation in the engaged range, while the invasion doesn't allow for this. However, occupation generally coincides with invasion. As soon as armed forces enter a certain area and capture a village or city, they immediately take control of the territory from the original authorities, postal services, and more. They also establish control over them, and from a military point of view, related areas are also considered occupied (Roberts, 2006: 594).

The description of the occupancy is grounded in its varied aspects. Among them is the difference between bare intrusion and occupation. An irruption becomes apparent from the fact that an inhabitant sets up some kind of administration (Kaya, 2001: 66). Also, there are some views about martial occupation, and generally, at least the relative closeness of enthralled ranges from the battle zones has made it possible for true negotiations to be reached on several concrete issues between the musts of war and the conditions of the standard of civilization (Schwarzenberger, 1960: 22). Also, we can say that occupation is a temporary, forcible seizure of all or part of the adversary's state range (Roberts, 2005: 28-29).

Other scientists define martial occupancy as a type of fugitive control of a range by another state that claims no right to endless autonomous control over that range. Martial

occupations generally succeed only if they are lengthy, but lengthy occupations elicit nationalist responses that impede success (Edelstein, 2004: 50-51). Another study gives the following description: that occupation is a temporary occupancy of the range (part of the range). It may be neither endless nor indefinite. Also, the enwrapping power is entrusted with the administration of public order and civil life in the range under control. And the main point is that sovereignty and title in the engaged range are not vested in the enwrapping power. (Ben-Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli, 2005: 554-555).

These delineations need some explanation and further detail, as they concentrate only on certain aspects of such a portent as an occupation. Article 42 of the Hague Regulations states that a range is considered enthralled if it is really under the authority of the adversary army and that it extends only to those areas where this authority is established and suitable to carry out its conditioning (Ferraro, 2012: 7). This description is as accurate as possible for the legal definition of occupation.

Among the distinctive features of the military occupation are the following:

1. the governance of military occupation is recognized as a consequence of the struggle that leads to the occupation by the fortified forces of one of the truculent countries of all or part of the adversary's range.

2. Transnational law requires that military occupation be effective, which is supported by the presence of enwrapping forces in the enthralled ranges. The effective workout of power by the occupier in the engrossed ranges involves the perpetration of several transnational legal scores towards civilians, their property, state property, and other holdings.

3. the military's occupancy is impermanent. Conquering a range unaccompanied can't be a way to acquire it. Legal ownership of the range differs from factual ownership, as the ultimate doesn't yet have a legal defense, nor is it homogenized by contract. Transnational law allows only impermanent military occupancy of the range and prohibits annexation, that is, the compulsory seizure of land in contradiction to the will of the populace.

4. the concept of temporary occupation includes the principle of the occupier's responsibility for violating the morals of transnational law governing occupation governance. The invader is responsible for preparing, waging, and waging an aggressive war, despoiling and enslaving civilians in the enthralled ranges, destroying and despoiling state and other property, galleries, and libraries, and stealing artistic property.

The aforesaid indicates that, unfortunately, there is presently no agreement on the description of a total list of features that could classify a case as a military occupation. It is especially important that the morals of the so-called “transnational benevolent law” (“law of war”, “laws and customs of war”, “transnational military law”, “law of fortified conflict”) pause and don’t completely meet conditions for the development of society, knowledge, military outfit, tactics, and strategy.

#### **2.2.4. Annexation**

All around, annexation is a one-sided act of the realm, through which it declares freedom over another territory (range) that was initially outside its borders. Annexation is a one-sided action based on de facto holding and legitimized by widespread recognition (Palmer and Lindsey, 2001: 60). Additionally, annexation occurs when a sovereign state asserts that it currently holds the range (Rothwell, Kaye, Akhtarkhavari and Davis, 2010: 286-288). Other scientists, J. W. Garner (Garner, 1936: 679-688), (Garner, 1938: 421-438), D. B. Rice (Rice, 2015: 717-768), J. Socher (Socher, 2021), and V. Azarova (Azarova, 2018: 41-71), have also defined the conception of annexation in their workshops.

From a profitable point of view, annexation can be represented as a type of absolute dependence on others, where weaker countries, despite their status and independence, are not independent from each other. Instead, they become more dependent on the negative side, and the endpoint may be the annexation of the whole country or part of the area where coffers are concentrated. Alternatively, the range itself is at an important strategic crossroads along certain paths (Randolph, 1898: 291).

The conception of annexation can also include other stages that precede the annexation itself: the previously mentioned occupancy, or indeed irruption or subjection (conquest). These are different generalities, but in this research, we should see these generalities as a single entity, which is not exhaustively used by countries in other domains and functions. It is understood that of all the former terms similar to annexation, conquest, occupancy, and subjection, the invading country can use two factors of force to ultimately annex the territory in its favor and have the right to stay there and establish its power, political governance, and more. Naturally, in the period from 1816 to 2022, there were numerous annexations, and they can be different. Among similar annexations, we can distinguish between hard annexation and soft annexation. Depending on its type, certain tools are discarded, and time periods are set – that is, the time frame during which the annexation takes place.

The styles, or rather the factors of any annexation, include pitfalls from the invader. They can be of two types: (i) hybrid, and (ii) non-hybrid. The first is a set of tools that were formerly used more in soft annexation. The second formerly included a set of tools that can be attributed further to hard annexation. Regarding the characteristics of annexation and annexation itself as a system of acquiring territorial sovereignty, it can be carried out in one of four ways: (i) the range is conquered or conquered by the adding state, (ii) the range is annexed due to the conclusion of the state as similar, occasionally called “peaceful annexation” (Texas’s annexation to the US in 1845) (Benson, 1961: 254-269), (iii) annexation without the concurrence of the population (as happened between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire) (Stevenson, 1996: 112-164), (iv) the range is adjoined in a state of submission to the adding state (for illustration, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910) (Kim Ji-Hyung, 2011: 87-122).

Annexation, anyhow, of the system of perpetration has been equated with the use of force (expedient to war) as a licit means of resolving transnational controversies. It was a fragment of the lawful testament of positivism, grounded on the hypothesis of unlimited jurisdiction essential to transnational law in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

#### **2.2.4.1 Annexation in transnational law**

Concerning annexation in transnational law, first of all, we should mention that annexation has the effect of partially destroying or deforming the state and its native political institutions. Annexation stretches the country’s domestic institutions to cover the new range. As might be expected, the leaders who ruled the country before the annexation may not like the variations in the legality of the administration due to institutional changes. Indeed, changes in scale alone may raise objections (Maas, 2020: 29).

Indeed, after World War I, despite restrictions on expediency and the prohibition of war in the Charter of the League of Nations and the 1928 Paris Pact, annexation remained a policy of outright violence, especially on the part of Japanese, German, and Italian forces. In particular, in 1931, notwithstanding the roster in the League of Nations, Japanese forces detained Manchuria, which was part of China, and in 1936, Italian forces, also neglecting their scores in the League of Nations, seized Abyssinia. This organization in 1936 also plainly allowed Hitler’s Germany to annex Austria and seize Czechoslovakia, depriving them of sovereignty. Similar acts of aggression were carried out in the absence of a clear rule in transnational law that would oblige the state not to fetter the rights of territorial supremacy acquired through annexation, as well as new covenants on the accession of territorial rights in

this way. The events of 1931-1941 revealed a practice that was inconsistent with the actuality of such a rule.

The UN Charter is critical of the experience of the League of Nations. In its core, the prohibition of war and annexation as part of it were momentous. Consequently, in the ultramodern international canon, annexation is identical to offense and its acts. Acquisition of territorial supremacy in any violent manner is illegal and can't be honored under any circumstances. This norm has entered transnational law as part of the value of non-use of power elevated in the UN.

The 1970 Assertion on the Principles of Transnational Law admirably states that it is vital for all countries to safeguard their worldwide interactions from danger or the utility of forcefulness that contradicts the principle of decency or politically aware determination of any country or in any other way undermines the purpose of the United Nations (UN Resolution, 1970: 122). Any direct or indirect encroachment of one state on the territory of another state is an encroachment on the decency of the country and its independence. This norm of non-recognition of annexation is verified by the transnational legal practice of the UN, in which similar acts are recognized as illegal. For illustration, during the 1967-1976 Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel seized and annexed several Arab territories (ranges), including Jerusalem, against which the GA and the UN Security Council have constantly stated in their judgments that annexation is contrary to transnational law and can't be accepted (Jabber, 1977: 159). The most recent illustration is the UN Security Council's condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, considering it an attempt to annex Kuwait (Quamar and Kumaraswamy, 2019: 75-87).

Before World War II, a similar strategy to non-recognition of annexation was contained in the Stimson Doctrine, which was the US reaction to Japan's 1931 seizure of the Chinese territory of Manchuria (Walker, 2017: 1). It states that the US administration can't legitimize any de facto stratum or pretension to fete convocation or agreement between countries or their delegates, as this could hardly be the pact rights of the US, and it doesn't intend to fete any situation, pact, or agreement that may be carried out in a location unsettled with the alliances and arrearages under the Treaty of Paris of August 28, 1928 (Josephson, 1979: 378).

At the same time, there are numerous outstanding territorial demands in the sovereignties of the southern and eastern parts of Europe, including Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Donbas, and Crimea. To sum up, it can be determined that guidance on annexation

exists, but it involves more interference than control of transnational law in the applicable position.

#### **2.2.4.2 Hard annexation**

Hard annexation aims to seize territory where weapons are required, but they are not used and only have the effect of intimidation, which is used to put psychological pressure on people and local authorities. In general, Nye defines strength as the ability to influence the behaviors of others to get the outcomes one wants (Nye, 2005: 2). This is true because, in this type of annexation, the aggressor country is already trying hard to achieve the goals that it has set for itself. This type of annexation is also characterized by institutional and political power. Unfortunately, representatives of this type of annexation often formulate their arguments inadequately, believing that they can safely ignore or simply include elements of national power that fall outside their competence (Wilson, 2008: 110). That is, in this context, we can see that this type of annexation is more suitable for autocratic regimes that can carry out this type of annexation without considering many factors and components, including ethnic and cultural characteristics, moods, and the impact on certain groups, through a well-thought-out step-by-step plan.

In international politics, power, especially autocracy, means the ability to influence not only another person but also a group of people so that a given person or group of people acts exactly as a given authority needs. Brutal force is the ability to force them to perform certain actions that are beneficial to the government. The strategy of hard annexation also includes brutality and intimidation focused on: (i) military intervention, (ii) forced diplomacy, (iii) economic sanctions that will protect national interests (Campbell and O'Hanlon, 2006: 319).

It similarly relies on accouterments and esprit coffers, similar to fortified forces and profitable coffers (Gallarotti, 2011: 27). An illustration of this is Germany's capture of Poland in 1939. Also, the puissant miens of the conception of hard annexation include time. Hard annexation itself takes much less time than soft annexation. In general, hard annexation is historically associated with the possession of certain specific material coffers similar to (i) territory, (ii) population, (iii) natural coffers, (iv) profitable power, and (v) military force. Hard annexation causes forced conduct that spontaneously occurs, and the side being attacked doesn't have time to form conduct in the form of counterassaults but is simply reflected arbitrarily and as it can (Gray, 2011: 3).

Therefore, concerning the first-named point, military intervention takes place instantly and without any warning. For example, there are sides A and B, and side A includes territory C, which has no desire to separate and lives in peace with territory A. However, side B intends by all means to take territory C, whatever it costs side B. It attracts the military and quickly captures territory under its control. In this case, the transition period in the form of occupation may not be mandatory because it is done instantly. And it follows that forced diplomacy will take place, and sanctions, which will also be imposed as a consequence to achieve the result, will take place instantly.

Today, however, hard annexation is less exploited as the world arrangement changes and states resort more to hybrid actions that result in soft annexation. It should also be noted that the world: *(i)* becomes further globalized, *(ii)* countries become additionally economically interdependent, *(iii)* there is a maturing of transnational actors, *(iv)* there is a revival of nationalism in weak states, *(v)* the growth of democracy around the world, *(vi)* distribution of military outfits, *(vii)* the quintessence of transnational political problems.

These factors prevent hard annexation and can serve as both deterrents and factors that make states resort to soft annexation, which takes more time and involves much more money and resources. Most importantly, it takes patience to wait for the moment when you can completely take control of your territory. We should not forget that soft annexation is preceded by occupation, which serves as a bridge between the enveloping state and the range it enthralls.

Certainly, some limitations apply to hard annexation: *(i)* if two countries have roughly the same status, potential, and position in the world, then hard annexation will not happen under any circumstances, *(ii)* the use of hard annexation usually leads to the further establishment of justice, in the concept of an eye for an eye, *(iii)* hard annexation requires much more resources and financial resources to be used. Therefore, this concept is not typical of weak states. Thus, it can be concluded that hard annexation is used much less than soft annexation.

By all means, this type of annexation is intended to seize the territory of the country from the aggressor, as in the case of soft annexation, but there is a huge difference (Raimzhanova, 2015: 5). First of all, under no circumstances, if the countries have approximately the same status and positions, will they not attack each other and try to capture a certain part of the territory? Secondly, if this type of annexation is used, it is costly in terms of material costs in the first place, and as the world is globalizing, this type of annexation is already inefficient and very dangerous to use. It is dangerous, first of all, for the country of

the aggressor, against which the whole civilized world can oppose and create a package of sanctions, at least. This package of sanctions will be a deterrent that will tie the hands of the aggressor country for a while.

To be sure, forced diplomacy and military forces will be used during this annexation, but as already mentioned, the globalization of the world and the transition of most states to democracy make it impossible to carry out this type of annexation as easily as before. Thus, it can be concluded that brutality and intimidation, which focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions, will ensure national interests and are components of hard annexation.

#### **2.2.4.3. Soft annexation**

J. R. Winkler (Winkler and Nye, 2006: 268-269), A. Fisher (Fisher, 2020: 1-22), H. W. Ohnesorge (Ohnesorge, 2014: 1-21), (Ohnesorge, 2020), and Joseph S. Nye (Nye, 1990: 153-171), (Nye, 2004), (Nye, 2004: 16-20), (Nye and Kennedy, 2004: 711-713), (Nye, 2004: 255-270), (Nye, 2004: 13-15), (Nye, 2005: 75-77), (Nye, 2006), (Nye, 2008: 94-109), (Nye, 2012: 1-4), (Nye, 2012: 151-155), (Nye, 2013), (Nye, 2014: 19-22), (Nye, 2017: 1-3), (Nye, 2018, Erişim: 20.11.2022) (Nye, 2018: 40-46), (Nye, 2019: 1-14), (Nye, 2021: 196-208), are considered to be the ones who first talked and wrote about soft annexation. As regards “soft annexation” we can define this concept as an idea expressed in various forms over the years. One country tries to pull political, economic, and military levers – all of which fall short of traditional invasion – to exploit ethnic conflicts in countries that used to be in its orbit. Also, the goal is to leverage these tensions (Friedman, 2014). So, we see that country A would like to take some part of country B with the help of tension on different levels, and country A would like to gain success, but not in the short term. Before gaining success, the country A prepares everything, like a big mechanism, and counts every step to run a big and great process that will look natural.

In other words, state A makes every effort to undermine the administration and its position and put pressure on weak points. In this case, most people in country B will start to understand that this government is not suitable for their country, and after that, they will start holding meetings and other demonstrations against this government in state B. So, in this case, we can see that hybrid threats and big mechanisms start to work. We should mention that all of the instruments that are used by country A on the territory of country B can be qualified as hybrid threats. Among them, we can give an example of the “fifth column” which was used on the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as propaganda, diplomacy, and eventually

special forces troops entering foreign territories in the guise of local rebel forces. Also, citizens of country B must sympathize with this plan (Simon, 2014: 47).

Also, it can be mentioned that country A would like to protect its citizens who historically lived there together on territory A, but it is now separated and some citizens live on territory B. For example, Russians live in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and before that, they lived in the USSR. When it comes to the tools used in soft annexation, it should be noted that hybrid threats are used, and without realizing it, over time we only begin to realize that thoughts, emotions, and views on different things were simply manipulated. We can mention the last example of Kazakhstan, where people's moods were manipulated and the people simply used the mood of the people against the old regime as if the new one came to power.

Preferably, we should mention the propaganda that is conveyed by all media. Certainly, this includes the media, which is the driving force in shaping the mood of people who watch the news, and various analytical programs with notorious guests whose opinions are important to the general public. Now we highlight the propaganda itself as a peculiar element that is used, including in the media.

It is the media as a whole, which skillfully and step by step completely transforms the population from critical to infantile, which can't think and analyze and just like a sponge absorbs information without further analysis. We should also mention disinformation, which is part of soft annexation and is one of the most important components of hybrid threats. It confuses people so that they lose their way in the information space and don't know where the truth is and where lies are. Eventually, they lose immunity to the analysis of information and become certain "vegetables" that are already exposed to the information influence of country A. Thus, a person becomes unconsciously controlled and victimized by the aggressor country, A.

Diplomacy is used as an element of soft power to gain the support of people who don't respond to the media and can critically analyze or, say, fully and completely gain the trust of the population (Nye, 2019: 7). There is no doubt that it doesn't carry anything threatening, but if you look at it from another angle, it is diplomacy that wins people's favor. If diplomacy is built correctly and every step is written and thought out in detail, it won't look like a hybrid threat. Most likely, it is a hybrid threat, but very cleverly disguised to win favor.

Culture, as a separate item, should be taken out of the fact that, with the help of various events, it is through cultural nature that one or another opinion about traditions and more is imposed. This is a long-term process that can be broadcast daily through the media and other

tools of mass media. The most important thing is that diplomacy can be involved in all these events.

Special citations should be acquired for the distinct forces applied to ensure peace and security. They are created by country A to protect against an imaginary enemy that exists or from a real threat that was provoked by country A itself concerning country B. By all means, national interests are taken into account, but they can be modified by country A, which again does so mainly through the media and by working directly with the populace through people working for country A.

Using ethnic groups as a driving force to achieve the goal of conquering a certain territory through soft annexation (Schaefer, 2015: 840). This is done, first of all, to explain why it is essential to carry out a soft annexation of part of the territory of country B. Without this group or further progress of the entire project of country A to capture part of the territory and its subsequent soft annexation, it is impossible since there is no certain group of people through which it is possible to influence the mood of the rest of the populace of a certain range of the country.

To sum up, we can see such structures as (i) the use of propaganda, (ii) the use of media, (iii) disinformation, (iv) the use of diplomacy and its institutions, (v) the use of culture as an instrument, (vi) use of special forces troops, (vii) use of national interests, and (viii) use of ethnic groups as a driving force in gaining control of people's minds. Therefore, these points and components are important to fully implement the plan for the soft annexation of territory B. If we look at the concept of Nye and McClory, especially Nye highlights a soft force and follows it, and the annexation is divided into three parts: (i) culture, (ii) political values, and (iii) foreign policies.

1) culture is the set of practices that create meaning for society, and it has many manifestations.

2) government policies at home and abroad are another potential source of soft power. Similarly, foreign policies strongly affect soft power. Government policies can reinforce or diminish a country's soft power.

3) Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical and indifferent to the opinion of others or based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power (Nye, 2008: 94).

Also, in other terms, it distinguishes five categories: (i) government, (ii) culture, (iii) diplomacy, (iv) education, and (v) business or innovation (McClory, 2015: 10). The first item is the country's political values. The item of "culture" includes sets of practices that have been created and are important to society. The third point should include international politics. With the 4th and 5th points, everything is clear from the names. However, it should be noted that education is also a soft force and an annexation to some extent. A striking example is the Russian language in Ukraine (Arel and Ruble, 2006: 365). She taught for many years after Ukraine's independence. If we take the annexation of Crimea as one of the factors, the people, some of whom belonged to Russia with their ancestors, but at the level of education where the Russian language was preserved for a long time, were allowed to feel like a Russian who was not oppressed (Bilaniuk, 2005: 15).

A business where big players at the state level play a key role in creating certain conditions for soft annexation should also be mentioned; that is, oligarchs and wealthy people who have influence over the government and own certain wealth have the opportunity to be one of the components of further soft annexation. There are also three components to soft annexation: (i) agents, (ii) spheres, and (iii) instruments. So, agents are individuals or organizations that create and implement soft power initiatives. These may include individuals, networks, civil society, the private sector, and so on. The second item includes foreign and domestic policy, culture, business, education, technology, sports, tourism, and so on.

And the third category includes specific tools or means by which soft power is activated. Politics and law, agreements of various levels (both international and domestic), programs (cultural diplomacy, national branding, etc.), exhibitions, events, conferences, symposia, and other events. So, after analyzing the components of soft annexation, we can conclude that this soft annexation includes all the means used for the ultimate goal – the annexation of a particular area. These may include agents, the private sector, civil society, influential people, the media, propaganda, and disinformation. Also, the use of national interests, the degree of popular sentiment, and ethnic groups through which it is possible to exert influence.

### **2.3. WHY OCCUPATION PRECEDES ANNEXATION**

So why was the annexation preceded by occupation? There are numerous reasons, but the foremost and most meaningful is that the occupancy is a transitional stage to the annexation, which will latterly be acquitted out by the enwrapping state concerning the engaged range (de Brabandere, 2009: 120). As it was mentioned above, after the enwrapping

country has enthralled a certain range, it introduces impermanent governance, which has its center in the capital of the enwrapping state. There is also a center in the enthralled ranges, but it still opens to the main center in the capital of the enwrapping country. By all means, troops are introduced to carry out orders from the capital. In the future, when a certain period passes, the work with the population continues, which in turn leads to the annexation, which is carried out in the engaged range. This includes the tools listed in Part 1.1.4.2. “Soft annexation”. This section noted that the use of the media as a tool of propaganda and disinformation is very effective in establishing some control over people who are methodically influenced and further controlled. And then, for the occupier, the choice of voting, which is carried out in a referendum.

After that, we need to understand four things that will be installed in the long run: (i) the law will be in force before the annexation and before the referendum. Will norms be respected that respect human rights and their constitutional rights on the model of the former administration (before the occupation) or will the laws of the enwrapping state take effect immediately; (ii) whether the legal framework will be fully implemented in the annexed territory as well as in the range of the occupier throughout the country. Will certain special constitutional norms be worked out, which will be approved separately in the future; (iii) to what extent the terms of the agreement and the established new norms and rules will be convenient for residents who will live under the new government after the referendum; (iv) to whom the range will eventually belong and to which administration the population will be vanquished.

That is, based on these points, we can conclude that occupancy is only a bridge that further paves the way for annexation and not vice versa. And having already established certain rules and norms, that is, having prepared the ground, it will be possible to make an annexation, which will lead to an official change of administration that will be controlled by the enveloping power in the future.

## CHAPTER III

### 3. DATA AND CASES ON ANNEXATION

#### 3.1. CASES ON ANNEXATION

Qualitative analysis is a complex analysis that should be explained by its field actions as well as its interests and difficulties in constructing the object (Minayo, 2012: 625). In this case, our object will be annexation and its components. Also, one of the main pretensions is that the researcher's role is to achieve a "holistic" (systemic, entailing, interfused) overview of the environment under study: its sense, its patterns, and its unequivocal and potential rules (Miles and Huberman, 1984: 6). As it was said, senses are produced and sequestered by various social subjects and objects, therefore enacting particular illuminative dispositions that produce certain possibilities and avert others (Doty, 1996: 4).

Qualitative data provides observers with a way to quantify data. Certainly, it should also be noted that in the case of annexations, attention should be paid to who is annexing the country or part of it and also to the country being annexed. Without hesitation, we should pay attention to what forces were involved and under what circumstances this or that side had the advantage. We should mention the regime of the country that annexed the territory at that time, as well as whether the world structure was monopolar, bipolar, or multipolar. It is always necessary to begin by introducing a meaning so that there can be a fact (Barthes, 1981: 15).

Furthermore, we should also remark on the key factors that prejudiced the transition. This refers to how one or the other side won the annexation of one region or another. What methods and tools were used to achieve the goals? And as a consequence, we contextualize the above and bring it to the broader structures within which these aspects were in a given period. That is, with a qualitative approach to the analysis of annexations, we will be able to understand how much the annexed range was prejudiced by the country that carried out the annexation. What are the sources that influenced the course of events and actions of people who were in a certain period when the annexation took place, and was it the effect of propaganda through the media as it happened with the annexation of Crimea (Grant, 2015: 68)? Especially, we can pay attention to the case of the annexation in 1824 of the provinces of Guanacaste, when the people were helped to choose the right path for the province's future (Shin and Hytrek, 2002: 468). Here we will see and understand the system of annexations that existed during the above-mentioned period. We will take into account some examples to see the main characteristics. Thus, if we conduct a qualitative analysis of the annexations that took

place in the period from 1816 to 2022, we can identify 3 stages + 1 new stage, or rather, 3 periods + 1 new period, into which all 54 cases of annexations can be divided.

### **3.1.1. Period from 1816 to 1945**

During this period, there were annexations of mostly large states over small countries due to the search for new territories with raw materials that large states would use to their advantage. At the same time, large countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, France, and others have sought to seize more islands to have strategic influence globally. That is, to dominate ocean waters, expanding their influence in both trade and military dominance in certain areas around the world.

Concerning the period during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, we can say that Great Britain actively dominated the world, and they actively tried to gain control over the territory of Southern Africa. During the 1870s, the United Kingdom annexed Transvaal in 1877, Walvis Bay in 1878, Zululand in 1887, and the Boer Republic in 1902. As for Transvaal, we can say that this territory was annexed, and as usual, Britain supported the opposite side. In this case, Britain also started using propaganda, telling people that the government in Transvaal is an opponent, they want to destroy Natal's inhabitants, and it is also a failed state. Additionally, before doing that, Britain tried to negotiate with Transvaal, but Britain decided to annex Transvaal on April 12, 1877, without asking the inhabitants of Transvaal or holding a referendum (Ray, 2013: 27).

Concerning Walvis Bay, it was annexed in March 1878 (Dreyer, 1984: 510). It was annexed because this point had access to the interior waters of South Africa. But officially, nobody owned this bay, and formally, Britain annexed it when there was no control. In this case, Britain used no negotiations or referendums with others to claim this territory. In the case of the Zululand annexation, we can see that the civil war and the unstable situation among Zululand settlers helped Britain gain success in the annexation. By all means, Britain gave a lot of money and, in this way, sponsored local governments, and they became loyal to Britain. Also, people didn't like that, and creating instability helped a lot, and in 1887 it was finally annexed (Laband, 2003: 53).

In respect of another big player, the USA, they adjoined (annexed) Texas on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March in 1845 (Barker, 1946: 49). After gaining freedom from Spain, Mexico started to live as an autonomous state, but some small groups of semi-autonomous Americans wanted to live in another way in the Texas region, and the Mexican administration tried to regulate this situation. In 1836 started a fortified conflict that lasted for a long time, but in the same year

Texas became an autonomous state, and until 1845 it existed separately from the USA and Mexico. Mexico didn't officially accept that Texas State would exist separately. On the other hand, the USA officially accepted Texas as a separate and autonomous state in 1837. In this case, the most important reason that people from Texas wanted to join the USA was because they could retain title to its public lands. Also, we should mention that some people who lived at that time in the region of the USA settled in Texas, and their loyalty to the US government and the possibility to join the USA played the most important role in 1845, when Texas joined the USA and became a state of this country (Maltz, 2006: 399).

Also, we can take into account another case from Cuba, which was held in 1898. In this case, the USA annexed Cuba because the settlers wanted to live without Spanish representatives. Cuban settlers started the war against Spain in 1868, and in June 1898, the USA army came to Cuba together with Cuban settlers and fought against the Spanish army because only Cuba wasn't strong enough to fight against Spain by itself. Certainly, Cuba, with the help of the US army, won Spain, but in reality, in 1902, Cuba didn't gain independence, and a lot of USA representatives stayed on the territory of Cuba. Formally, it was an independent country, but the USA controlled it, and in 1901, the USA government made an amendment to the law about the allocation of the US army, which allowed the US to stay within the range of Cuba (Plokhiy, 2021: 25-26). In the same year, the USA annexed the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii. All these cases are the same because the USA wanted to dominate this part of the Pacific Ocean, and for this, it used troops and the navy to gain success against Spain in 1898 (Chang, 2015: 71). Also, we should mention Samoa, which was divided into three parts among the USA, Germany, and the United Kingdom. After accepting agreement among these countries, the USA's part in Samoa was also an important point in dominating and having a presence in the Pacific Ocean (Michal, 1992: 137).

Another big player in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, France also conquered the territories of Tahiti, New Caledonia, and the Leeward Islands. The first one, New Caledonia, was taken under control in 1853 and remained as its colony (Robertson, 2017: 1). There was no resistance, and this territory became both a colony and a penal colony. Another territory they conquered was Tahiti in 1880 (Newbury, 2019: 194). In this case, France occupied this territory for a long time and divided its interests with Britain. France negotiated with the son of a Tahitian queen, and finally, it was annexed. But before that, beginning in 1840, started assimilation with French people who came to Tahiti Island. Political and military aspects of colonization existed, but conquering and then annexing territory in Tahiti had differences, for example, with New Caledonia, which was also annexed by France in 1853. Also, the assimilation of

language, the judicial system, and culture played one of the most important roles in the subsequent annexation of Tahiti by France (Saura, 2015: 340). And the third one – we mean the Leeward Islands – was taken under control in 1897. Here we can say that a series of conflicts and wars between French troops and local citizens lasted for 17 years, from 1880 to 1897, when France won this battle. These islands were taken under control because, at that time (like in the case of Holland and New Guinea), France wanted to extend its impact into the ocean, but in the case of France, it was the Atlantic Ocean (Newbury, 1956: 272).

Also, we should mention that Holland also dominated the multipolar world and annexed some territories, as was the case with the annexation of New Guinea in 1848. By all means, it started in 1828, when Holland came to this island to search for new resources and gain control over new territories, but the main idea is that the king of Holland recognized Dutch sovereignty and it became part of Holland, and no elections or votes were held at that time. Holland was so powerful for the inhabitants of New Guinea that they didn't resist for a long period of time (Chauvel, 2005: 105).

Without hesitation, the Japanese annexation of Taiwan in 1895 should be adduced. We can discern that this annexation was passed after the Sino-Japanese war in the 1894-1895 period, and Japan congeals their assignees who were ruled by Taiwan, and these congeals were only Japanese service troops. At that time, Japan was much more influential, and China, at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, after the Opium Wars, defeated one further battle and lost its range for a long time until 1945, when it was suddenly taken over by China after Japan was defeated in World War II.

Also, Germany should be mentioned, and equally the cases of the annexation of the Marshall Islands and one more fragment of the Marshall Islands, known as Caroline in 1899, can be joined. First of all, these territories were annexed by Germany from Spain, the first one in 1885 and the second one in 1899. Also, we should mention that these cases involved a type of non-aggressive annexation, and Germany signed a treaty in both cases with Spain. Sure, at that time, dominance over the Pacific Ocean or its parts was really important, and Spain gave those islands to Germany (Hempenstall, 2016: 12).

By all means, the old system of a multipolar globe in which many states had roughly equal military and economic potential couldn't function forever, and the turning point began in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century when one empire after another began to fall apart. This disintegration and weakening can be seen in Great Britain, which had considerable influence around the globe; nevertheless, as long wars and subsequent annexations of African territories have

shown, Britain was one of the first great empires to live out its last great times. Through the weakening of Britain's military pole and particularly political changes to some extent, the share of British influence has fallen significantly, whose sphere of influence stretched from the Far Eastern port of Formosa to the nomadic Patagonian plain of the New World in South America before, as we will see in the quantitative analysis (Lee, 2014: 249).

In general, the 20<sup>th</sup> century can be branched into two periods because the First World War changed everything. Therefore, if we pay attention to the study of the period from 1901 to 1918, it should be noted first of all the annexation of Bosnia, which started in 1908 (Baba, 2013: 75). It should be noted that this annexation started with the concurrence of both sides. The Ottoman Empire delivered part of its possessions to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and thus it was an intriguing case of annexation because the Russian Empire, impacting Serbia, decided to try to break the annexation, arguing that it would destabilize the region. In Belgrade, Serbians started to make demurrers, and the German Foreign Minister didn't understand what special interests and rights of Serbia had been injured by the annexation (Schmitt, 1931: 660). Yes, the Ottoman Empire has indeed fallen, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire adjoined Bosnia, but the crucial factor was the agreement between the two empires before that in 1878 (Gencer, 2014: 295).

Also, we can mention the annexation of Korea in 1910 and Bessarabia in 1918. We can join these two cases because they happened in a non-aggressive way after the agreement between both sides. Clearly, in the case of Korea, we can say that Japan adjoined the country, but it started five years before the official annexation. After the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Korea and Japan inked a treaty where Japan started to control Korean ranges, and after that, Japan was adding to its dominance. In 1907, they inked one more treaty where Korea was deprived of the management of its internal affairs, and finally, in 1910, it was officially annexed by Japan (Lone, 1991: 171). In the case of Bessarabia, we can say that in 1918, annexation happened because Bessarabia had become independent and wanted to be under the protection of a more powerful country, which is why the council of Bessarabia voted for joining Romania. But after some time, Romanian pledges about some independence for Bessarabia in the Romanian squad were abandoned, and Bessarabia had no right to do business on its own. So, we can see how two different countries, in the same way, after annexing countries, started to dominate the internal affairs of annexed ranges (Bruchis, 1987: 195).

It should also be mentioned about the case of the US annexation of the West Indies. First of all, the USA feared that Germany would annex that territory, so they decided to gain

that land before them (Scott, 1916: 853). Also, the main reason why the USA annexed the West Indies was that Germany, after annexing it, would try to take control of the West Indies. Before that, the West Indies belonged to Denmark, and logically, the USA tried to play faster and gain control over that range. Before that, the West Indies were sold by Denmark, and the main reason for the USA to buy this land and annex it after that was to gain control and keep that part of the USA safe from possible invasions. In this case, it wasn't important which regime dominated in both countries. The main goal was to gain results in controlling the southeastern part of the Caribbean basin on March 31, 1917 (De Booy and Faris, 1918: 16).

Also, we can mention two more annexations by Germany in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which were made before World War II. Austria and Czechoslovakia should also be declared, and in 1938 they were both annexed by Germany in a fast way. Austria was annexed on March 13, 1938 (Rathkolb, 2018: 282). First of all, it happened because four years ago, the administration of Austria was changed, and they tried to be closer to Mussolini, but the turning point exactly with Germany happened in 1936, when two Nazis entered the administration of Austria. After that, this unit started to work closer. Also, we should mention that in February 1938, Hitler started to pressure Austrian representatives to join Austria in Germany because, as Hitler thought, 10 million Germans live outside Germany and it is better to join their native country. On March 10<sup>th</sup>, people voted, but it was under great pressure and terror. Also, Nazis used propaganda to gain successful results in the referendum. On March 11<sup>th</sup>, beneath Hitler's pressure, the Chancellor of Austria was changed into Hitler's representative, Seyss-Inquart, and a formal referendum, which was carried out under the control in two days, was formal, and officially Austria was adjoined by Germany on March 13<sup>th</sup>, 1938 (Niescior, 2021: 236). So, in this case, we see that a formal referendum didn't show the real desire of the population to join Germany, and only political changes under pressure, terror, and propaganda helped Hitler join Austria to Germany.

Another case with Czechoslovakia also happened in 1938. But in this case, Germany handled long-term residents who had German origins. We want to introduce Sudetenland, which will be taken into account. It was the first step to annexation because the majority in those ranges were Sudeten Germans, and in 1938, the German Nazis provoked the final stage of a big extremity when this region wanted to join Germany because of the history that connected Sudeten Germans with Germany. At the same time, propaganda played an important role. It was made by the German Nazis, but it was made by the pro-German party that worked in Germany, and since 1935, this party has received the most votes and started to dominate in Czechoslovakia. But in September 1938, the pro-German party was abandoned,

and Hitler didn't like that. All in all, on the 30<sup>th</sup> of September in Munich, an agreement was signed (Winter and Sweet, 2009: 845).

Concerning the case of the annexation of Albania by Italy, we can say that this annexation was made after that war. At that time, the fascist regime was much more powerful than Albanian representatives. Because the Fascist and Nazi regimes worked together and had one aim – to gain control over territories – Italy was a good example of how it could be done. It was made fast by the invasion of Albania over five days in April 1939. The Albanian government escaped to Greece, and formally, until 1943, Italy controlled this area (Barolli, 2005: 248).

In the case of Hatay in 1939, Turkey adjoined (annexed) this range after signing a treaty with France. Before that, the Hatay area was under the dominion of France after World War I and had its privileges because the citizens were Arabs, Armenians, and Turks. In 1923, Atatürk proclaimed that this range was Turkey's, and after that, the main aim of Turkey was to return to this area. After that, Turks who lived on the territory of the Hatay area started to make reforms and form organizations that supported Turkey. So here we can see that Turkey started to play an important role a long time before annexing the Hatay area. Turkey invested in that part of Turk citizens who maintained Turkey and their reunion in the future, and before that, the name of the Hatay area was Sanjak of Alexandretta. Needless to say, Atatürk played a key role in connecting this province, and in 1936 he asked the League of Nations to resolve Hatay's question, and the League of Nations twisted a constitution so that Sanjak of Aleksandretta, or Hatay, became an autonomous province in Syria. In 1938, Hatay became sovereign, and the next year it was annexed by Turkey after a vote of the legislature, where it was accepted that Hatay became part of Turkey. Certainly, Turkey invested a lot of resources in such a campaign, and from 1923 to 1938, it made a lot of progress in joining the Hatay area in 1939 (Khadduri, 1945: 423). Atatürk used Turk citizens to achieve his goal of annexing some parts of Syria, and it became especially obvious that the "independent" government of the Hatay area was carefully designated and was paid to gain confident results in annexing the Hatay area.

One of the biggest cases was when the USSR annexed three territories, namely Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, in 1940. This happened because, in 1939, these three countries allowed the USSR to locate its army and military bases. The next year, the USSR annexed these countries, and before that, the previous leaders of those three territories were exiled.

After that, new puppet governments came to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and recognized the determination and requested inclusion into the USSR in 1940 (Anušauskas, 2014: 12).

### **3.1.2. Period from 1946 to 1989**

Generally, during this period, 13 annexations happened after wars, and only four ended by referendum or were taken without any war, like in the case of Rockall in 1955, which will also be taken into account. This period can be singled out primarily because it was the period of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA. Secondly, in this period, there were annexations of ranges that countries took back because states themselves, such as India, obtained independence and wanted to return as much as possible of the ranges that they considered their own, some of them like the annexation of Hyderabad in 1948 or Goa in 1961. In both cases, India used its soldiers to advance victory and take control over these ranges, which belonged to India. By all means, India at that moment was very powerful, became independent, and wanted to obtain control over ranges, which had not a lot of power but were strategically important for India.

It should also be noted that the world had a bipolar structure with a clear dominance and struggle between two states, which were already discussed above: the USA and the USSR. Most importantly, the world became bipolar, and the struggle between the USA and the USSR became the main theme throughout the Cold War. Especially among the countries affected by this struggle was Vietnam, where the struggle between the USA and the USSR had been going on for years. In this case, after the war, we can observe an interesting example of annexation where North and South Vietnam united in 1976 (Elliott, 1982: 36). Yes, it was an annexation, but it was a voluntary, or one might say a soft annexation, where historically two parts of the country had to become whole again to become a stronger country and survive in harsh conditions.

The main point was that the USSR during the Cold War took control over some countries in Europe, like Czechoslovakia, and it helped the USSR control governments that became puppets, like in the cases of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. As we know, after the Prague Spring Revolution in 1968, the USSR sent their army to stop this revolution, and a short war began where the USSR army won and controlled the government in Czechoslovakia until 1991. But the main detail that must be taken into account is that the USA didn't annex any territory during the Cold War, and the USSR tried to start a big war in 1962, during the Cube crisis (Allison, 2012: 11). Also, we should mention the USSR's annexation of the Kuril Islands, which were taken under control after winning the battle against Japan in 1946. It is

almost the same case as the case of Taiwan, which was mentioned above in Chapter 2.1.1. and it was an important annexation for the USSR in gaining control of some small parts of the Pacific Ocean and gaining strategic positions not far from Japan.

After five years, China in 1951 obtained control across Tibet, which was very vital for the Chinese régime. Before that, Tibet, from 1912 to 1951, was an autonomous state that lived without the impact of China because this country was very powerless at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. But afterward, World War II between China and Tibet happened, and in 1951 they signed an arrangement where the Communist regime would “peacefully” liberate the populace of Tibet. Certainly, before that, Tibet became less influential, and wars with China made Tibet feebler than before, which aided China in obtaining control and annexing Tibet (Goldstein, 2006: 148).

Also, we should mention that the main methods used to gain annexation were war, and as we mentioned above, 13 cases of annexation became possible only after wars, but there are some exceptions among them, like the annexation of Rockall by the United Kingdom in 1955. This annexation was important for Great Britain because it was an important strategic point for the country in the Atlantic Ocean, but this territory couldn't be settled by people, and only ships could reach this small rock and control it. It also controlled some parts of the Atlantic Ocean that Great Britain dominated at that time. One more event with Great Britain occurred in the Falkland Islands in 1982 in contradiction to Argentina, and about this situation, we can say that the United Kingdom again had war, but this time with a big country, which we mentioned above. This case is very stimulating because Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and started the war, declaring that this range was Argentinian, and in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Britain took these islands illegally. On the other hand, Britain had owned that island since 1841, and it was their colony. Definitely, in Chapter 3, we will see the difference between Great Britain and Argentina and why Great Britain won that war and annexed that territory again officially from Argentina after its invasion in 1982 (Snyder, 1989: 1).

Between Israel and Jordan, we have two examples that should be mentioned: in 1950, Jordan adjoined the West Bank from Israel, and in 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem from Jordan. In both components, there was warfare, and in the second case of East Jerusalem, after six days of warfare, Israel expanded their purpose and adjoined, or, as Israel said, reunified, their historical ranges. In the case of West Bank Jordan, after the Arab-Israeli warfare obtained triumph, and first of all, Israel wasn't ready to struggle with such prevailing countries at that time as Israel appeared 3 years before the annexation of the West Bank, Israel couldn't obtain

triumph because of the feebleness of the army that wasn't ready. On the other hand, when Israel became much more influential and in 1967 adjoined East Jerusalem very quickly, after six days of war (Friesel, 2016: 363). Also, we should mention the Golan Heights, which were taken under Israeli control after the war with Syria. Here we must remark that this height has big strategic meaning and value in the region, and Israel took control over these ranges in 1967, but officially only in 1981 did it make an annexation of that region. Officially, this region wasn't recognized by world leaders as the Israel region, but in 2019, the president of the USA proclaimed that this range is Israel's range. In general, we can say that these cases of Israel's annexations of the Golan Heights, West Bank, and East Jerusalem weren't recognized by world leaders and organizations because, like in the case of the Golan Heights, predominantly Israel took control over areas that didn't belong to them in history (Kumaraswamy, 1999: 1155).

Also, we should mention that in this period, the annexation of Sikkim happened after a vote in 1975 by India. Another case that was calm and without warfare was in 1961 in Dadra and Nagar Haveli, adjoining India. In the case of India in 1961 in Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Sikkim in 1975, these blackballs were groomed, and notably in the case of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, where the range was carried off in 1954 after a long period of Portuguese vanquishing around, Indians arranged everything from 1954 to 1961 to join this range, which de facto was under Indian regulation but de jure was a sovereign state. After adding Goa in 1961 to this allotment, we mean Dadra and Nagar Haveli, which are formally part of India (Rodrigues, 2013: 166).

The last peaceful annexation was the annexation of West New Guinea by Indonesia; after that, it was named "Act of Free Choice", where de facto West New Guinea didn't brand a free choice because the more powerful opponent, in this case, Indonesia, who annexed this range, before annexation sent from Indonesian militaries, and after that made a vote, but undisputedly, not more than 1000 people, which were designated by Indonesian representatives, took part in this "referendum" where they voted for the annexation, or it is better to say for "freedom". By all means, this wasn't a choice for the freedom of settlers in West New Guinea, and they didn't take part in it. Normally it can't be counted as official annexation as native settlers wanted, but the UN organization counted it as the self-government of West New Guinea, and finally, in 1969, this territory was annexed by Indonesia (Janki, 2010: 2).

In the cases of Eritrea and East Timor, the same thing happened: these two cases were adjoined after the war. In the case of East Timor, in 1976, Indonesia invaded this country, but before that, people who lived in the range of East Timor wanted a sovereign country, and with the help of the local elite, the citizens started to be proactive and gained success in becoming sovereign, but Indonesia decided in another way and thought that East Timor has no right to be sovereign and only Indonesia has the right to decide what to do with this territory. It was a good moment for annexing this range because Portugal, which had owned this territory since the 18<sup>th</sup> century, became less powerful and, starting in the 1950s, started to lose control over many territories that were their colonies beginning in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. So, here we can conclude that the weakness of Portugal, the readiness of citizens of East Timor for freedom, and at the same time their weakness of the army and weakness of the structure of a possible sovereign country played a big role in the successful annexation of East Timor in 1976 by Indonesia (Hoadley, 1977: 133).

In the case of Eritrea, which happened in 1962, we can mark a noteworthy turning point by observing spinal 10 years before the annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia, Eritrea underwent a confederation through a voting process where only a select few could bounce intimately. However, this arrangement was brief. In 1954-1955, Ethiopia began exerting its influence on the local governance of Eritrea, particularly favoring Christians, while Eritrean Muslims opposed the growing dominance of representatives from Ethiopia. The Eritrean public began to acquire soldiers to brawl against Ethiopian attorneys. After that wafted the warfare, where at the end of it Ethiopia determined to annex by itself Eritrean ranges in 1962 and made this country their province on the local level, started to dominate Ethiopian representatives as Ethiopia planned before the warfare (Pateman, 1990: 81).

The last case of such a period adduced above is Western Sahara, where formally the executive of Western Sahara was deported and the complete range of Western Sahara was branched amid Morocco and Mauritania, where two-thirds of the whole range adjoined Morocco and one-third came Mauritanian, but three years later Morocco swayed the Mauritanian part, and the whole country legitimately was adjoined by one country, Morocco. Actually, in 1976, a convention between Morocco and Mauritania was signed without any warfare, and the Western Sahara executive was, as we mentioned above, in exile. But the key success of annexing the range of Western Sahara was the big armed forces of Morocco and Mauritania, which came without warfare and without using munitions to Western Sahara (Lovatt and Mundy, 2021: 5).

### **3.1.3. Period from 1989 till 2022**

In this period, it can be noted that Russia has mostly illegally annexed the territories of other countries, either alone or with the help of others (as was the case with Karabakh in the 1990s). Regarding the qualitative analysis of these cases, we can highlight the systematic approach used by Russia to achieve its goals. This includes, first of all, the so-called “rescue” of the Russian-speaking population from oppression allegedly perpetrated by the authorities of the country where they live. It also includes the media, which prepares the population for a long time to separate from the country where they live and join Russia.

It should also be mentioned that the generation that served in the Soviet era and was devoted to this state was ideologically inspired to return to Russia, which, in their opinion, could return to the Soviet era and where their activities would be the same as in Soviet times. Those are the parties that were formed after the collapse of the USSR to operate in post-Soviet times. For example, Ukraine, where the Communist Party functioned, simply changed and didn't go anywhere, and narratives that liked the elderly didn't disappear.

Separately, we can mention the annexation of Kuwait, which was made by Iraq in 1990. The regime of Hussein wanted to get much more money for petrol and gas, which existed in Kuwait, and this country was very rich in them. That is why, in 1990, Iraq invaded the territory of Kuwait, gaining success in 2 days. It was a short war in which Iraq gained control and started to earn much more money by controlling petrol, and at that time Iraq controlled 20 percent of the world's petrol and gas. Nobody recognized this invasion and annexation, and the next day, the USA and their partners helped Kuwait free this country from invaders (Grammas, 1991: 2).

Furthermore, we can mention the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where, in 1994, Armenia annexed the territory of Karabakh. We should mention here that after the breakup of the USSR, newly created countries started the war, but on the side of Armenia, there were some Russian troops, like in the war in Karabakh in 2020. In this case, Armenia won that war and annexed the territory of Karabakh, but the roots of this conflict began in 1988, when, as we can assume, the USSR regime wanted to pay attention to this protest because, at the same time, in Afghanistan, they defeated them, and people should concentrate their attention on another problem that was created by the “citizens” of Karabakh who wanted to join the Armenian republic and not be in the squad of the Azerbaijan republic. In 1988, the USSR officially joined Karabakh as the Armenian Republic, but Azerbaijan rejected it. So,

the long war began, and after 1991 it lasted for three years, during which Russia, together with Armenia, won that war and annexed Karabakh for Armenia (Melander, 2001: 51).

### **3.1.3.1. Prydnistrovya or Transnistria 1992**

In respect of the area of Transnistria, in 1992, instantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this entity in the form of a republic had the leadership, which was located in Moscow, and the puppet government on the spot simply controlled part of the territory. But at the same time, it should be noted that from a legal point of view, this entity had no force because part of the elite decided to separate from Moldova and have their own state with its own borders and system. But the intentions were not usually confirmed in favor of the self-proclaimed republic of Transnistria by Gorbachev's declaration of December 22, 1990, which stated that the republic after the Second Congress had no legal force to exist separately.

Previously, in June 1992, Transnistria proclaimed a state, but the whole civilized world refused to recognize this entity (Cojocaru, 2006: 261). As we noted in Chapter 1.1.2, secession took place after the Cold War and could be initiated by a larger state. Furthermore, seeing the significance of the ongoing warfare between Ukraine and Russia, we can say that the Russian Federation has specially planned such an entity to influence and activate the range to further increase pressures in future wars or conflicts.

It is a secession from Moldova. Until 2022, the unsung democracy worked "alone" and didn't take part in conflicts or wars. But in 2022, in May, Ukraine, fighting against the Russian Federation, began bombing the city council in Tiraspol to raise tensions on the border with Ukraine and divert the attention of some troops at the initiative of Russia. Also, in the future, with a certain periodicity, Russia tried to drag Transnistria into the war against Ukraine and try to open a second front; however, taking into account the supply of militaries, the Russian Federation abandoned this plan, starting to recruit and prepare men from Transnistria for the warfare with Ukraine. Here we can see only the tension that tried to separate Russia from that minor self-placarded state, and it helps Russia to restrain some parts of the Ukrainian troops.

### **3.1.3.2. Georgia 2008**

On this occasion, as the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions were apprehended, the prerequisites were identical to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian media broadcasting in the area reported that the Russian-speaking resident populace was oppressed and that South Ossetians and Abkhazians would be pleased to be living in the Russian Federation. Even so,

these feelings have been spreading for years, and at the same time, through its agency, the Russian Federation has had considerable influence on the people who were happy to meet the Russians. However, there was a three-day war from August 6 to August 8, 2008, as soon as the Russians accused the Georgian powers that be of wrongdoing against their people. Certainly, such a narrative was a cover, and since the whole world knows that Russia is frightened of NATO, the Russian Federation itself formed the image of an opponent who wants to destroy the Russian Federation and is slowly creeping across Georgia's borders at that time in 2008 (Wither, 2016: 75).

### **3.1.3.3. Ukraine 2014**

This is how Ukraine, after gaining independence, was ruled by communists, who quietly continued to function within the state. President Kravchuk, a Soviet-era communist, was also elected. That is where the work of the Communists lived, and their agency, which worked within Ukraine and not only, didn't go anywhere. Given that Ukraine has become a democracy, the Constitution enshrines the right to exist for all parties that want to join the government and that would be elected by the people, regardless of whether they are communists or European parties.

Also, the demilitarization that took place at the behest of President Yanukovich on the territory of Ukraine led to the fact that Ukraine had an incompetent army, which was forced to withdraw from Crimea or join the Russians to be able to continue to function. Therefore, the freedom of action and continued functioning of the Communists under the guise of various parties and agents at all levels provoked further sentiments among Russian-speaking Ukrainians to return to Soviet times. The main reason why this annexation happened without using weapons is the Kharkivski treatment in 2010, when the Ukrainian government signed this treaty and gave permission for the Russian Navy army to stay in Sevastopol until 2042. This helped the Russians start this long procedure, which ended with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Javed, Rahim, and Khan, 2019: 383).

### **3.1.3.4. Ukraine 2022**

Concerning this case of annexation, we can say that the Russian Federation sustained its assault on Ukraine and occupied many regions as of February 24, 2022. Here we can say that it was a planned action to obtain control over all of Ukraine, but the Russian Federation didn't understand that Ukraine would resist the invader. As Russians expected, Ukraine, with their government, which was chosen in the 2019 year, will exist for 2-3 days. Resistance against Russia became possible due to two factors: firstly, the Ukrainian army trained and

used NATO standards for the last eight years; and secondly, before the big war in 2022, the head chief of the Ukrainian army became Zaluzhnyi, who planned well for resistance against Russian troops.

But at the same time, we should mention that the new president, Zelenskiy, became a figure who made a lot by having some people nearby who started to control a lot of spheres in Ukraine. Among them were Tatarov, Yermak, and representatives of the political pro-Russian party Opozytsiynyy Blok Za Zhittia (OBZZ). All these factors played a key role in not preparing in a good way for the invasion of Russian troops in 2022. These people, who operated with Russia and were and are Russian agents, opened the door for Russian troops with ease. We mention when Russia, with ease, invaded some parts of Ukraine in the north, like the Kyiv region, Chernihiv region, and Sumy region. Otherwise, we should mention the Kherson region, which was deloused before the invasion by representatives of the Ukrainian government. Also, some parts of the Ukrainian military were removed to the eastern part of Ukraine because there Ukraine waited for the main part of the Russian military.

#### **3.1.3.4.1. Annexation of Kherson region and Zaporizhzhia region**

First of all, we should mention the annexation of this region because it is located in the south of Ukraine and, at the same time, borders the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which was seized back in 2014 and annexed by Russia. On the eve of the full-scale war, there was a betrayal on the part of the Ukrainian authorities, and the territory that was mined between Kherson and Crimea in the Chongar region became demined, and primarily because of this, the rapid annexation of almost the entire region took place. It also made it possible for the Russian occupiers to advance towards the Zaporizhzhia region and capture almost the entire region with minimal resistance from the Ukrainian military and maximum resistance from the local population. The liberation and de-occupation of the right-bank part of the Kherson region were carried out on November 11, 2022, after the retreat of Russian troops to the territory of the left-bank part of the Kherson region. The annexation of the Zaporizhzhia region took place, as already mentioned above, partly because the Russians were able to pass through the Crimean Peninsula. Also, thanks to a certain advance from the Donetsk region by part of the troops and the cooperation of Ukrainian collaborators with the Russian troops, it helped to capture populated areas.

#### **3.1.3.4.2. Annexation of Kyiv region, Chernihiv region, and Sumy region**

The annexation of the Kyiv area took place partly and mostly in the northern, northeastern, and northwest directions. Why did it happen that Russian troops easily occupied

a large part of the Kyiv region? This happened, first of all, because shortly before the full-scale offensive by Russia, Ukrainian authorities withdrew their troops from the northern direction and thereby exposed sides from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions. This also happened because Ukrainian authorities thought that the offensive would take place only in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Chernihiv region, as already mentioned above, took place because Ukrainian troops were withdrawn from the northern direction, thereby exposing this direction, where irregular troops and volunteer formations remained. Regarding the partial annexation of the Sumy region also taking place thanks to the withdrawal of regular Ukrainian militaries, in this case, Russian militaries were occupying, but in certain cities, the Russian army didn't touch the Ukrainian population, but the destruction took place. So here we can see that no propaganda or some collaborators played a key role in the annexation of these regions; the main reason was the Ukrainian authority, which played a key role in allowing the passage of the Ukrainian borders with Russian militaries.

#### **3.1.3.4.3. Annexation of Kharkiv region**

Because this region also borders the Russian Federation and the regional center in the form of the city of Kharkiv, most of the region came under occupation, and in the city of Kharkiv itself, fierce battles were fought that the Ukrainian army won a month later. Some regional centers in the Kharkiv region were easily captured, especially points that are very close to the border, because the local authorities were loyal to the Russian authorities. Here we can mention representatives of the “Sluga Narody” and the “Oppozytsiynyy blok za zhittia”. To be sure, without collaborators, the successes of the Russians were not so rapid, and it was the collaborators who were bribed by the Russians or recruited by them before the full-scale invasion who helped establish pro-Russian rule after the arrival of Russian troops. It is true that big cities like Kharkiv were not captured, but the hub of Kupyansk was captured and served as an important point for Russians to bring in their techniques.

At the beginning of September 2022, a counter-offensive process by Ukrainian militaries commenced, which quickly instigated the unfettering of the Kharkiv region. In turn, the enwrapping powers that be fled to the ranges of the Russian Federation and Belgorod, to the enthralled ranges of the Donetsk area. From September 8<sup>th</sup> to September 10<sup>th</sup>, more than 30 settlements were liberated, including Kupyansk, Lysychansk, Lyman, Balakliya, and Izyum. Izyum and Kupyansk, which remained key for the Russian Federation due to their strategically important locations, should be highlighted.

#### **3.1.3.4.4. Annexation of Donetsk region and Luhansk region**

First of all, it should be noted that the annexation in 2014 of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, given below as an example, took place partly because of collaborators who facilitated Russian troops and the occupancy authorities to operate in the ranges of these areas. But in 2022, when a full-scale war with the annexation of more regions of Ukraine had already begun, the majority of the Ukrainian population had already left those parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were occupied, and only those who couldn't leave their homes – old people and collaborators – remained in those ranges.

Regarding the annexation of the Luhansk region, we can say there were also a lot of collaborators, and it also depends on the history and geographical contiguity of the borders between this region and the Russian Federation. From 1991 until 2014, this region watched and accepted Russian TV programs, and when pro-Russian parties were elected in this region, there was no problem working with people who became pro-Russian. Also, an important role was played by businessmen who worked with Russians in this region or were Russian originally but received Ukrainian passports. So, from 2014 to 2022, it was no problem for the Russians to gain partial control over this region.

#### **3.1.4. From the 2022 year**

As we mentioned above, there is a new 4<sup>th</sup> period that began in 2022, and from this year, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of some parts of Ukrainian territories, we can see how Russia played the main role in opening many cases of possible annexations and revolutions with wars around the world. The last cases can be mentioned in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Also, we can see how China becomes the main player against the USA, starting to resist and show their power in different parts of the world, especially in Taiwan (Culver, 2022). Also, we should mention that at the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party of China, it was declared that China would annex and join Taiwan shortly, and after that, the USA immediately changed its doctrine of national security strategy, saying that China would become the most threatening country in the near future and that China would be the most consequential challenge to the global order (Renshaw and Martina, 2022). We can mention and predict that the Cold War will appear again in 2022, and the main players are the USA and China. The world turned bipolar again, with the two dominants mentioned above.

Now we can see clearly how, with the help of Russia, China thought that it would dominate the world and that this world could be unipolar with the domination of China. We can see clearly how China supports Russia in the UN and how they get money, military equipment, and techniques from North Korea and Iran, especially. Only this step shows that

the plan of unipolarity failed, and now we will see the main battle during the Second Cold War between the USA and China.

### **3.2. STATISTICS ON ANNEXATION**

In terms of a quantitative analysis of all cases, we should note that country A, which annexed, conquered, or occupied the territory of country B, always has a higher score compared to country B, according to the CINC score, which is a measure of nationwide power (Heim and Miller, 2020: 5). CINC is a Composite Index of National Capability score. It aggregates the six individual measured components of national material abilities into a single value per state and year. The CINC reflects an average of a state's share of the system total of each element of capabilities in each year, weighting each component equally. CINC always ranges between 0 and 1. ``0.0`` would indicate a state had 0% of the total abilities present in the system in that year, whereas ``1.0`` would indicate that the state had 100% of the abilities in a given year. (Singer, Bremew and Stuckey, 1972: 19)

We will divide the analysis into four periods, from 1816 to 2022, considering the world's structure and major powers. The period from 1816 to 1945 (until the end of World War II), when the world was multipolar, will be examined; the period from 1946 to 1989, where the world was bipolar; the period from 1990 to 2007, when the world was unipolar; and the last period from 2008 to 2022, when the world began to return to a bipolar structure and finally returned in 2022.

#### **3.2.1. Period from 1816 to 1945 year**

To better understand the chosen period, we will split it into two sub-periods. It will be split into two intervals: 1816 to 1900, which is the primary interval, and 1901 to 1945.





Table 3.1. CINC components of countries that annexed territories from 1816 to 1900

If we look at the years from 1816 to 1945, it can be determined that Great Britain predominated in the world, and its CINC in 1888 was 0.18865056. However, if we take into account the starting point from 1816 to the period 1900, then this indicator fell sharply because Great Britain itself had already begun to decline, and having colonies everywhere simply could not draw funding to all the points in the world where it had its possession. Therefore, the campaigns in Africa were successful, but the protracted wars that followed the annexation of territories took place at a great cost. By all means, the annexations carried out by the empire, especially in the southern part of Africa, also played a role.

Also, we can pay attention to the USA because their CINC from 1816 to 1900 was increased to 0.18799882 points, and it became the biggest point in 1900. To compare with Britain in 1900, their CINC was 0.1752758. At that time, the USA dominated the world and also conquered new territories that were taken from Spain with ease during the Spanish-American War in 1898. Also, we can take into account that the Netherlands had its territories in the Asian part of the world but also started to lose them. As we can see, this fall on the CINC indicator of the Netherlands in 1824 was 0.038766857 and in 1900 became 0.007061319. That is why, with this component, we can understand why the Netherlands became less powerful and why they started to lose their colonies. Also, we can take into account Germany, where their CINC indicator was raised during the last 33 years, from 1877


to 1900, and the increase of the indicator was from 0.098763414 to 0.13152538. During these years, we can see how Germany took control of the Marshall Islands and the Caroline Islands (which also belong to the Marshall Islands' system).

As regards Japan and France's CINC indicators, Japan was almost stable, and the peak of this indicator was in 1895 at 0.031202998, and on average it was not more than 0.028886403, and this year we can see why Japan won the China War and annexed Taiwan. The CINC indicator in France fell twice from 1845 to 1900, dropping from 0.14144173 to 0.074714355, but it wasn't a problem for them to annex Tahiti and New Caledonia. It wasn't a powerful state, but it was important to preserve some dominance in that part of the Pacific Ocean.




**Table 3.2.** CINC components of China and Japan in 1895

Furthermore, we can see on the diagram that the CINC indicator is smaller in Japan, but since Taiwan was a part of China at the time of the transfer of Taiwan to Japan, the indicator will be indicated for China. However, having lost the war in 1895, it was Japan that won over China. In this case, we see that China wasn't powerful, even with a much higher CINC indicator of 0.15219986 compared to Japan's CINC indicator of 0.031202998. Certainly, this fall started in the mid-60<sup>th</sup>, and the Opium Wars didn't allow China to be more powerful in 1895 in contradiction to Japan, and this also helped Japan win against China and obtain control over Taiwan.



**Table 3.3.** CINC components of USA and Spain in 1898


In this table, we see a clear example of how the CINC indicator gives a complete picture of how one country completely dominates another and that losing a war was predicted by this indicator. That is, Spain lost the US territorial war in 1898, and the US did not have any particular problems with the Spanish troops; it was obvious and predictable. As a result of the war, the USA annexed Guam and the Philippines. To compare the CINC indicator, we see the difference as the USA had 0.19706185 against Spain, which had 0.017012449. It was obvious that the annexation of the above-mentioned territories would be in favor of the USA.



**Table 3.4.** CINC components of Germany and Spain in 1899


In this case, we again clearly see how, in 1899, Germany defeated Spain without much trouble, and this can be understood primarily by the CINC indicator, which reflects the difference in power between the two states that fought. To compare the CINC indicators of both states, Germany in 1899 had 0.12672231 against Spain's CINC indicator of 0.016421596. So, 12 times Germany's CINC indicator was bigger than the CINC of Spain.

Now we are moving to another historical period, from 1901 to 1945. This historical period will be divided into five countries that annexed ranges in this period. The first will include the USA, USSR, United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany. The second will include Norway, Italy, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Turkey, and Romania.




**Table 3.5.** CINC components of countries that annexed territories from 1900-1945

Due to this diagram, first of all, we can see that the USA in 1918 had 0.29487148 and in 1938 had 0.1707712, and during this period, the USA lost 42 percent of its CINC indicator. Also, Germany's CINC indicator fell from 0.17243373 in 1918 to 0.008912835 in 1934. On the other hand, the Japanese CINC score became 0,059 in the 1938-1939 years. We should mention the United Kingdom, where the CINC score became less powerful, and compared with the 1902 year in 1940, it became less than 56 percent. And concerning the USSR, we can see clearly that after the wars from 1918 to 1921, the USSR became more powerful and prepared for World War II. To compare the lowest point of the USSR CINC score in 1918 with the highest one in 1938, the difference is 5.1 times bigger.




**Table 3.6.** CINC components of countries that annexed territories from 1900-1945

Now we will pay attention to the countries that were annexed during this period from 1901 to 1945 and the CINC scores we have for these countries. This list will include Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Austria, and three Baltic countries: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. On the occasion of Denmark, this country gained an agreement with the USA and sold the Danish West Indies without any war. In the case of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, we can, with the assistance of this component, understand why the USSR annexed these three states in one year, in 1940. Lithuania had 0,000815, Latvia had 0,000891, and Estonia had 0,000491 CINC components, and even if we add all these three components and compare them with the CINC component of the USSR (0,13734491), it will be 0,002197 CINC components of those three countries, and if we divide the CINC component of the USSR and those three countries, we will see that the USSR is stronger than 62,5 percent of those three states. Regarding the cases of Czechoslovakia and Austria, the Germans played a complicated role in the operation that was used to gain control over these two countries. The CINC score of Germany was much higher, but they used cunning tactics using propaganda and the people of those two territories who wanted to return to the squad of Germany. And Albania wasn't very complicated as Italy was much more powerful, and at that time the Nazi and Fascist regimes worked together and gained big success in annexation territories, but Italy used troops to annex Albania in 1939, showing their power. In the CINC component, compare the two tables 2.7. and 2.6., where we can see the difference between the two countries and the simple reason why Italy annexed Albania.



*Table 3.7. CINC components of countries that were annexed from 1900-1945*


It is necessary to single out Japan, which in 194 and 1945 was the first state to annex part of its territory – the Marshall Islands in 1944. This annexation was carried out by the USA, and in 1945, Japan had already lost Taiwan and China had gained control over it. Here we can see a clear example of how a less powerful CINC score played an important role in the loss of Japan against two states, China and the USA, whose CINC scores were much more powerful and bigger than the Japanese ones.




*Table 3.8. CINC components of the USA, China, and Japan*

### 3.2.2. Period from 1946 to 1989

Now we move on to the period from 1946 to 1989, and this period was taken separately because during this period the Cold War between the USA and the USSR took place and the world became bipolar. Such a transition of events affected other countries, but a certain number of annexations took place in which other countries already participated. First, the CINC score of those countries that annexed territories will be shown, and after that, those countries that were annexed will be indicated.




**Table 3.9.** CINC components of countries who annexed between 1946-1989




**Table 3.10.** CINC components of countries who annexed between 1946-1989

Here we can see the CINC scores of countries whose ranges were incompletely annexed to be seized fully, as was the case with North Vietnam and South Vietnam. What will be in the next two diagrams, where four states will be shown in each of the tables, are the CINC scores of Jordan, Israel, Portugal, and Czechoslovakia.




*Table 3.11. CINC components of countries that were annexed or lost colonies between 1946-1989*



*Table 3.12. CINC components of countries that were annexed or lost their territories*

The events about the joining of North and South Vietnam (formally the Republic of Vietnam) should be highlighted separately due to the extensive warfare. The unification of the two parts of Vietnam began in 1975 and was completed in 1976. At that moment, precisely in

1975, the CINC score was 0,006809 in North Vietnam, compared to 0.006745 in South Vietnam. Here we can see how almost equal states in the CINC score joined and created one state, but officially it was documented as an annexation.




*Table 3.13. CINC components of South Vietnam and North Vietnam*

### **3.2.3. Period from 1990 to 2007**

#### **3.2.3.1. Moldova and Transnistria**

Subsequent to the letdown of the USSR, Moldova proximately misplaced Transnistria, which was under Russian Federation rule from the very beginning, and it was a ticking time bomb that could work only when Russia wanted to make it. So here we can say that a much weaker country that was detached from Moldova became an unclaimed satellite of a much more powerful state like the Russian Federation, and if we compare the CINC of Moldova and Transnistria, it will be easy to say that Moldova couldn't have difficulties returning this part of their state like Transnistria, but a more powerful player like Russia didn't give permission to do that, and here we can say that the most powerful player with the biggest CINC score, and we mean Russia, dictated their own rules.


#### **3.2.3.2. Iraq and Kuwait**



**Table 3.14.** CINC components of Iraq and Kuwait in 1990


Concerning Iraq, we can say that the CINC score of Iraq is much higher than Kuwait's, but with the help of the world leaders, Kuwait gained success in returning control over the territory of this country. Here also, we can say that in Table 3.14, we can see clearly how, in most cases that we took into account, the CINC score of the state that annexes is much higher than that of the state that was annexed.

### 3.2.3.3. Armenia and Azerbaijan



**Table 3.15.** CINC components of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994


Now we will pay attention to the ratio of CINC in percentage terms to understand how much stronger Azerbaijan was, but in this case, it lost its territories, and this concerns the territory of Karabakh. During the six years of the war, we can say that Armenia could gain success only with the help of another country, and it was Russia that helped to gain control under Karabakh and finally annex that territory in 1994. We can see in Table 2.14 that approximately 20 percent of 100 were Armenian CINC and another 80 percent were Azerbaijanis.



*Table 3.16. CINC components of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994 in percentage ratio*


#### **3.2.4. Period from 2008 to 2022**

So, this chart will show Russia and its CINC indicator for the period from 2008 to 2022. The years 2008, 2014, 2020, and 2022 will be shown when the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were annexed in 2008, Crimea and the territory of Donbas in 2014, Belarus as a soft annexation of the entire territory for its benefit with the self-proclaimed president Lukashenko in 2020, and Ukraine again in 2022.




**Table 3.17.** *CINC components of Russia and Georgia in 2008 in percentage ratio*

In August 2008, the Russian Federation condemned Georgia's state and later separated Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which remained accepted by Russia as sovereign areas, to which some Russian Federation bases were then enthused after signing the contract on February 17<sup>th</sup>, 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2013: 8). That is, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia began to actively manifest itself and stand out among world players. That is, having a great desire to become on the same level as the United States, Russia restored the order of the bipolar world, where both Russia and the United States had already begun to share interests. Also, here we can see that Russia's CINC dominated and was 88 percent, or 0.04875051, against Georgia's, whose CINC was 12 percent, or 0.00642671204.



**Table 3.18.** CINC components of Russia and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022

As regards Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, we can see the difference between these two countries, and we can see clearly that the CINC component shows us why Russia could annex some parts of Ukraine. In the case of 2014, it was the annexation of Crimea and Donbas, and in 2022, some parts of Ukraine were mentioned above in Chapter 2.1. qualitative analysis.



**Table 3.19.** CINC components of Russia and Belarus in 2020

Regarding Belarus and their CINC score, which was 0,00448 against the Russian CINC score, which was 0,016183, we can say that this country, while still having an autocratic regime, was annexed with ease for two reasons. First, in the case of Belarus, the self-

proclaimed president Lukashenko received certain benefits from Russia, both materially and in terms of freedom of action, which Russia would support. Secondly, the autocratic regime and lack of opposition were mentioned in Chapter 3.1. “Qualitative analysis”. These reasons served as an example of soft annexation, which was carried out by Russia in various ways, and simply using the state of affairs that existed at the time in Belarus in August 2020.



## BÖLÜM IV

### FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

To summarize, it can be deduced that occupation, secession, annexation, and conquest have accomplished peculiar parallels and certain similarities that allow us to distinguish whether the country has adjoined territory (range) or enthralled it. Among all the things mentioned above, first of all, we note subjection, which is traditionally defined as the capture of one country by another country or part of this range. The conquest is accompanied by force and war. Further conquest can be fairly elevated if the conquest turns into annexation. In this way, it can help the world community celebrate the range fairly named in the course of the conflict. This approach took place from 1648 until the First World War. Among the decisive factors are the League of Nations Pact, the Kellogg-Brian Pact, the Stimson Doctrine, the UN Charter, the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the 1969 Vienna Convention, and the 1970 Declaration on Friendship and Acceptance of the value of tone-government as a right in transnational law.

By all means, the secession of a certain part of the country is on a dissimilar level, but it should be noted that certain forces must always be present to monitor the course of events concerning the secession of a certain region. That is, there must be an external force, a country or countries as independent observers, that will monitor the progress of events and monitor the implementation of all items to be observed by parties A and B during secession. Secession is based on three principles: maintaining respect for the principle of *uti possidetis*, avoiding the influence of third parties, and most importantly, the desire of the people to participate in a vote that decides the fate of the region. This is the only way to preserve the legality of the branch, but in practice, we are currently seeing the direct or indirect influence of a third-party C, which is directly interested in the branch of a certain territory.

As noted above, there have been more and more such examples in recent years, and this trend will continue due to the influence of major powers and their geopolitical interests, which play an important role in negotiations with other countries. Concerning occupation, it can be recognized if the previous government was declared incapable of carrying out its activities in public. Also, the enwrapping power has the opportunity to replace the previous administration with its own officials. The enwrapping power must replace the power they enthralled, that is, the one that functioned before the occupancy. And the previous administration must have become incapable of functioning in public. Enemy forces capitulated, were defeated, or withdrawn. The enwrapping power has sufficient military power

to send its military units within a certain period (preferably short) so that the enwrapping power is felt in the range enthralled by the enwrapping country. A temporary administration is being established over the range. The enwrapping power issued and executed orders against the people living in the enthralled ranges. Numerous factors add to the explanation of this notion: the extension of onslaughts, the drill of firm authorities by original establishments, the turndown of the overrunning gathering to assume authority on the role of original direction, and be it for the crowd during the possession.

Regarding annexation, we must first distinguish two types: hard annexation and soft annexation. The first type includes such features as non-hybrid methods of annexation. Among these methods are tough forces and intimidation, which focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions that will serve the national interest. Mild annexation already includes hybrid elements, which include the media, propaganda, oligarchs and influential people, and culture as a form of propaganda. Diplomacy and certain military formations that can serve as agents of influence can also be attributed. That is, it is necessary to be able to influence the masses to control their thoughts, or rather, to lead their moods and thoughts in the right direction, which is needed by the state that wants to annex the territory. That is, all the components that are within the country that the conquering country wants to annex will use their advantage, and for other countries, it will seem like a natural process that no one has controlled from other countries, namely the inhabitants of the annexed future territory. Having additionally comprehended why the ownership (occupancy) occurs before the seizure (annexation), we can conclude that not only the occupancy but also the conquest and even the secession of a certain range may ultimately lead to the annexation of a certain range in favor of grand power.

So, after analyzing qualitative and quantitative aspects of annexations in all cases, we can see clearly that all 54 cases have a systematic structure, like in qualitative and quantitative analysis, where we can see that the regime played an important role in the annexation of the territory. Also, the key role played was preparation for annexation by the state that annexed the territory. Definitely, in the cases from 1816 to 1900, we can see clearly that the dominance of the main states played a key role because they controlled a lot of colonies like Britain, the USA, or Germany with the Netherlands and Portugal. After that, annexations became much more complicated, and aggressors or countries that wanted to annex territory made a big step and complicated propaganda with local citizens to gain success in annexation and worked with a local government to gain success in future annexations, like they did with Austria in 1938.

Certainly, we should mention that during the period of the Cold War, the dominance of war conflicts and subsequent annexations helped countries gain success in their dominance over territories after they were annexed. Without hesitation, this period showed us that countries wanted to return the territories that belonged to them a long time ago, and they wanted to gain control over critical points to resist their neighboring countries. Also, after that, the monopolar system of the world started to exist and showed us the passive way of countries that almost didn't make any annexations, and there was only an exceptional case with Kuwait in 1990. Karabakh and Prydnistrovnia started earlier, before the USSR fell. In the last period from 2008 to 2022, we can say that Russian dominance in the region in the Caucasus and Black Sea showed that the bipolar system of the world started to return, but we can see now that the real obstacles are that China and the USA started to create a powerful bipolar world, unfortunately with a possible second Cold War.

Without hesitation, the CINC component played the key role in the quantitative aspects that we described with the help of tables that demonstrated the dominance of the country and the key role of the CINC component, which showed why this or that country annexed a less powerful state. Certainly, there are exceptions here that we should mention, and among them are the cases of the annexation of Taiwan in 1895 by Japan, where the Japanese CINC score was less than the Chinese CINC score and there were other key factors in Japan's success that year. Here, qualitative aspects played a much more important role because CINC didn't show the real situation at that time. Also, we should mention the case of Vietnam, where people of both sides wanted to reunite with South Vietnam from the side of North Vietnam and vice versa. Also, the last case with Ukraine and Russia in 2022 showed us that CINC didn't play an important role in reflecting real-life situations, and here played other factors that helped Ukraine resist Russia, among them the clever supreme commander of Ukraine, Zaluzhnyi, who planned some actions against the big opponent, understanding that an earlier or later Russian invasion would happen after 2014. Secondly, the resistance of all people who didn't want to be annexed by Russian troops and Western weapons helped to resist Russia. These key factors played an important role in gaining success, and the CINC factor didn't play an important role in showing who should annex the territory like it did in 2014. Generally, we can say that CINC shows the real dominance of one country above another, and this component helped us analyze why this or that country annexed a weaker opponent.

To summarize, we can see that all 54 cases of annexations of countries ended in two ways: first, annexations that appeared after aggressive actions, and second, annexations that appeared after non-aggressive actions. Among them, 28 cases appeared after aggressive

actions and 26 after non-aggressive actions. In percentage ratio, aggressive actions appeared at 51,9 percent, and annexations, which appeared after non-aggressive actions, were at 48,1 percent. As we can see, aggressive actions do not prevail too much. If we take into account periods from 1816 to 1900, there were 17 cases, of which 9 were annexations in non-aggressive ways and 8 were in aggressive ways. So, in percentage ratio, annexations with non-aggressive ways are 53 percent, and on the other hand, the rest of the cases with aggressive ways of annexation are 47 percent. If we take into account the period from 1901 to 1945, we can see that here are 13 cases of annexations where the non-aggressive style dominated over the aggressive style of annexation 5.5 times because non-aggressive annexations have 11 cases and only 2 cases are annexations in an aggressive way, in a percentage ratio of 84,7 percent against 15,3 percent.

If we take into account the period of the Cold War here, we can see 17 cases where aggressive ways of annexation prevailed over non-aggressive ways. Here we can see that 13 of the 17 cases were annexations after aggressive actions and only 4 after non-aggressive actions. In percentage ratio of 76,5 percent for the aggressive way against 23,5 percent for the non-aggressive way. And in the last period after the Cold War, we can say that there were only 7 annexations: 5 cases were annexations in an aggressive way and 2 cases in a non-aggressive way. In percentage ratio of 71,4 percent against 28,6 percent. Big players: only Great Britain after World War II continued to annex territories, and there were two cases with the Falkland Islands and Rockall. By all means, we can mention the USSR or Russia, which annexed the Kuril Islands, Czechoslovakia, and especially territories after 2008 like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Crimea, Donbas, and Belarus. Generally, it is 6 cases with the USSR/Russia and 2 with Great Britain, and there will be 8 cases from 54, and in percentage ratio, it will be 12.5 percent.

Regimes that impacted annexation As we can see, Nazi, Fascist, and dictatorial regimes of one person generally impacted the annexation of countries, and as we can see in the case of Nazi Germany, we can understand how one person and all systems under it could impact the whole country and help to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia. Also, we should mention the CINC component, which played an important role in understanding who annexed the territory and who was annexed. We can see clearly comparing CINC to a country that was annexed by another country, where this played the key role of annexing the territory by one country to another. Also, we should mention annexes that still exist; there are 24 cases, and in percentage ratio, it is 44.4 percent. And the last point that should be mentioned here is the

recognition by the major powers of 34 cases of annexation; the percentage ratio is 63 percent, and many cases were recognized from 1816 to 1900.



## KAYNAKÇA

- Akyol, E.D. (2015). *Contested Nationalisms: Turkish Nationalist Propaganda in the Sanjak of Alexandretta*. (Published Ph.D. thesis). Bilkent University/Department of History, Ankara.
- Alexander, R.C. (2013). The U.S. Constitution. Cavalli C.D. (Ed.), In *The Basics of American Government* (11-25). Atlanta: University Press of North Georgia.
- Allison, G.T. (2012). The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today. *Foreign Affairs*, 91(4), 11-16. doi:10.2307/23218035.
- Anderson, G. (2008). *Federalism: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Anušauskas, A. (2014). *Lessons of History: The Silent Occupation of 1940*. Vilnius: Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo kanceliarija.
- Arai-Takahashi Y. (2009). *The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, and its Interaction with International Human Rights Law*. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Arai-Takahashi Y. (2012). Preoccupied with Occupation: Critical Examinations of the Historical Development of the Law of Occupation. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 94(885), 51-80. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383112000495>.
- Arai-Takahashi Y. (2018). Index. *American Journal of International Law*, 112(3), 544-548. <https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2018.40>.
- Arai-Takahashi Y. (2019). Unearthing the Problematic Terrain of Prolonged Occupation. *Israel Law Review*, 52(02) 125-167. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223719000037>.
- Arel, D. and Ruble, B.A. (2006). *Rebounding identities: the politics of identity in Russia and Ukraine*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Arnold, P.A. (2004). *About America: How the United States is Governed*. Herndon, VA: Braddock Communications.
- Aruri, N.H. (1972). *Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965)*. The Hague: Springer Dordrecht.
- Aspinall, E. and Fealy, G. (2010). *Soeharto's New Order and its Legacy: Essays in Honor of Harold Crouch*. Canberra: The Australian National University.
- Azarova, V. (2018). An Illegal Territorial Regime? On the Occupation and Annexation of Crimea as a Matter of International Law. S. Sayapin and E. Tsybulenko (Ed.), *The Use of Force Against Ukraine and International Law* (41-71). Springer.
- Baba, M. (2013). The Annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1908. *The Studies of International Society*, 2, 75-82.
- Baioa, M., Fernandes P.J. and Meneses F.R. (2003). The Political History of Twentieth-Century Portugal. *e-Journal of Portuguese History*, 1(2), 1-18.
- Barker, E.C. (1946). The Annexation of Texas. *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, 50(1), 49-74. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30237259>.
- Barolli, B. (2005). An Overview of the Albanian History: With Main Emphasis on Economy. *現代社会文化研究*, 34, 241-266.
- Barthes, R. (1981). The Discourse of History. In: Shaffer E.S. (Ed.), *Comparative Criticism, A yearbook*, Vol. 3 (7-20). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Belitser, N. (2015). The Transnistrian Conflict. In: Bebler A. (Ed.), *“Frozen Conflicts” in Europe* (45-56). Opladen, Berlin, Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers.
- Ben-Hillel, Y. (2013). *The Legal Status of East Jerusalem*. Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council.
- Ben-Naftali, O., Gross, A.M. and Michaeli, K. (2015). Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory. *Berkeley Journal OF International Law* 23(3), 551-614.
- Benson, L. (1961). *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Benvenisti, E. (1993). *The International Law of Occupation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bereketeab, R. (2012). *Self-determination and Secessionism in Somaliland and South Sudan: Challenges to Postcolonial State-building*. Uppsala, Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute.
- Berglund, C. (2013). Georgia. In: Berglund C., Ekman J., Deegan-Krause K. and Knutsen T. (Ed.), *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (775-821). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Beri, H.M.L. (2009). End of Military Rule in Argentina. *Strategic Analysis*, 7(10), 815-820. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700168409428649>.
- Bertolini, E. (2018). Western and Japanese Constitutional Thought in the Shaping of the Role of the Japanese Emperor in the 1889 and 1946 Constitutions. *Historia Constitucional*, 19, 641-668. <https://dx.doi.org/10.17811/hc.v0i19.490>.
- Beveridge, A. (1900, 9 January). *The March of the Flag*. [in Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess.]. 9, 4-12.
- Bilaniuk, L. (2005). *Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in Ukraine*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Black, D., Chinn, J., Herman, R., and Watson, C. (2005). *Moldova Democracy and Governance Assessment*. Washington, D.C.: Management Systems International Corporate Offices.
- Bonfils, H. and Fauchille P. (1905). *Manuel de droit international public* (4<sup>th</sup> Edition). Paris: Rousseau & C.
- Brabandere, E. (2009). *Post-conflict Administrations in International Law. International Territorial Administration, Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in Theory and Practice*. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Bracey, S. (2019). The Symmetry of Hypocrisy in Czech-German Legal Conciliation, 1989–1997. *Central European History*, 52(3), 496–526. doi:10.1017/S0008938919000724.
- Brichta, A. (1998). The New Premier-Parliamentary System in Israel. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 555, 180-192. DOI: 10.1177/0002716298555001012.
- Bridges, K.W. (1998). *The Texas Presidencies: Presidential Leadership in the Republic of Texas, 1836-1845*. (Published Master of Arts thesis). University of North Texas/Department of History, Denton, Texas.
- Bruchis, M. (1987). A turning point in the history of Bessarabia: Winter 1917–1918. *Nationalities Papers*, 15(2), 194–214. doi:10.1080/00905998708408055.

- Brusis, M. (2015). Czechoslovakia: State Formation and Administrative-Territorial Organization. In: Caramani D., Flora P. and Kraus F. (Ed.), *The Territorial Structure of Europe, 1870-2000* (1-10). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Buchanan, T. and Conway, M. (2002). The Politics of Democracy in Twentieth- Century Europe: Introduction. *European History Quarterly*, 32(1), 7-12.
- Bulmer, E. (2014). *Constitutional Monarchs in Parliamentary Democracies. International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 7* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition), Stromsborg: International IDEA.
- Bulmer, E. (2017). *Federalism. International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 12* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). Stockholm: International IDEA.
- Buska, S.I. (2006). "Marimba por ti me Muero": Region and Nation in Costa Rica, 1824-1939. (Not published PhD Thesis). Indiana University/Department of History, Bloomington.
- Butt, A.I. (2017). *Secession and Security: Explaining State Strategy Against Separatists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Butt, A.I. (2017). Why Do States Fight Some Secessionists but Not Others? The Role of External Security. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 2, (4), 1-22. doi: 10.1093/jogss/ogx014.
- Butt, A.I. (2011). Goodbye or See You Later: Why States Fight Some Secessionists but Not Others. *APSA 2011 Annual Meeting paper*. [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1920848](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920848).
- Butt, A.I. (2020). State Strategies Against Secessionists. *Conference: Strategies of secession and counter-secession*. 69-83.
- Campbell, K. and O'Hanlon, M. (2006). *Hard power: The new politics of national security*. New York: Basic Books.
- Cașu, I. (2020). The mass deportation from Bessarabia/Moldavian SSR in mid-June 1941. Enhancing security, a social engineering operation, or something else?. *Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů*, 37, 86-106.
- Cédric, J. (2005). "The President Is Coming to Visit!": Dramas and the Hijack of Democratization in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. *Comparative Politics*, 37(4), 421-440. doi:10.2307/20072902.
- Chaguaceda, A. (2016). The Putin System: Russian Authoritarianism Today. *Revista Mexicana de Análisis Político y Administración Pública, Departamento de Gestión Pública y Departamento de Estudios Políticos y de Gobierno*, 5(1), 75-92.
- Chakrabarty, B. (2008). *Indian Politics and Society Since Independence: Events, Processes and Ideology*. London, New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.
- Chang, W. (2015). Darkness over Hawaii: The Annexation Myth Is the Greatest Obstacle to Progress. *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal*, 16(2), 70-115. <http://hdl.handle.net/10125/37601>.
- Chauvel, R. (2005). *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation*. Washington D.C.: Policy Studies 14, East-West Center.
- Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J. and Vreeland, J.R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. *Public Choice*, 143(1/2), 67-101. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40661005%20>.
- Chen, R. (2017). Chinese Youth Nationalism in a Pressure Cooker. In: Dittmer L. (Ed.), *Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace* (93-116). Oakland, California: University of Press.

- Cheng, C. (1971). *The Economy of Communist China, 1949-1969*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies.
- Cheterian, V. (2009). The August 2008 war in Georgia: from ethnic conflict to border wars. *Central Asian Survey*, 28(2), 155-170. DOI: 10.1080/02634930903056768.
- Chiang, Y.F. (1999). State, Sovereignty, and Taiwan. *Fordham International Law Journal*, 23(4), 959-1004.
- Choudhry, S., Sedelius, T. and Kyrychenko, J., 2018, *Semi-presidentialism and Inclusive Governance in Ukraine: Reflections for Constitutional Reform*. Kyiv: Centre of Policy and Legal Reform.
- Christiansen, P.M., Elklit, J. and Nedergaard, P. (2020). *The Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Clapham, C. (1968). The Ethiopian Coup d'Etat of December 1960. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 6(4), 495-507.
- Clegg, P. and Matheson, K. (2022). Falkland Islands – 40 years on, *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*. 111(1). <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2022.2037233>.
- Clodfelter, M. (2017). *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015* (4<sup>th</sup> Edition). Jefferson, North Caroline: McFarland & Company.
- Cojocar, N. (2006). Nationalism and Identity in Transnistria. *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, 19(3-4), 261-272. doi:10.1080/13511610601029813.
- Colegrove, K. (1932). The Japanese Emperor. *The American Political Science Review*, 26(4), 642-659. doi:10.2307/1946532.
- Connelly, J. (2006). The Dictators: Hitler`s Germany, Stalin`s Russia. *Kritika: Exploration in Russian and Eurasian History*, 7(4), 919-929. DOI: 10.1353/kri.2006.0047.
- Conradt, D.P. (2009). *The German Polity* (9<sup>th</sup> Edition). Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.
- Correlates of War, *NMC 6.0 Data*, <https://correlatesofwar.org/news/nmc-6-0-data-available/>, (Eriřim tarihi: 13.11.2022).
- Culver, J. (2022). How We Would Know When China is Preparing to Invade Taiwan. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/03/how-we-would-know-when-china-is-preparing-to-invade-taiwan-pub-88053>, [Visit date: 22 November 2022].
- Day, D. (2005). *Conquest: A New History of the Modern World*. HarperCollins Publishers.
- Day, D. (2008). *Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- De Booy, T. and Faris, J.T. (1918). *The Virgin Islands Our New Possessions and the British Islands*. Folsom, CA: Lippincott Company.
- Deneckere, G. (2015). Continuity and Discontinuity of the Constitutional Monarchy from a Transnational Perspective. *BMGN, Low Countries Historical Review*, 130(4), 121-131. DOI:10.18352/bmgn-lchr.10149.
- Devereux, R. (1968). South Vietnam`s New Constitutional Structure. *Asian Survey*, 8(8), 627-645. doi:10.2307/2642582.

- Dhussa, R.C. (2009). Tibet: A Nation in Exile. *Focus of Geography*, 52(2), 1-6. doi:10.1111/j.1949-8535.2009.tb00241.x.
- Doty, R. (1996). *Imperial Encounters*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Douglas, B. (2017). *A History of Culture in North-Eastern New Caledonia 1774-1870*. (Published PhD Thesis). Australian National University/Pacific Historic Department, Canberra.
- Dreyer, R. (1984). Dispute over Walvis Bay. Origins and Implications for Namibian Independence. *Oxford University Press*, 83(333) 497-510. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/722921>.
- Edelstein, D.M. (2004). Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail. *International Security*, 29(1), 49-91.
- El Bouchikhi, M. (2018). Monarchy and Political Parties in Morocco: A Study on the Power Relationship, the Case of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces Party (USFP). *한국이슬람학회논총*, 28(1), 2-30.
- Elliott, D.W.P. (1982). Training revolutionary successors in Vietnam and China, 1958–1976: The role of education, science and technology in development. *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 15(1-2), 34–70. doi:10.1016/0039-3592(82)90004-7.
- Ellison, J.W. (1939). The Partition of Samoa: A Study in Imperialism and Diplomacy. *Pacific Historical Review*, 8(3), 259–288. doi:10.2307/3633805.
- Fainsod, M. (2012). Terror as a System of Power. In: Ostrow J.M. (Ed.), *Politics in Russia a Reader* (16-56). Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
- Fan, L.S.P. (2007). My Land, Your Land, But Never China's: An Analysis of Taiwan's Sovereignty and Its Claim to Statehood. *Taiwan International Studies Quarterly*, 3(2), 141-181.
- Fazal, T.M. and Griffiths, R.D. (2008). A State of One's Own: The Rise of Secession Since World War II. *Brown J. World Aff.*, 15, (1), 199.
- Fazal, T.M. and Griffiths, R.D. (2014). Membership Has Its Privileges: The Changing Benefits of Statehood. *International Studies Review*, 16, 79-106.
- Fazal, T.M. (2018). *Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Federal Political Department of Switzerland. (1949). *Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of 1949*, Vol. II, Section A, Bern, 675-676.
- Ferraro, T. (2008). Enforcement of Occupation Law in Domestic Courts: Issues and Opportunities. *Israel Law Review*, 41(1-2), 331-357. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002122370000025X>.
- Ferraro, T. (2012). Determining the beginning and end of an occupation under international humanitarian law. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 94(885), 133-163. doi:10.1017/S181638311200063X.
- Ferraro, T. (2012). *Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory*. Geneva: ICRC.
- Ferraro, T. (2013). The Law of Occupation and Human Rights Law: Some Selected Issues. Kolb, R. and Gaggioli, G. (Ed.), *Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law* (273-294). Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

- Ferring, R. L. (1968). The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War. *Political Research Quarterly*, 21(4), 651–667. <https://doi.org/10.1177/106591296802100408>.
- Finch, G.A. (1917). The Danish West Indies. *The American Journal of International Law*, 11(2), 413–416. doi:10.2307/2188064.
- Fisher, A. (2020). Trickle Down Soft Power: Do Russia`s Ties to European Parties Influence Public Opinion?. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 1-22. <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/oraa013>.
- Frantz, C.R. and de Boeck, C. (1910). *Despagnet, Cours de droit international public* (4<sup>th</sup> Edition). Paris.
- Friedman, U. (2014). Putin`s Playbook: The Strategy Behind Russia`s Takeover of Crimea. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/putins-playbook-the-strategy-behind-russias-takeover-of-crimea/284154/>, [Ziyaret tarihi: 5 June 2022].
- Friesel, O. (2016). Israel's 1967 Governmental Debate about the Annexation of East Jerusalem: The Nascent Alliance with the United States, Overshadowed by “United Jerusalem”. *Law and History Review*, 34(2), 363–391. doi:10.1017/s0738248016000031.
- Gallarotti, G. (2011). Soft Power: what it is, its importance, and the conditions for its effective use. *Journal of Political Power*, 4(1), 25-47. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2011.557886>.
- Gan, I. (2009). *Red Antarctic: Soviet Interests in the South Polar Region Prior to the Antarctic Treaty 1946-1958*. Thesis (Published Ph.D. Thesis), University of Tasmania/Institute of Antarctic and Southern Ocean Studies, Hobart.
- Garner, J.W. (1936). Non-Recognition of Illegal Territorial Annexations and Claims to Sovereignty. *The American Journal of International Law*, 30(4), 679-688.
- Garner, J.W. (1938). Questions of State Succession Raised by the German Annexation of Austria. *The American Journal of International Law*, 32(3), 421-438.
- Gavison, R. (2006). Legislatures and the Quest for a Constitution: The Case of Israel. *Review of Constitutional Studies/Revue d'études constitutionnelles*, 11(2), 345-400.
- Gavrilov, V. (2016). Challenges and Prospects of the Southern Kuril Islands' Status. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 7(1), 301-305. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2016.v7n1p301.
- Gawdiak, I.Y. (1987). *Area Handbook Series: Czechoslovakia: A Country Study* (3d Edition). Washington, D.C: Library of Congress Washington D.C. Federal Research.
- Geistlinger, M. (2016). The Republic of Austria before 1938 and after 1945 – Some Thoughts on Continuity. *Journal of the University of Latvia Law*, 9, 5-20.
- Gencer, M. (2014). The Congress of Berlin (1878) in Context of the Ottoman-German Relations. *International Periodical for History and Social Research*, 6(12), 293-313.
- General Assembly, 25<sup>th</sup> session. (1970, 24 October). Resolution no. 2625. [Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations], (A/8082), 121-124.
- Goldstein, M.C. (2006). The United States, Tibet, and the Cold War. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8(3), 145–164. doi:10.1162/jcws.2006.8.3.145.

- Gonschor, L. (2013). Mai te hau Roma ra te huru: The Illusion of "Autonomy" and the Ongoing Struggle for Decolonization in French Polynesia. *The Contemporary Pacific*, 25(2), 259-296. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23725651>.
- Governor of the Virgin Islands of the United States. (1925). [From March 31, 1917 to Decemeber 31, 1924, The Laws of the Virgin Islands of the United States Municipality of Saint Thomas and Saint John]. St. Thomas, V. I.: Government Printing Office.
- Grammas, G.N. (1991). Multilateral Responses to the Iraq Invasion of Kuwait: Economic Sanctions and Emerging Proliferation Controls. *Maryland Journal of International Law*, 15(1), 1-21. <https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol15/iss1/3>.
- Grant, T.D. (2015). Annexation of Crimea. *The American Journal of International Law*, 109(1), 68-95. <https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.109.1.0068>.
- Gray, C.S. (2011). *Hard Power and Soft Power: the Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2010). Secessionism and the Domestic Democratic Peace. *APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper*.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2014). Secession and the invisible hand of the international system. *Review of International Studies* 40(3), 559-581.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2014). Secession. *The Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, 3367-3368.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2015). Between Dissolution and Blood: How Administrative Lines and Categories Shape Secessionist Outcomes. *International Organization*, 69(3), 731-751.
- Griffiths, R.D, Alvarez, P.G. and Martinez i Coma, F. (2015). Between the Sword and the Wall: S Pain's Limited Options for Catalan Secessionism. *Nations and nationalism*, 21(1), 43-61.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2016). *Age of Secession: The International and Domestic Determinants of State Birth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2016). The State of Secession in International Politics. *E-International Relations* 23.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2018). Kurdistan, the International Recognition Regime and the Strategy of Secession. A. Danilovich (Ed.), *Federalism, Secession, and International Recognition* (111-126). New York: Routledge.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2018). Who counts? Why do governments deny secession in some cases but not others?. *Secession and counter-secession: an international relations perspective*, 79-84.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2019). Dynamics of Secession and State Birth. *Routledge Handbook of State Recognition*, 138-147.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2020). Boxing Pandora: Rethinking Borders, States, and Secession in a Democratic World. *Political Science Quarterly*, 135(3), 527-528.
- Griffiths, R.D. (2021). *Secession and Sovereignty Game: Strategy and Tactics for Aspiring Nations*. Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Griffiths, R.D. and Martinez, A. (2021). Local Conditions and the Demand for Independence: A Dataset of Secessionist Grievances. *Nations and Nationalism*, 27(2), 580-590.

- Griffiths, R.D. (2021). Secessionist Strategy and Tactical Variation in the Pursuit of Independence. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 6(1), 1-19. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz082>.
- Grossheim, M. (2021). Reunification Without Reconciliation?: Social Conflicts and Integration in Vietnam after 1975. *인문논총*, 78(2), 459-488. <https://doi.org/10.17326/jhsnu.78.2.202105.459>.
- Hafner, G. (2019). The ‘Soviet’ Intervention in Czechoslovakia (1968). *Austrian Review of International and European Law Online*, 21(1), 27–72. doi:10.1163/15736512-02101003.
- Halleck, H.W. (1861). *International Law, or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War*. New York: D. Van Nostrand.
- Halleck, H.W. (1885). *Elements of International Law and Laws of War*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company.
- Halleck, H.W. (1893). *Halleck's International Law, or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, and CO. Ltd. Paternoster house.
- Hanelt, C.P., Luciani, G. and Neugart, F. (2004). *Regime Change in Iraq: The Transatlantic and Regional Dimensions*. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.
- Harrison, T., Jones, S., Lunn, J., Smith, B., Taylor, C. and Youngs, T. (2007). *A Political Introduction to India*. London: House of Commons Library.
- Hasegawa, T. (2011). Soviet Policy Toward Japan During World War II. *Cahiers du Monde russe*, 52(2/3), 245-271. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/41708322>.
- Haverland, C. (2000). Secession. In: Bernhardt R. (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (354-356). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Hazareesingh, S. (2003). Bonapartist Memory and Republican Nation-building: Revisiting the Civic Festivities of the Second Empire. *Modern and Contemporary France*, 11(3), 349-364. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0963948032000128591>.
- Hedenskog, J. (2022). Russia's “Soft Annexation” of Belarus During its Invasion of Ukraine. *Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies Commentary*, 4, 1-4.
- Heim, J.L. and Miller, B.M. (2020). *Measuring Power, Power Cycles, and the Risk of Great-Power War in the 21st Century*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Hein, J.R., McIntyre, B.R. and Piper, D.Z. (2005). *Marine Mineral Resources of Pacific Islands—A Review of the Exclusive Economic Zones of Islands of U.S. Affiliation, Excluding the State of Hawaii*. Reston, Virginia: U.S. Geological Survey.
- Heine, C. (1974). *Micronesia at the Crossroads: A Reappraisal of the Micronesian Political Dilemma*. Canberra: Australian National University Press.
- Heinrich, A. (2011). The Formal System in Azerbaijan. *Caucasus Analytical Digest*, 24, 1-22.
- Hempenstall, P.J. (2016). *Pacific Islanders Under German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance*. Canberra: ANU Press.
- Heyningen, E.V. (2015). The South African War as humanitarian crisis. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 97(900), 999–1028. doi:10.1017/S1816383116000394.

- Higson, A. (2016). From Political Power to the Power of the Image: Contemporary “British” Cinema and the Nation’s Monarchs. In: Merck M. (Ed.), *The British Monarchy on Screen* (339-362), Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Hiio, T. (2019). On the Historical Identity of the Estonians and the Politics of Memory in Estonia. *Institute of National Remembrance Review*, 1, 67-116.
- Hoadley, J.S. (1977). Indonesia's Annexation of East Timor: Political, Administrative, and Developmental Initiatives. *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 133-142. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27908311>.
- Horiuchi, Y. (2007). Political Institutions and Distributive Politics in Japan: Getting Along with the Opposition. *Asia Pacific Economic Paper*, 363, 1-25.
- Hudson, R.A. (2002). *Cuba: a country study* (4<sup>th</sup> Edition). Washington D.C.: Library of Congress.
- ICRC, Reference, *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5>. (Erişim tarihi: 23.11.2022).
- Inoguchi, T. (1997). The Japanese Political System: Its Basic Continuity in Historical Perspective. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 5(2), 65-77. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185379708434105>.
- International Crisis Group (ICG). (2013). *Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation* (Europe Report, No. 224). <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5178ece44.html>.
- Jabber, P. (1977). Peace Proposals for the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976. *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, 8(2), 153-166. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44480593>.
- Janki, M. (2010). West Papua and the Right to Self-Determination under International Law. *West Indian Law Journal*, 34(1), 1-33.
- Jasutis, G., Mikova, R. and Steyne, R. (2022). *Ceasefires and Peace Agreements in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia: Assessing the Inclusion of Security-Sector Reform Provisions*. Geneva: DCAF - Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.
- Javed M., Rahim, N. and Khan, A.M. (2019). Russia’s Annexation of Crimea and Security Implications for the Baltic States. *Global Social Sciences Review (GSSR)*, 4(3), 383-389. DOI:10.31703/gssr.2019(IV-III).48.
- Jelavich, B. (1983). *History of the Balkans*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jennings, R.Y. (1963). *The Acquisition of Territory in International Law*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Josephson, H. (1979). Outlawing War: Internationalism and the Pact of Paris. *Diplomatic History*, 3(4), 377-390. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24910222>.
- Kalicka-Mikołajczyk, A. (2021). The international legal status of Western Sahara. *The Opole Studies in Administration and Law*, 18(4), 35-47. <https://doi.org/10.25167/osap.3429>.
- Kamenetsky, I. (1961). *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe, A Study of Lebensraum Policies*. New Haven, Connecticut: United States Services.
- Karnes, T.L. (1959). The Origins of Costa Rican Federalism. *The Americas*, 15(3), 249-269. doi:10.2307/978813.
- Kaya, I. (2001). Hostile Occupation and International Humanitarian Law. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, 9(3-4), 65-75.

- Kellogg-Briand Pact. (1928). The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/kbpact.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp). (Erişim tarihi: 23.11.2022).
- Khadduri, M. (1945). The Alexandretta Dispute. *The American Journal of International Law*, 39(3), 406-425. doi:10.2307/2193522.
- Knapp, A. and Wright, V. (2006). *The Government and Politics of France* (5<sup>th</sup> Edition). London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.
- Kodaz, Y. (2016). French Mandatory Education: The Case of Sanjak (Hatay) (1920-1939). *The Online Journal of Science and Technology*, 6(1), 18-20.
- Kohen, M.G. (2006). *Secession: International Law Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Korman, S. (1997). The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice. *American Journal of International Law*, 91(4), 745-748. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2998107>.
- Kosaki, R.H. (1978). Constitutions and Constitutional Conventions of Hawaii, Honolulu. *Hawaiian Historical Society*, 12, 120-138. <http://hdl.handle.net/10524/196>.
- Kretzmer, D. (2012). The Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 94(885), 207-236. doi:10.1017/S1816383112000446.
- Kumaraswamy, P.R. (1999). The Golan Heights: Israel's predicament. *Strategic Analysis*, 23(7), 1155–1175. doi:10.1080/09700169908455112.
- Laband, J. (2003). Colonial Flotsam: The Zululand Squatters and the Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission 1902-1904. *South African Journal*, 49(1), 53-70. doi:10.1080/02582470308671447.
- Laband, J. (2009). *Historical Dictionary of the Zulu Wars*. Lanham, Maryland, Toronto, Oxford: The Scarecrow Press Inc.
- Laband, J. (2018). The Eight Zulu Kings. *The Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation*, 83, 40-42.
- Lacombe, G. (1997). Nationalism and education in Latvia, 1918-1940. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 28(4), 309-338. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01629779700000121>.
- Lange, F. (2017). Between Systematization and Expertise for Foreign Policy: The Practice-Oriented Approach in Germany's International Legal Scholarship (1920–1980). *European Journal of International Law*, 28(2), 535–558. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chx032>.
- Leacock, S. (1910). The Union of South Africa. *The American Political Science Review*, 4(4), 498-507. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1944928>.
- Lee, F.I. (2014). An Introduction to the History of Taiwan. *Gdańskie Studia Azji Wschodniej*, 5, 95-105. DOI 10.4467/23538724GS.14.010.2213.
- Leon, C. (2011). Sociopolitical Aspects of the Norwegian Monarchy. *Bulletin of the Transylvania University of Brasov*, 4(2), 97-104.
- Leśniewski, M. (2017). The Annexation of the Transvaal in 1877: The First Boer Reactions. *Volume & Issue*, 12(1), 35-48. <https://doi.org/10.1515/werk-2017-0003>.

- Levie, H.S. (1956). *FM 27-10 Department of the Army Field Manual: The Law of Land Warfare*. Washington D.C.: Department of The Army.
- López Sanchez, M.C. (2014). *The Spanish Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century, Bibliography on 19th Century Spanish Monarchy*. Saint Andrews: University of St. Andrews.
- Li, Y. (2014). Writing the British Imperial and Colonial History: A Global Perspective. *Asian Review of World Histories*, 249-265, 2(2). doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12773/arwh.2014.2.2.249>.
- Lone, S. (1991). The Japanese Annexation of Korea 1910: The Failure of East Asian Co-Prosperity. *Modern Asian Studies*, 25(1), 143-173. doi:10.1017/s0026749x00015870.
- Lovatt, H. and Mundy, J. (2021). *Free to Choose: A New Plan for Peace in Western Sahara*. London: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
- Lukin, A. (2009). Russia`s New Authoritarianism and the Post-Soviet Political Ideal. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 25(1), 67-93. DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.24.1.67.
- Maas, R.W. (2020). *The Picky Eagle: How Democracy and Xenophobia Limited U.S. Territorial Expansion*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- MacDonald, F. (2006). The last outpost of Empire: Rockall and the Cold War. *Journal of Historical Geography*, 32(3), 627-647. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2005.10.009>.
- Maffei, M.C. (1993). The Case of East Timor before the International Court of Justice-Some Tentative Comments. *European Journal of International Law*, 4(2), 223–238. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.ejil.a035827.
- Malanczuk, P. (1991). The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War. *European Journal of International Law*, 2(2). 114–132. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.ejil.a035787.
- Malik, M.A. (2019). Changing Dimensions of Federalism in India: An Appraisal. *ILI Law Review*, 2, 85-114.
- Mälksoo, L. (2022). *Illegal Annexation and State Continuity* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). Leiden: Brill, Nijhoff.
- Maltz, E.M. (2006). The Constitution and the Annexation of Texas. *Constitutional Commentary*, 23(3), 381-40. <https://hdl.handle.net/11299/170160>.
- Markarov, A. (2007). Regime Formation and Development in Armenia. In: Elgie R. and Moestrup S. (Ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in the Caucasus and Central Asia* (301-327). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marszalek-Kawa, J. and Burak, A. (2018). The Political System of the Republic of Turkey, Past and Present. *Przegląd Politologiczny*, 3, 95-108. <https://doi.org/10.14746/pp.2018.23.3.7>.
- Martinez Montes, L.F. (2018). *Spain, a Global History*. Madrid: Global Square Editorial.
- McClory, J. (2015). *The Soft Power 30. A Global Ranking of Soft Power*. Portland, Oregon: Institute for Government.
- Meadwell, H. (1999). Secession, States, and International Society. *Review of International Studies*, 25(3), 371–387. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S026021059900371X>.
- Melander, E. (2001). The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revisited: Was the War Inevitable?. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3(2), 48–75. doi:10.1162/152039701300373880.

- Merezhko, O. (2015). Crimea`s Annexation by Russia-Contradictions of the New Russian Doctrine of International Law. *ZaöRV/HJIL*, 75, 167-194.
- Michal, E.J. (1992). American Samoa or Eastern Samoa? The Potential for American Samoa to Become Freely Associated with the United States. *The Contemporary Pacific*, 4(1), 137-160. <http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8550>.
- Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1984). *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Sourcebook of New Methods*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Mills, C. (2021). *Belarus: One Year on From the Disputed Presidential Election (9334)*, London: Commons Library Research Briefing.
- Minayo, M. (2012). Analise qualitativa: teoria, passos e fidedignidade. *Ciencia & Saude Coletiva*, 17(3), 621-626. doi:10.1590/S1413-81232012000300007.
- Minic, D. (2022). *Russia`s Invasion of Ukraine, A Political-Strategic Break?*. Paris: IFRI.
- Mitchell, B.R. (1998). *International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1993*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mohammad, A.S. and Tronvoll, K. (2015). Eritrean Opposition Parties and Civic Organizations. *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre*, 1-5.
- Mommsen, W.J. (2011). German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century. In: Jones G.S. and Claeys G. (Ed.), *Nineteenth Century Political Thought* (409-432). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moore, J.B. (1913). *Costa Rica Panama Arbitration: Memorandum on Uti Possidetis*. Rosslyn, VA: Commonwealth.
- Morello, M. (1954). *The Meaning of Independence to the Philippines Since July 4, 1946*. (Published Masters of Arts Thesis). Loyola University/Faculty of the Graduate School, Chicago.
- Morton, R.C.B, Pate J.L. and Barabba V.P. (1975). *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (1<sup>st</sup> Edition). Bicentennial, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
- Musteata, S. (2019). History Education and the Construction Identity in a Conflict Region: The Case of Transnistria, the Republic of Moldova. *Zivilgesellschaft in Zeiten militärischer Bedrohung*, 6, 84-104.
- Narayan, R. (2000). The East Timor Crisis. *China Report*, 36(1), 93-99. doi:10.1177/000944550003600107.
- Newbury, C. W. (1956). *The Administration of French Oceania, 1842-1906* (Published PhD Thesis). Australian National University, Canberra.
- Newbury, C. W. (2003). *Tahiti Nui: Change and Survival in French Polynesia 1767-1945*. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii.
- Newbury, C. W. (2019). *Tahiti Nui, Change and Survival in French Polynesia 1767-1945*. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii.
- Niescior, B. (2021). The Ostmarkgesetz of 14 April 1938 – One of the Normative Grounds of the Annexation of Austria. *Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza*, 13, 233-251. DOI 10.14746/ppuam.2021.13.11.

- Norbauer, R. and Sturdlar, D.T. (2011). Monarchy and the British Political Elite: Closet Republicans in the House of Commons. *Comparative Politics*, 43(2), 225-242. doi:10.2307/23040834.
- Nye, J.S. (1990). Soft Power. *Foreign Policy, Twentieth Anniversary*, 80, 153-171.
- Nye, J.S. (2004). *Power in the Global Information Age*. New York: Routledge.
- Nye, J.S. (2004). The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry. *Foreign Affairs*, 83, (3), 16-20. <https://doi.org/20033972>.
- Nye, J.S. and Kennedy, J.F. (2004). Reviewed Work: Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire by Matthew Fraser, *International Journal*, 59 (3), 711-713.
- Nye, J.S. (2004). Soft Power and American Foreign Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*, 119 (2), 255-270. doi:10.2307/20202345.
- Nye, J.S. (2004). When Hard Power Undermines Soft Power. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 21 (3), 13-15. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2004.00673.x>.
- Nye, J.S. (2005). On the Rise and Fall of American Soft Power. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 22 (3), 75-77. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5842.2005.755\_1.x.
- Nye, J.S. (2005). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Nye, J.S. (2006). *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*. New York: Longman Publishing.
- Nye, J.S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616 (1), 94-109. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699>.
- Nye, J.S. (2012). Power: Hard, Soft, and Smart. D.J. Christie (Ed.) (First Edition), *The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology* (1-4). doi:10.1002/9780470672532.wbep21.
- Nye, J.S. (2012). China and Soft Power. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 19, (2), 151-155.
- Nye, J.S. (2013). Soft Power and the Korean Wave. Youna Kim (Ed.), *The Korean Wave*, New York: Routledge.
- Nye, J.S. (2014). The Information Revolution and Soft Power. *Current History*, 113 (759), 19-22.
- Nye, J.S. (2017). Soft Power: The Origins and Political Progress of a Concept, *Palgrave Communications*, 3 (1), 1-3. doi:10.1057/palcomms.2017.8.
- Nye, J.S. (2018). How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power, *Economics, Foreign Affairs*. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power>, (Erişim tarihi: 20.11.2022).
- Nye, J.S. (2018). Soft Power. Piatt, C. (Ed.), *Surviving the Bible: A Devotional for the Church Year 2019*, 40-46, Fortress Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt22nmcnf.9>.
- Nye, J.S. (2019). Soft Power and the Public Diplomacy Revisited. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 14(1-2), 7-20. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-14101013>.
- Nye, J.S. (2021). Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept. *Journal of Political Power*, 14 (1), 196-208. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2021.1879572>.

- Ohnesorge, H.W. (2014). Making the Intangibles Tangible: Soft Power and its Subunits. *Emerging Scholars Forum at the ISA West Annual Conference*, 1-21.
- Ohnesorge, H.W. (2020). *Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations*. Springer Cham.
- Osadchuk, I. (2017). Bonapartism as a historical prototype of authoritarianism in France (1852-1860). *Visnuk of the Lviv University*, 14, 162-168.
- Our World in Data, *Primary energy consumption, 2021*, <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/primary-energy-cons?time=2020>, (Erişim tarihi: 13 November 2022).
- Our World in Data, *Primary energy consumption, 2021*, <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/primary-energy-cons?time=latest>, (Erişim tarihi: 13 November 2022).
- Palais, J.B. (1979). Political Participation in Traditional Korea, 1876-1910. *The Journal of Korean Studies*, 1, 73-121. doi:10.2307/41490142.
- Palmer, J.L. and Lindsey, G. (2001). Classifying State Approaches to Annexation. *State and Local Government Review*, 33(1), 60-73. DOI:10.1177/0160323X0103300106.
- Park, P.K. (2001). The 1965 "Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement" and Individuals' Claims Rights. *Hosei Gakkai*, 68(2), 196-222. <https://doi.org/10.15017/2261>.
- Park, P.K. (2010). Discussion Concerning the Legality of the 1910 "Annexation" of Korea by Japan. *Korea Journal*, 50(4) 13-41. DOI:10.25024/kj.2010.50.4.13.
- Pateman, R. (1990). The Eritrean War. *Armed Forces & Society*, 17(1), 81-98. doi:10.1177/0095327X9001700104.
- Pearl, M. (2015). Books and Libraries as Witness of the Second World War and the Holocaust in Monuments: Vienna and Berlin. In: Bischof G. and Karlhofer F. (Ed.), *Austrian Federalism in Comparative Perspective* (151-171). New Orleans, LA: Uno Press, Innsbruck University Press.
- Piotrowski, S. (2018). Security policy of the Baltic states and its determining factors. *Security and Defence Quarterly*, 22(5), 46-70. <https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.7586>.
- Pingeot, A. (2021). Paul Gauguin (Paris, 1848-Atuona, 1903): Inventor of the Readymade?. *Getty Research Journal*, 13, 157-176. <https://doi.org/10.1086/713434>.
- Plokhiiy, S. (2021). *Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Kharkiv: Klub Simeynoho Dozvilla.
- Poirine, B. and Moyrand, A. (2001). Insularity and Governance: The Case of French Polynesia. *Public Organization Review: A Global Journal*, 1, 193-213. DOI: 10.1023/A:1011500527780.
- Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. (2015). *The UK Constitution: A Summary, WITH Options for Reform*, London: House of Commons.
- Posen, B. R. (2011). From unipolarity to multipolarity: transition in sight?. In: Ikenberry, G.J., Mastanduno, M., and Wohlforth W.C. (Ed.), *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity* (317-341). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pozo Andres M.M. and Braster, J.F.A. (1999). The Rebirth of the "Spanish Race": The State, Nationalism, and Education in Spain, 1875-1931. *European History Quarterly*, 29(1), 75-107.

- Qafisheh, M.M. (2017). Who Has the Right to Become a Palestinian Citizen? An International Law Analysis. *Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online*, 18(1), 112-149. [https://doi.org/10.1163/22112987\\_01801007](https://doi.org/10.1163/22112987_01801007).
- Quamar, M.M. and Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2019). The Kuwait Crisis of 1990-1991: The Turning Point in India's Middle East Policy. *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, 6(1), 75-87. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2347798918812287>.
- Rached, K. (2017). The Six-Day War and Its Impact on Arab and Israeli Conflict. *History Research*, 7(2), 90-101. DOI:10.17265/2159-550X/2017.02.004.
- Raghavan, S. (2010). *War and Peace in Modern India*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rai, D. (2013). Monarchy and Democracy in Sikkim and the Contribution of Kazi Lhendup Dorjee Khangsherpa. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 3(9), 1-13.
- Rai, D. (2013). Democratic Uprising in Sikkim: Pre-Merger Perspective (Special Reference to the Role of First Chief Minister of Sikkim). *Journal of Risk Research*, 3(12), 558-579.
- Raimzhanova, A. (2015). Power in IR: Hard, soft and smart. *Institute for Cultural Diplomacy and the University of Bucharest*, 1-20.
- Randolph, C.F. (1898). Constitutional Aspects of Annexation. Part First. *Harvard Review*, 12(5), 291-315. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1321733>.
- Rathkolb, O. (2018). The Neglected Factors Leading to the "Anschluss" 1938, "Anschluss" March 1938: Aftermath on Medicine and Society. *The Central European Journal of Medicine*, 280-341. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00508-018-1366-4>.
- Rauzon, M.J. (2016). *Isles of Amnesia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Ray, T.R. (2013). *Imperially-Minded Britons: A Study of the Public Discourse on Britain's Imperial Presence in the Cape-to-Cairo Corridor, Military Reform, and the Issue of National and Provincial Identity, 1870-1900*. (Published PhD Thesis). Marquette University/Faculty of the Graduate School, Milwaukee, WI.
- Reiman, M. (2016). *About Russia, Its Revolutions, Its Development and Its Present* (10<sup>th</sup> Edition). Frankfurt am Main, New York: Peter Lang Edition.
- Renshaw, J. and Martina, M. (2022). Biden's National Security Plan Takes Aim at China, Russia. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/bidens-national-security-plan-aims-china-russia-2022-10-12/> (Eriřim tarihi: 22 November 2022).
- Researcher, S. (2013). *War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara*, Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College.
- Rhodes, A. (2020). Same Water, Different Dreams Salient Lessons of the Sino-Japanese War for Future Naval Warfare. *Journal of Advanced Military Studies*, 11(2), 35-50. <https://doi.org/10.21140/mcuj.20201102002>.
- Rice, D.B. (2015). Territorial Annexation as a "Great Power". *Duke Law Journal*, 64 (4), 717-768.
- Roberts, A. (2005). The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 54(1), 27-48. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3663356>.
- Roberts, A. (2006). Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights. *The American Journal of International Law*, 100(3), 580-622. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4091371>.

- Robertson, S. (2017). The New Caledonian Referendum on Independence. Part I: Historical Origins. *In Brief*, 40, 1-2.
- Robinson, N.K. (1981). *Villagers at war: some Papua New Guinean experiences in World War II* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). Canberra: The Australian National University.
- Rodrigues, L.N. (2013). The United States and Portuguese Decolonization. *Portuguese Studies*, 29(2), 164–185. doi:10.5699/portstudies.29.2.0164.
- Rodriguez, R.M. (2011). *The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea: An Assessment and Potential Solutions*. Morrisville, North Carolina: lulu.com.
- Rognhaug, M.H. (2014). *Norway in the Antarctic*. Tromso: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Rohl, J.C.G. (2013). *Wilhelm II Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941* (1<sup>st</sup> Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rothwell, D.R., Kaye, S., Akhtarkhavari, A. and Davis, R. (2010). *International Law Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rotter, A.J. (2000). *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964*. Ithaka, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Roucek, J.S. (1973). Yugoslavia`s History of Education Before 1918. *Paedagogica Historica*, 13(1), 66-84. doi:10.1080/0030923730130104.
- Russell, M. (2020). Political Institutions in Indonesia Democracy, Decentralization, Diversity. *Members` Research Service, European Parliament*, Almeria, 1-8.
- Russo, G. (2020). *World War I and the Rise of Fascism in Italy*. Department of Economics, Boston: Boston University.
- Ryseck, L.R. (2014). *The search for national identity in postcolonial, multicommunal states: the cases of Eritrea and Lebanon, 1941-1991*. (Published PhD Thesis). London School of Economics/Department of International History, London.
- Sablin, I. (2020). Parliaments and Parliamentarism in the Works of Soviet Dissidents, 1960s-80s Parliaments. *Estates and Representation*, 40(1), 78-96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02606755.2019.1615672>.
- Salameh, M.T.B. and Ananzah, A.A. (2015). Constitutional Reforms in Jordan: A Critical Analysis. *Digest of Middle East Studies*, 24(2), 139-160.
- Salem, P. (2007). Kuwait: Politics in a Participatory Emirate. *The Carnegie Middle East Center*, 3, 1-19.
- Sarkesian, S.C., Williams, J.A. and Cimbala S.J. (2008). *US National Security: Policymakers, Processes and Politics* (4<sup>th</sup> Edition). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Satuniene, Z. (2007). Russia`s Political Regime and its Future Perspectives. *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 19, 91-130.
- Saura, B. (2015). Remembrance of the Colonial Past in the French Islands of the Pacific: Speeches, Representations, and Commemorations. *University of Hawaii Press*, 27(2), 337-368. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24809936>.
- Schaefer, R.T. (2015). Minorities. In: Wright J.D. (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (839-845). Orlando, FL: University of Central Florida.
- Schindler, D. and Toman, J. (2004). *The Laws of Armed Conflicts* (4<sup>th</sup> Edition). Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher.

- Schmitt, B.E. (1931). The Bosnian Annexation Crisis (II). *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 9(27), 650-661. doi:10.2307/4202566.
- Schwarzenberger, G. (1960). The Law of Belligerent Occupation: Basic Issues. *Nordic Journal of International Law*, 30(1), 10-24.
- Scott, J.B. (1916). The Purchase of the Danish West Indies by the United States of America. *The American Journal of International Law*, 10(4), 853-859. doi:10.2307/2186936.
- Sedelius, T. (2015, 16-19 April). Semi-Presidential Shifts in Ukraine: Institutional Perils and Party Presidentialization. *MPSA Annual Conference*, 1-18.
- Sereni, A.P. (1941). The Legal Status of Albania. *The American Political Science Review*, 35(2), 311–317. doi:10.2307/1948702.
- Shakabpa, T.W.D. and Maher, D. (2009). *One Hundred Thousand Moons: An Advanced Political History of Tibet*. Leiden: Brill's Tibetan Studies Library.
- Sharma, K.M. (1969). Civil Law in India. *Washington University Law Quarterly*, 1969(1), 1-39. [https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law\\_lawreview/vol1969/iss1/4](https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss1/4).
- Shaw, S.J. and Shaw, E.K. (1977) *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sherman, T.C. (2007). The Integration of the Princely State of Hyderabad and the Making of the Postcolonial State in India, 1948-56. *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 44(4), 489-516. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001946460704400404>.
- Shin, G.W. and Hytrek, G. (2002). Social Conflict and Regime Formation, A Comparative Study of South Korea and Costa Rica. *International Sociology*, 17(4), 459-480. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580902017004001>.
- Shirvani, F. (2011). The Concept of Party Government in the Constitutional System of Germany. *Ritsumeikan Law Review*, 28, 313-320.
- Simon, S. and McDonald-Gibson, C. (2014). Russia's Fifth Column. *TIME Magazine*, 184(23), 46-49.
- Singer, D.J., Bremer, S., Stuckey, J. (1972). Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820-1965. In: Russett B.M. (Ed.), *Peace, war and numbers* (19-48). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Singer, J.W. (2011). Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest & Possession to Democracy & Equal Opportunity. *Indiana Law Journal*, 86(3), 763-778. <https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol86/iss3/1>.
- Snyder, C.A. (1989). *The Falkland Islands War in 1982: A Legal Diplomatic and Strategic Evaluation*. (Published Master of Arts Thesis). Brock University/Department of Politics, Ontario.
- Socher, J. (2021). *Russia and the Right to Self-Determination in the Soviet Space*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Spennemann, D.H.R. (2000). *The use of Tobacco, Alcohol and Opium during the German Colonial Period in the Marshall Islands: Review and Evaluation of German Colonial Government Policies*. The Johnstone Centre, Albury: NSW: Charles Sturt University.
- Spennemann, D.H.R. (2007). *Edge of Empire: The German Colonial Period in the Mariana Islands 1899–1914*. Albury, NSW: Retrospect.

- Sprinzak, E. (1993). The Israeli Radical Right: History, Culture and Politics. In: Merkl P.H. and Weinberg L. (Ed.), *Encounters with The Contemporary Radical Right* (140-169). New York: Routledge.
- Steinberg, S.H. (1955). *The Statesman`s Year-Book*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stevenson, D. (1996). *Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stevenson, K. (1990). “Heiva”: Continuity and Change of a Tahitian Celebration. *The Contemporary Pacific*, 2(2), 255-278. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23698359>.
- Stirk, P.M.R. (2004). Carl Schmitt, the Law of Occupation, and the Iraq War. *Constellations*, 11(4), 527-536. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1351-0487.2004.00393.x>.
- Stirk, P.M.R. and Schmitt, C. (2005). *Crown Jurist of the Third Reich: on Preemptive War, Military Occupation, and World Empire*. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Stirk, P.M.R. (2012). *The Politics of Military Occupation*. Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press.
- Stirk, P.M.R. (2015). The Concept of Military Occupation in the Era of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. *Comparative Legal History*, 3(1), 60-84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2049677X.2015.1041726>.
- Stirk, P.M.R. (2016). *A History of Military Occupation from 1792 to 1914*. Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press.
- Suveica, S. (2017). Between Science, Politics and Propaganda: Emmanuel de Martonne and the debates on the status of Bessarabia (1919-1920). *Cahiers du monde russe*, 58(3), 589-614. <https://doi.org/10.4000/monderusse.10129>.
- Svarauskas, A. (2018). Government, society and the political crisis in Lithuania, 1938-1940. In: Fleishman L. and Weiner A. (Ed.), *War, revolution, and governance: the Baltic countries in the twentieth century* (140-153). Boston: Academic Studies Press.
- Tamada, D. (2020). The Timor Sea Conciliation: The Unique Mechanism of Dispute Settlement. *European Journal of International Law*, 31(1), 321–344. doi:10.1093/ejil/chaa025.
- Tase, P. (2012). Italy and Albania: The political and economic alliance and the Italian invasion of 1939. *Academicus International Scientific Journal*, 6, 62-70.
- The Constitution of the United Kingdom. (1991). London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
- The Covenant of the League of Nations (Including Amendments adopted to December 1924), The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/leagcov.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp). (Erişim tarihi: 23.11.2022).
- The World Bank, *Armed forces personnel (% of total labor force)*, [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.TF.ZS?most\\_recent\\_year\\_desc=false](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.TF.ZS?most_recent_year_desc=false), (Erişim tarihi: 13 November 2022).
- The World Bank, *Military expenditure (% of GDP)*, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2020&start=2020>, (Erişim tarihi: 13 November 2022).

- The World Bank, *Urban population (% of total population)*, [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?end=2021&most\\_recent\\_year\\_desc=true&start=2021&view=bar](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?end=2021&most_recent_year_desc=true&start=2021&view=bar), (Erişim tarihi: 13 November 2022).
- Tomuschat, C. 2006. Secession and self-determination. Marcelo G. Kohen (Ed.), *Secession: International Law Perspectives* (23-45). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thürer, D. and Burri, T. (2009). International law and secession. In: Thürer D. (Ed.), *Völkerrecht als Fortschritt und Chance. International Law as Progress and Prospect* (511-538). Zürich/St.Gallen: Dike Verlag.
- Tridimas, G. (2021). Constitutional Monarchy as Power Sharing. *Constitutional Political Economy*, 32, 431-461. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-021-09336-8>.
- Trovaio, S. and Araujo, S. (2020). Ambivalent Relationships: The Portuguese State and the Indian Nationals in Mozambique in the Aftermath of the Goa Crisis, 1961–1971. *Itinerario*, 44(1), 106-139. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0165115320000078>.
- Tuma, O. (2008). 1968: Czechoslovakia. In: Farik N. (Ed.), *1968 revisited 40 years of protest movements* (21-26). Brussels: Heinrich Böll Foundation EU Regional Office.
- United Nations, *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*. 23 May 1969, Entered into force on 27 January 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.
- United Nations Charter. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>. (Erişim tarihi: 23.11.2022).
- U.S. Department of State, Archive, *Stimson's doctrine*, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/16326.htm> (Erişim tarihi: 23.11.2022).
- Van Den Bosch, A. (1976). Indonesia, the Netherlands and the New Guinea Issue. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 7(1), 102-118. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20070166>.
- Van Der Veur, P.W. (1964). New Guinea annexations and the origin of the Irian boundary. *Australian Outlook*, 18(3), 313-339. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357716408444183>.
- Varenes, F. (1997). Ethnic Conflicts and Language in Eastern European and Central Asian States: Can Human Rights Help Prevent Them?. *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights*, 5(2), 135-174. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24674587>.
- Vile, M.J.C. (2007). *Politics in the USA* (6<sup>th</sup> Edition). London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.
- Villari, G. (2007). A Failed Experiment: The Exportation of Fascism to Albania. *Modern Italy*, 12(2), 157–171. doi:10.1080/13532940701362698.
- Vu, T. (2005). Workers and the Socialist State: North Vietnam's State – Labor Relations, 1945-1970. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 1-28.
- Walker, M.M. (2017). *The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew (Modern War Studies)*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.
- Watkin, K. (2008). Maintaining Law and Order during Occupation: Breaking the Normative Chains. *Israel Law Review* 41(1-2)175-200.
- Watkin, K. (2012). Use of Force During Occupation: Law Enforcement and Conduct of Hostilities. *International Review of the Red Cross*, 94(885), 267-315.
- Watson, R.E. (1996). *The Foreign Office and Policy-Making in China 1945-1950. Anglo-American Relations and the Recognition of Communist China*. (Published PhD Thesis). The University of Leeds/Institute for International Studies, Leeds.

- Weizmann, N. (2016). The end of armed conflict, the end of participation in armed conflict, and the end of hostilities: Implications for detention operations under the 2001 AUMF. *Columbia Human Rights Law Review*, 47(3), 204-257. <https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/agispt.20200324027456>.
- Welt, C. and Nelson, R.M. (2020). *Russia: Domestic Politics and Economy*. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service.
- Wilson, E. J. (2008). Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1), 110-124. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207312618>.
- Winkler, J.R. and Nye, J.S. (2005-2006). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. *International Journal*, 61 (1), 268-269, <https://doi.org/40204149>.
- Winter, D.G. and Sweet, B.E. (2009). Measuring Implicit British Perception of German Intentions in 1938-1939. *Political Psychology*, 30(6), 839-861. doi:10.2307/25655427.
- Wiszowaty, M.M. (2017). Return of the Kings, Institutionalization of the Royal Families in the Republics of Romania and Montenegro in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. *Gdanskie Studia Prawnicze*, 38, 245-263.
- Wither, J.K. (2016). Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare. *Connections QJ*, 15(2), 73-87. <http://dx.doi.org/10.11610/Connections.15.2.06>.
- World Population Review, *Steel Production by Country 2022*, <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/primary-energy-cons?tab=table>, (Erişim tarihi: 13 November 2022).
- World Population Review, *Steel Production by Country 2022*, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/steel-production-by-country>, (Erişim tarihi: 13 November 2022).
- Worldometr, *Countries in the world by population (2022)*, <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/>, (Erişim tarihi: 13 November 2022).
- Yale Law Journal Company. (1980). Namibia, South Africa, and the Walvis Bay Dispute. *The Yale Law Journal*, 89(5), 903-922. doi:10.2307/796090.
- Yilmaz, M.E. (2008). “The New World Order”: An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era. *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 7(4), 44-58. DOI:10.21599/ATJIR.59426.
- Zhang, Y. (2001). System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations. *Review of International Studies*, 27, 43-63.
- Zickel, R. and Iwaskiw, W.R. (1994). *Albania a Country Study* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.
- Zilbershats, Y. (2013). Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A Reply to John Dugard and John Reynolds. *European Journal of International Law*, 24(3), 915-928. doi:10.1093/ejil/cht043.

## APPENDIX

### EK. 1. Cases Of Annexation From 1816 To 2022

**Annexation of Guanacaste province (Nicoya and Santa Cruz):** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1821-1824, enter date of claim: July 25, 1824, the date of annexation: March 18, 1826, annexation still exists (Buska, 2006: 46). Side A: Costa Rica, side B: Nicoya and Santa Cruz. Regime type of side A: federal republic, regime type of side B: didn't exist (Karnes, 1959: 249). CINC score of side A: unknown, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar (Posen, 2011: 319). Type of annexation: agreement.

**Annexation of Texas (USA):** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1836-1845 years, enter date of claim: 01 of March 1845, date of annexation: 29 of December 1845, annexation till today exists (Barker, 1946: 49). Side A: USA, side B: Texas. Regime type of side A: constitutional republic (Bulmer, 2017: 3), regime type of side B: presidential constitutional republic (Bridges, 17: 1998). CINC score of side A: 0.061653126, CINC score of side B: unknown (Morton, Pate and Barabba, 1975: 8). Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: was recognized by major powers. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of New Guinea:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1828-1848. Enter the date of claim: 24 August 1828. The date of annexation: 30 July 1848 (Van Der Veur, 1964: 320). Annexation finished in March 1942 when Japan invaded it (Robinson, 1981: 9). Side A: Holland, side B: Guinea. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy, regime type of side B: tribes (Deneckere, 2015: 129). CINC score of side A: 0.038766857, CINC score of side B: unknown (Correlates of War, Erişim: 13.11.2022). Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement. The 1848-year Systematic structure of the world at the moment of annexation: multipolar.

**Annexation of New Caledonia:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1851-1853. Enter the date of claim: September 23, 1853, the date of annexation: September 24, 1853, annexation still exists (Douglas, 2017: 69). Side A: France, side B: New Caledonia. Regime type of side A: units try parliamentary constitutional monarchy, and regime type of side B: tribes (Osadchuk, 2017: 166). CINC score of side A: 0.13097121, CINC score of side B: unknown

(Mitchell, 1998: 32). Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: conquest. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Transvaal (South Africa):** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1870-1877. Enter the date of claim: April 12, 1877. The date of annexation: April 12, 1877, annexation ended in 1910 (Leśniewski, 2017: 36). Side A: Great Britain, side B: Transvaal (South Africa). Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy, regime type of side B: tribes (Norbauer and Studlar, 2011: 226). CINC score of side A: 0.23322026, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Walvis Bay:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1878. Enter the date of claim: March 12, 1878. The date of annexation: March 12, 1878. Annexation ended in 1922 (Yale Law Journal Company, 1980: 917). Side A: Great Britain, side B: Walvis Bay. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy, regime type of side B: no regime (Bulmer, 2014: 3). CINC score of side A: 0.23322026, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: conquest. Before the annexation what preceded: war of agreement.

**Annexation of Tahiti:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1845-1880, enter date of claim: July 29, 1880, the date of annexation: February 1881 (Stevenson, 1990: 259), end of annexation: in September 1984 but has internal autonomy (Gonschor, 2013: 275). Side A: France, side B: Tahiti. Regime type of side A: unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy (Hazareesingh, 1980: 350), regime type of side B: monarchy (Newbury, 2003: 55). CINC score of side A: 0.15799318, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: a multipolar system of the world. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Marshall Islands:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1885. Enter the date of claim: October 15, 1885. The date of annexation: October 15, 1885, end of annexation: October 3, 1914, and became part of Japan (Spennemann, 2000: 54). Side A: Germany, side B: Spain. Regime type of side A: Federal parliamentary semi-constitutional monarchy (Shirvani, 2011: 313-314), regime type of side B: monarchy (López Sanchez, 2014: 16). CINC

score of side A: 0.11463291, CINC score of side B: 0.023436245 (it was CINC of Spain because the Marshall Islands were under the protection of Spain). Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Zululand:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1879-1887, enter date of claim: May 19, 1887, the date of annexation: May 19, 1887 (Laband, 2009: 110), end of annexation: May 31, 1910 became part of Natal Province, which became part of South Africa (Leacock, 1910: 498). Side A: United Kingdom, side B: South Africa. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy (Tridimas, 2021: 436), regime type of side B: monarchy (Laband, 2018: 40). CINC score of side A: 0.19465719, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Taiwan:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1894-1895, enter date of claim: May 29, 1895, the date of annexation: October 21, 1895 (Rhodes, 2020: 39), end of annexation: 1945 (Fan, 2007: 146). Side A: Japan, side B: China. Regime type of side A: monarchy (Colegrove, 1932: 642), regime type of side B: monarchy (Zhang, 2001: 61). CINC score of side A: 0.031202998, CINC score of side B: 0.15219986. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of the Leeward Islands complex of three islands:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1880-1897, enter the date of claim: December 1897, the date of annexation: December 1897 (Pingeot, 2021: 174), end of annexation: 1984 became part of French Polynesia (Poirine and Moyrand, 2001: 193). Side A: France, side B: Tahiti. Regime type of side A: unitary parliamentary republic, regime type of side B: (Knapp and Wright, 2006: 2). CINC score of side A: 0.08699561, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, and Cuba:** Years of crisis before the annexation: from April 25 to December 10, 1898, enter date of claim: December 10, 1898, the date of annexation: December 10, 1898 (Beveridge, 1900: 4), annexation ended: annexation

of Guam still exists, Hawaii till 21<sup>st</sup> August 1959 was annexed after that became a state of USA (Kosaki, 1978: 122), Cuba 20<sup>th</sup> May 1902 (Hudson, 2002: 34), Philippines (Morello, 1954: 4). Side A: USA, side B: Spain. Regime type of side A: federal constitutional republic (Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, 2008: 21), and regime type of side B: monarchy (Martinez Montes, 2018: 129). CINC score of side A: 0.19706185, CINC score of side B: 0.017012449. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: conquest. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Caroline Islands:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1898-1899, enter date of claim: February 12 1899, the date of annexation: 12 February 1899 (Spennemann, 2007: 7), end of annexation October 1914 and became part of Japan (Heine, 1974: 14). Side A: Germany, side B: Spain. Regime type of side A: federal parliamentary semi-constitutional monarchy (Mommsen, 2011: 428), regime type of side B: monarchy (Pozo Andres and Braster, 1999: 77). CINC score of side A: 0.12672231, CINC score of side B: 0.016421596. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of East Samoa:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1900, enter date of claim: February 16, 1900, the date of annexation: April 17, 1900, annexation still exists (Ellison, 1939: 284, 287). Side A: USA, side B: East Samoa. Regime type of side A: federal constitutional republic, regime type of side B: tribes (Arnold, 2004: 3). CINC score of side A: 0.19706185, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Boer Republics:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1899-1902, enter date of claim: May 21, 1902, the date of annexation: May 21, 1902 (Heyningen, 2015: 1011), end of annexation: May 21, 1910 (Steinberg, 1955: 251). Side A: United Kingdom, side B: Boer Republics. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy, regime type of side B: (Higson, 2016: 339). CINC score of side A: 0.16125357, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Bosnia:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1878-1908, enter date of claim: October 6, 1908, the date of annexation: February 1909 (Rohl, 2013: 700, 724), end of annexation: December 1, 1918 (Roucek, 1973: 66). Side A: Austro-Hungary, side B: Bosnia. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy (Jelavich, 1983: 51), regime type of side B: constitutional monarchy (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 274). CINC score of side A: 0.04685317, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Korea:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1904-1910, enter date of claim: August 22, 1910, the date of annexation: August 22, 1910 (Park, 2010: 15), end of annexation: 1945 (de facto) but on June 22, 1965 (de jure) (Park, 2001: 222). Side A: Japan, side B: Korea. Regime type of side A: unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy (Bertolini, 652: 2018), regime type of side B: Constitutional monarchy (Palais, 1979: 77). CINC score of side A: 0.035019185, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized by major powers. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Danish West Indies:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1916-1917, enter date of claim: January 25, 1917 (Governor of the Virgin Islands of the United States, 1925: i), the date of annexation: March 31, 1917, annexation still exists (Finch, 1917: 413). Side A: USA, side B: Denmark. Regime type of side A: federal constitutional republic (Vile, 2007: 3), regime type of side B: constitutional monarchy (Christiansen, Elklit and Nedergaard, 2020: 9). CINC score of side A: 0.24402818, CINC score of side B: 0.0016842517. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Bessarabia:** Years of crisis before the war: 1918, enter date of claim: March 5, 1918, the date of annexation: March 27, 1918 (old style) and on April 9, 1918 (new style) (Suveica, 2017: 594), end of annexation: August 2, 1940 (Cașu, 2020: 87). Side A: Romania, side B: Bessarabia. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy, regime type of side B: no regime (Wisowaty, 2017: 246). CINC score of side A: 0.004367908, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized.

The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: vote.

**Annexation of Kingman Reef:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1922, enter the date of claim: May 10, 1922 (Lauzonuzon, 2016: 106), the date of annexation: December 29, 1934, annexation still exists (Hein, McIntyre and Piper, 2005: 31). Side A: United Kingdom, side B: Kingman Reef. Regime type of side A: constitutional republic, regime type of side B: no regime (Alexander, 2013: 20). CINC score of side A: 0.004367908, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: non-aggressive. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Czechoslovakia:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1938, enter the date of claim: September 30, 1938, the date of annexation: September 30, 1938 (Lange, 2017: 546), end of annexation: in April 1945 year (Gawdiak, 1987: 54). Side A: Germany, side B: Czechoslovakia. Regime type of side A: dictatorship (Conradt, 2009: 11), regime type of side B: unitary parliamentary republic (Brusis, 2015: 6). CINC score of side A: 0.15422215, CINC score of side B: 0.0053306291. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Austria:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1933-1938, enter date of claim: March 12, 1938, the date of annexation: March 13, 1938 (Geistlinger, 2016: 8), annexation ended: July 27, 1955 (Ferring, 1968: 664). Side A: Germany, side B: Austria. Regime type of side A: dictatorship (Connelly, 2006: 921), regime type of side B: autocratic regime (Pearl, 2015: 153). CINC score of side A: 0.15422215, CINC score of side B: 0.005123815. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the war what preceded: vote.

**Annexation of Albania:** Years of crisis before the annexation: March-April 1939, enter date of claim: April 7, 1939 (Tase, 2012: 62), the date of annexation: April 12, 1939 (Sereni, 1941: 311), end of annexation: September 8, 1943 (Villari, 2007: 157). Side A: Italy, side B: Albania. Regime type of side A: dictatorship (fascism) (Russo, 2020: 7), regime type of side B: monarchy (Zickel and Iwaskiw, 1994: 31). CINC score of side A: 0.027029654, CINC score of side B: 0.00029760788. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers:

wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: occupation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Queen Maud Land:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1939, enter date of claim: January 14, 1939, the date of annexation: January 14, 1939 (Rognhaug, 2014: 7), end of annexation: June 23, 1961 (Gan, 2009: 178). Side A: Norway, side B: Queen Maud Land. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy, regime type of side B: no regime (Leon, 2011: 97). CINC score of side A: 0.027029654, CINC score of side B: 0.00029760788. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation nothing preceded.

**Annexation of Hatay:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1939, enter date of claim: July 7, 1939, the date of annexation: July 23, 1939, annexation still exists (Akyol, 2015: 64). Side A: Turkey, side B: Hatay. Regime type of side A: was a unitary presidential constitutional republic (Marszalek-Kawa and Burak 2018: 98), and the regime type of side B: was under French Mandatory (Kodaz, 2016: 18). CINC score of side A: 0.0053594923, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: referendum.

**Annexation of Baltic states Latvia Lithuania and Estonia:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1940, enter date of claim: June 15, 1940, the date of annexation: June 15, 1940 (Mälksoo, 2022: 74), end of annexation: September 6, 1991 (Piotrowski, 2018: 53). Side A: USSR, side B: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Regime type of side A: totalitarianism (Fainsod, 2012: 35), regime type of side B: Latvia - dictatorship (Lacombe, 1997: 310), Lithuania - dictatorship (Svarauskas, 2018: 140), Estonia - authoritarianism regime (Hiio, 2019: 68). CINC score of side A: 0.13734491, CINC score of side B: Estonia - 0.00049081817, Latvia - 0.00089130242, Lithuania - 0.00081485498. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: occupation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Taiwan:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1945 year, enter date of claim: August 29, 1945 the date of annexation: October 24, 1945 (Chiang, 1999: 976), end of annexation 1952 (Chen, 2017: 96). Side A: China, side B: Japan. Regime type of side A: communism (Watson, 1996: 1), regime type of side B: unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy (Inoguchi, 1997: 69). CINC score of side A: 0.09349604, CINC score of side B:

0.052876092. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Kuril Islands:** Years of crisis before the annexation: August-September 1945, enter date of claim: September 5, 1945 (Hasegawa, 2011: 245), the date of annexation: February 2, 1946, annexation still exists (Gavrilov, 2016: 302). Side A: USSR, side B: Japan. Regime type of side A: totalitarianism (Reiman, 2016: 178), regime type of side B: unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy (Horiuchi, 2007: 4). CINC score of side A: 0.11820719, CINC score of side B: 0.052876092. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: multipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Hyderabad:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1947-1948, enter date of claim: September 18, 1948, the date of annexation: September 18, 1948, annexation still exists (Sherman, 2007: 502). Side A: India, side B: Hyderabad. Regime type of side A: constitutional republic (Anderson, 2008: 9), regime type of side B: nizam (Raghavan, 2010: 66). CINC score of side A: 0.052450538, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar (Yılmaz, 2008: 45). Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of West Bank:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1948-1950, enter date of claim: April 24, 1950, the date of annexation: April 24, 1950 (Qafisheh, 2017: 115), end of annexation: June 1967 (Rached, 2017: 91). Side A: Jordan, side B: Israel. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy (Aruri, 1972: 37), regime type of side B: parliamentary republic (Sprinzak, 1993: 145). CINC score of side A: 0.00029139925, CINC score of side B: 0.001331942. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Tibet:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1949-1951, enter date of claim: May 23, 1951, the date of annexation: May 23, 1951, annexation still exists (Shakabpa and Maher, 2009: 955). Side A: China, side B: Tibet. Regime type of side A: communism (Cheng, 1971: 2), regime type of side B: theocracy (Dhusa, 2009: 3). CINC score of side A: 0.10362443, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by

major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Dadra, Nagar Haveli:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1954-1961, enter date of claim: August 11, 1961, the date of annexation: August 11, 1961, annexation still exists (Sharma, 1969: 12). Side A: India, side B: Portugal. Regime type of side A: constitutional republic (Chakrabarty, 2008: 84), regime type of side B: authoritarianism government (Baioa, Fernandes and Meneses, 2003: 5). CINC score of side A: 0.046494652, CINC score of side B: 0.0019737377. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: referendum.

**Annexation of Goa:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1954-1961, enter date of claim: December 19, 1961, the date of annexation: December 19, 1961, end of annexation: still exists (Trovao and Araujo, 2020: 7). Side A: India, side B: Portugal. Regime type of side A: constitutional republic (Harrison, Jones, Lunn, Smith, Taylor and Youngs, 2007: 47), regime type of side B: authoritarianism government (Buchanan and Conway, 2002: 11). CINC score of side A: 0.048727892, CINC score of side B: 0.0018870721. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Eritrea:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1952-1962, enter date of claim: November 14, 1962, the date of annexation: November 14, 1962 (Ryseck, 2014: 99), end of annexation May 24, 1993 (Rodriguez, 2011: 2). Side A: Ethiopia, side B: Eritrea. Regime type of side A: parliamentary constitutional republic (Clapham, 1968: 504), regime type of side B: Eritrean Liberation Front was in exile (Mohammad and Tronvoll, 2015: 2). CINC score of side A: 0.0016515342, CINC score of side B: no info. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of East Jerusalem:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1952-1967, enter date of claim: June 27, 1967, the date of annexation: June 28, 1967, end of annexation: still exists (Ben-Hillel, 2013: 8). Side A: Israel, side B: Jordan. Regime type of side A: parliamentary republic (Brichta, 1998: 180), and regime type of side B: constitutional monarchy (Salameh and Ananzah, 2015: 144). CINC score of side A: 0.0015568113, CINC score of side B: 0.00073561934. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't

recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Czechoslovakia:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1968, enter date of claim: October 16, 1968, the date of annexation: October 16, 1968 (Hafner, 2019: 58), end of annexation: 1991 (Bracey, 2019: 502). Side A: USSR, side B: Czechoslovakia. Regime type of side A: communism (Sablin, 2020: 78-79), regime type of side B: communism (Tuma, 2008: 21). CINC score of side A: 0.17100362, CINC score of side B: 0.0096778441. Contiguity of borders: existed. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: occupation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of West New Guinea:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1962-1969. Enter the date of claim: July 1969. The date of annexation: August 1969, annexation still exists (Van Den Bosch, 1976: 115). Side A: Indonesia, side B: West New Guinea. Regime type of side A: authoritarianism, regime type of side B: no regime (Russell, 2020: 2). CINC score of side A: 0.01254273, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: agreement.

**Annexation of Rockall:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1955-1972, enter date of claim: September 18, 1955, the date of annexation: February 10, 1972, annexation still exists (MacDonald, 2006: 641, 646). Side A: United Kingdom, side B: Rockall. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy, regime type of side B: no regime (The Constitution of the United Kingdom, 1991: 3). CINC score of side A: 0.050592918, CINC score of side B: didn't exist. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: neither war nor agreement.

**Annexation of Sikkim:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1973-1975, enter date of claim: April 9, 1975, the date of annexation: May 16, 1975, annexation still exists (Rai, 2013: 558). Side A: India, side B: Sikkim. Regime type of side A: constitutional republic (Rai, 2013: 2), regime type of side B: absolute monarchy (Malik, 2019: 98). CINC score of side A: 0.054597087, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: referendum.

**Annexation of Western Sahara:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1975-1976, enter date of claim: April 14, 1976, the date of annexation: April 14, 1976, annexation still exists (Kalicka-Mikołajczyk, 2021: 35). Side A: Morocco and Mauritania side B: Western Sahara. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy in Morocco (El Bouchikhi, 2018: 4) and one-party authoritarian in Mauritania (Cédric, 2005: 427), regime type of side B: Democratic socialism in exile (Researcher, 2013: 16). CINC score of side A: 0.0027218659 (Morocco) and 0.00020206088 (Mauritania), CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of South Vietnam:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1974-1975, enter date of claim: April 30, 1975, the date of annexation: April 30, 1975, annexation still exists (Grossheim, 2021: 459). Side A: North Vietnam, side B: South Vietnam. Regime type of side A: communism (Vu, 2005: 2), regime type of side B: constitutional republic (Devereux, 1968: 643). CINC score of side A: 0.0068086619, CINC score of side B: 0.0067449342. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of East Timor:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1975-1976, enter date of claim: May 31, 1976, the date of annexation: July 17, 1976 (Maffei, 1993: 224), end of annexation: May 20, 2002 (Tamada, 2020: 333). Side A: Indonesia, side B: East Timor. Regime type of side A: authoritarianism (Aspinall and Fealy, 2010: 1), regime type of side B: presidential republic (Narayan, 2000: 95). CINC score of side A: 0.011911296, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: invasion. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Golan Heights:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1967-1981, enter date of claim: December 14, 1981, the date of annexation: December 14, 1981, end of annexation: annexation still exists (Zilbershats, 2013: 917). Side A: Israel, side B: Syria. Regime type of side A: parliamentary republic (Gavison, 2006: 389), regime type of side B: dictatorship (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010: 86). CINC score of side A: 0.0032867698, CINC score of side B: 0.0032967213. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't

recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Falkland Islands:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1982, enter date of claim: June 14, 1982, the date of annexation: June 14, 1982, end of annexation: still exists (Clegg and Matheson, 2022: 53). Side A: United Kingdom, side B: Argentina. Regime type of side A: constitutional monarchy (Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2015: 5), regime type of side B: military dictatorship (Beri, 2009: 815). CINC score of side A: 0.023727851, CINC score of side B: 0.0068101771. Contiguity of borders: didn't exist. Recognition by major powers: was recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Kuwait:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1990, enter date of claim: August 2, 1990, the date of annexation: August 2, 1990, end of annexation: April 3, 1991 (Malanczuk, 1991: 114). Side A: Iraq, side B: Kuwait. Regime type of side A: authoritarianism (Hanelt, Luciani and Neugart, 2004: 1), regime type of side B: constitutional monarchy (Salem, 2007: 17). CINC score of side A: 0.0083682146, CINC score of side B: 0.0034608885. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**The secession of Transnistria, officially the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR):** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1990-1992, enter the date of claim: July 21, 1992, the date of annexation: July 21, 1992, secession still exists (Belitser, 2015: 51). Side A: Moldova, side B: Pridnestrovyia. Regime type of side A: parliamentary republic (Black, Chinn, Herman and Watson, 2005: 26), regime type of side B: separatists (Musteata, 2019: 89). CINC score of side A: 0.0009099188, CINC score of side B: unknown. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: unipolar. Type of annexation: secession. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Karabakh:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 1988-1994, enter the date of claim: May 12, 1994, the date of annexation: May 12, 1994 (Jasutis, Mikova, Steyne, 2022: 177), end of annexation: still exists. Side A: Armenia, side B: Azerbaijan. Regime type of side A: parliamentary republic (Markarov, 2016: 306), regime type of side B: constitutional republic (Heinrich, 2011: 2). CINC score of side A: 0.00075404963, CINC score of side B: 0.0011940271. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't

recognized. The systematic structure of the world: unipolar. Type of annexation: hard annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 2008, enter date of claim: August 8, 2008, the date of annexation: August 12, 2008, annexation still exists (Cheterian, 2009: 155). Side A: Russia, side B: Georgia. Regime type of side A: authoritarianism (Satuniene, 2007: 94), and regime type of side B: parliamentary republic (Berglund, 2013: 775). CINC score of side A: 0.04875051, CINC score of side B: 0.00642671204. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: unipolar. Type of annexation: secession. Before the annexation what preceded: war.

**Annexation of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions (Ukraine):** Years of crisis before the annexation: November 2013-February 2014, enter date of claim: February 20, 2014, the date of annexation: March 18, 2014, annexation still exists (Merezhko, 2015: 186). Side A: Russia, side B: Ukraine. Regime type of side A: is authoritarianism (Chaguaceda, 2016: 75), regime type of side is B: president-parliamentary (Choudhry, Sedelius, and Kyrychenko, 2018: 9). CINC score of side A: 0.039191708, CINC score of side B: 0.0071153818. Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: protests.

**Annexation of Belarus:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 2020, enter the date of claim: August 2020, the date of annexation: August 2020, annexation still exists (Hedenskog, 2022: 4). Side A: Russia, side B: Belarus. Regime type of side A: authoritarianism (Welt and Nelson, 2020: 1), regime type of side B: dictatorship (Mills, 2021: 9). CINC score of side A: 0,016183, CINC score of side B: 0,00448 (Worldometr, Erişim: 13.11.2022), (the World Bank, Erişim: 13.11.2022), (World Population Review, Erişim: 13.11.2022), (Our World in Data, Erişim: 13.11.2022), (The World Bank, Erişim: 13.11.2022), (The World Bank, Erişim: 13.11.2022). Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: soft annexation. Before the annexation what preceded: protests of people.

**Annexation of Ukraine:** Years of crisis before the annexation: 2014-2022. Enter the date of claim: February 24, 2022. The date of annexation: began on February 24, 2022, Annexation still exists in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Crimea regions (Minic, 2022: 13). Side A: Russia, side B: Ukraine. Regime type of side A: authoritarianism (Lukin, 2009: 67), regime

type of side B: semi-presidentialism (Sedelius, 2015: 2). CINC score of side A: 0,01588, CINC score of side B: 0,00547 (Worldometr, Eriřim: 13.11.2022), (the World Bank, Eriřim: 13.11.2022), (World Population Review, Eriřim: 13.11.2022), (Our World in Data, Eriřim: 13.11.2022), (The World Bank, Eriřim: 13.11.2022), (The World Bank, Eriřim: 13.11.2022). Contiguity of borders: exists. Recognition by major powers: wasn't recognized. The systematic structure of the world: bipolar. Type of annexation: invasion/conquest. Before the annexation what preceded: war from 2014.



## ÖZGEÇMİŞ

### **Kişisel Bilgiler**

**Adı, Soyadı** : Kyrylo DOVHOPOL

**Yabancı Dili** : İngilizce, Ukraynaca, Rusça

### **Eğitim durumu**

**Lisans:** Kyiv National Linguistic University, Faculty of Oriental Studies, Philology

**Yüksek lisans:** Kırşehir Ahi Evran Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü,  
Uluslararası İlişkiler